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Foreword
Baroness Sayeeda Warsi
It has been 20 years since the publication of the Runnymede Trust’s report Islamophobia: A Challenge 
for Us All and, as this report highlights, in the last two decades the phenomenon has become more 
complex and entrenched. 
In 2011, I said that Islamophobia had passed the dinner-table test. I was speaking about those who 
display their bigotry overtly, but also those who do so more subtly in the most respectable of settings 
– middle-class dinner tables. It is this more covert form of Islamophobia, couched in intellectual 
arguments and espoused by thinktanks, commentators and even politicians, that I have spent the last 
decade trying to reason with.
The rationalizing of bigotry is not new. Discrimination has always been subject to ideological and 
intellectual justification. Whether this is directed against women, black people, Jewish people or 
LGBT communities, history shows that it’s always possible to rationalize racism and couch bigotry in 
‘acceptable’ arguments; this form of hatred is the most dangerous. Muslims are the latest in a long line 
caught in the crossfire of these so-called rational arguments. Islamophobia is Britain’s latest bigotry 
blind spot.
Sadly, six years on from my first keynote speech on Islamophobia, there has been little funding for 
work combating Islamophobia and little political will to tackle the issue. Indeed, decades on from 
Runnymede’s early attempts to define Islamophobia, the UK government still does not have an agreed, 
published definition.
To challenge Islamophobia the starting point must surely be a definition, a mechanism that leads 
to accountability. The Runnymede Trust’s definition is a starting point for discussion. We also need 
to bring together a cross-section of community organizations and individuals, parliamentarians and 
government, to agree a definition.
Hate crime figures for the last 12 months have been the highest since records began, and in one 
month alone anti-Muslim hate crime increased by 500%. The number of Islamophobic incidents 
recorded is at an all-time high, and all while it’s accepted that the problem is under-reported. The 
government’s latest Hate Crime Action Plan accepts that only 25% of actual hate crimes are reported 
to the police. The plan, published in 2015, made some 80 recommendations, of which many have 
been either not followed, such as the work with IPSO (the Independent Press Standards Organisation), 
or not fully implemented. We are simply skimming the surface of the problem. 
Some within British Muslim communities tasked with tackling this issue have also proved disappointing, 
seeming to spend more energy on in-fighting than fighting the challenge of Islamophobia.
Of all the challenges to a cohesive Britain at ease with its Muslims, the hostile press environment is the 
most worrying. The daily poisoning of the discourse around British Muslims has intensified, and shapes 
our collective understanding of the challenges we face. It informs dialogue across the country, from 
Parliament to the local pub. The fact that as a country we have allowed this scourge of Islamophobia to 
grow should worry us all.
This important and timely report is an important resource for those interested in understanding and 
addressing Islamophobia. It offers insight into the experiences of Muslims in Britain today, who, as 
I highlight in my book The Enemy Within, feel they are caught in a no-win place. If they engage with 
politics and British institutions they are viewed as suspicious, as ‘entryists’, but if they keep themselves 
to themselves they are viewed as ‘separatists’, disengaged from mainstream society.
This report should be a wake-up call for politicians, civil society and public services to address 
Islamophobia in all its forms and its recommendations should be engaged with seriously.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the past two decades awareness of 
Islamophobia has increased, whether in terms 
of discrimination against Muslims, or in terms of 
public and policy discussion of it. Runnymede has 
produced this report, Islamophobia: Still a challenge 
for us all, to gather together the evidence on 
Islamophobia in Britain today, and to suggest how 
we should respond to it.
This report is being published on the 20th anniversary 
of our initial report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us 
All, which first brought the term to public and policy 
prominence, in Britain and indeed beyond. This 
edited volume updates and extends the evidence 
over the past 20 years in three main sections.
Part I outlines Runnymede’s understanding of 
Islamophobia, Part II maps out the evidence on 
Islamophobia in various domains, while Part III 
presents different conceptions of Islamophobia. The 
report may be viewed as moving from chapters that 
fully reflect Runnymede’s corporate view in Part I, 
to those that reflect individual authors’ viewpoints 
in Part III. While this volume therefore presents 
Runnymede’s position on Islamophobia, we have 
also included a range of voices to cover the diversity 
of current debates.
Too many of the public debates on Islamophobia 
lack the nuance of the chapters in Part III, or fail to 
refer to the evidence we gather in Part II. Our aim 
in this report is to improve the accuracy and quality 
of public and policy debate and action in response 
to Islamophobia. We do not claim to cover all the 
issues affecting British Muslims, nor are we arguing 
that Islamophobia is the only challenge Muslims 
face. Instead, this report outlines why Islamophobia 
matters to everyone in 21st-century Britain, and how 
we all can and should respond to it.
To that end, we offer a short and long-form definition 
of Islamophobia. As we explain at greater length in 
the Introduction, we fully recognize the complexity 
of issues that ‘Islamophobia’ picks out, and 
acknowledge some limitations of the term. 
The original Islamophobia report states that the term 
refers to three phenomena:
• Unfounded hostility towards Islam;
• Practical consequences of such hostility in unfair
discrimination against Muslim individuals and
communities;
• Exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political
and social affairs.
We mainly agree with this broad definition. In our 
view, the focus should be on the second and 
third phenomena. To clarify the scope of how 
Islamophobia should be understood in a social 
and policy context in Britain, we offer the following 
definition of Islamophobia.
Definition:	Islamophobia	is	anti-Muslim	racism.
This is obviously a short definition. We have also 
developed a longer-form definition, building on the 
United Nations definition of racism generally.
Longer	definition:	Islamophobia	is	any	
distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or 
preference against, Muslims (or those perceived 
to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field	of	public	life.
We have offered these definitions to forestall further 
confusion about the nature of Islamophobia, but also 
to focus policy and social change on what could best 
tackle Islamophobia and so improve British Muslims’ 
lives. The definition therefore is not simply what 
Runnymede thinks is the best analytical account of 
what Islamophobia is, but also points to our various 
recommendations on how to respond to it. 
Reflecting on the evidence in the report, and  
the need to chart a better response to  
Islamophobia, Runnymede offers the following 
10 recommendations. 
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Recommendations 
1.	The	government	should	adopt	our	definition	
of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism. As with 
many Black and minority ethnic groups, Muslims 
experience disadvantage and discrimination in a 
wide range of institutions and environments, from 
schools to the labour market to prisons to violence 
on the street. Policies to tackle Islamophobia should 
be developed in line with policies to tackle racial 
discrimination more generally, with the focus also 
on the real effects on people. Islamophobia is a 
complex issue, but so too are all forms of prejudice 
and discrimination.
2. Public services but also private and charity 
sector employers should collect more data 
on Muslims and other faith/non-faith groups. 
Given evidence of a specific ‘Muslim penalty’ across 
different sectors, and the diversity of the Muslim 
population, using existing census group ethnicity 
categories cannot capture the experience of Muslims 
in the public and private sectors. This should be part 
of wider efforts of public services and employers 
to improve their data collection, including response 
rates, on ethnic monitoring. Historically, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnic group categories were used as 
proxies for Muslim; these groups currently account 
for just over half (55%) of British Muslims.
3. The government should reintroduce a 
target to reduce child poverty, and develop a 
wider anti-poverty strategy. Given that over half of 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani children live in poverty, 
and given that the rates of poverty among Muslims 
generally are much higher than the average, 
tackling poverty would greatly improve British 
Muslims’ opportunities and outcomes. Preventing 
poverty is especially important for children not just 
morally but also because it is a good preventive 
strategy for reducing inequalities in later life and for 
improving integration.
4. Following up on its strong and commendable 
commitment to collecting race equality data, 
the government should adopt a wider strategy 
to tackle those inequalities which particularly 
affect British Muslims. This should be a central 
plank of its integration strategy. The Race Disparity 
Audit has revealed inequalities across a range of 
outcomes, from health, housing and environment 
to education, employment and criminal justice. 
Tackling these inequalities – including but not limited 
to barriers to accessing English language provision 
– should be a priority for every government 
department (and local authority), and should also 
be linked up across government departments in a 
wider strategy to tackle racial inequalities at every 
stage of the life course.
5. Employers and employment support 
organizations should address barriers to equal 
labour market participation. Policies addressing 
racial discrimination within the labour market will 
also improve outcomes for minority faith groups. 
This includes: publishing pay gaps, name-blind 
CVs, ensuring long- and shortlists reflect the local 
working-age population, measuring managers’ 
ability to progress minorities as a key performance 
indicator, and accountability for outcomes not just 
by human resources or senior leadership but at 
every level of management.
6. Race equality, Muslim and other faith-
led civil society groups and organizations 
should work more closely together to build 
a common platform to challenge all forms 
of racism and prejudice. It is not enough for 
people or organizations to challenge only the form 
of discrimination that directly affects them; anti-
discrimination and equality are universal principles 
that must be defended even when doing so doesn’t 
have a direct effect on us personally. It is important 
to understand that different forms of racism have 
different attributes, whether anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim 
or anti-black, and that it is therefore reasonable and 
justifiable to understand and respond to specific 
forms of racism. But challenging racism requires 
challenging it in all its forms, and understanding anti-
racism as a wider human rights and equality position 
entails defending other groups that experience 
discrimination too.
7. Local mayors and Police and Crime 
Commissioners should ensure appropriate 
resources are allocated to tackling hate crime 
effectively at a local level. In addition to criminal 
justice sanctions for the most serious hate crime 
offenders, the government should utilize community-
based, restorative and rehabilitative interventions to 
tackle hate crime.
The Home Office’s 2016 Hate Crime Action Plan 
commits to preventing hate crime by challenging 
the beliefs and attitudes underpinning such crimes 
and to working with young people and schools. This 
must involve addressing the core curriculum 
and ensuring the history of migration is taught 
effectively. See www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 3
Finally, and in line with the concluding 
recommendations of the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the government 
should ensure that public	officials	do	not	partake	
in hate speech, and that they robustly challenge 
hate speech and condemn any hateful ideas or 
policies that promote intolerance and hostility.
8. There should be a full independent and fully 
transparent inquiry into the government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy. The government 
should recognize its statutory equality 
obligations as set out in the public sector 
equality duty (PSED) in the implementation of 
all counter-terrorism policies. Counter-terrorism 
measures must not lead to discrimination on the 
grounds of race, colour, religion, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin, in purpose or effect.
There is substantial evidence that among the 
government’s four counter-terrorism strands, 
the current Prevent policy is discriminatory, 
disproportionate and counterproductive. Given the 
mounting evidence, the independent review 
must answer whether the Prevent strategy 
should be withdrawn and how to better 
separate the state’s security apparatus from 
wider safeguarding or social policy strategies. 
The government should develop funding and support 
Muslim and other disadvantaged communities to 
improve opportunities, encourage civic participation, 
and so provide the grounds for effective integration, 
but these policies should not be conceived in terms 
of counter-terrorism, and should not target British 
Muslims only.
9. Full protection of freedom of speech and the 
freedom of the press is consistent with tackling 
inaccurate and discriminatory reporting. Media 
regulators should intervene more proactively 
in cases of allegedly discriminatory reporting, 
and	in	so	doing	reflect	the	spirit	of	equalities	
legislation, as recommended by the Leveson 
Inquiry. Where inaccurate or misleading content 
is published, corrections or retractions should 
be given equal prominence, and not relegated to a 
small box in an inconspicuous position.
A press regulator should investigate the 
prevalence of Islamophobia, racism and 
hatred espoused in the press. This should 
focus on accuracy and discrimination, but also 
consider whether individual stories have wider 
negative effects on whole ethnic groups, and on 
wider social attitudes. The press and the wider 
media should publish data on the ethnic and class 
diversity of their journalists, editors and senior 
management, and establish targets in line with 
local working-age populations.
The government should establish a group of media 
practitioners, and representatives from the press, 
local authorities and race equality NGOs, to initiate 
new strategies to combat racial prejudice in the 
media and negative public perceptions of minority 
ethnic groups. All politicians should show greater 
accountability for the impact on race relations of 
negative media coverage and misrepresentation of 
minority ethnic and religious groups. 
10. Tackling Islamophobia is a responsibility 
for all of us. There is a need for greater 
awareness of how Islamophobia and all forms 
of racism affect people’s lives in modern 
Britain. It is good that British Muslims increasingly 
challenge Islamophobia. However, to challenge 
and end Islamophobia and all forms of racism 
effectively, we all need to confront and condemn it 
where we see it, and commit to raising awareness 
in others of its wider effects. Tackling Islamophobia 
and all forms of racism is not only the responsibility 
of Muslims or ethnic minorities, but nor is it only 
the government or the state that must show 
greater responsibility in tackling it. Employers, 
neighbours, teachers and fellow citizens must all 
work to raise awareness and to act to combat 
racism wherever and however it appears.
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PART I: UNDERSTANDING
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1 Introduction: What is Islamophobia?
Farah Elahi and Omar Khan
Introduction
In November 1997 the Runnymede Trust published 
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. At the time the 
term ‘Islamophobia’ was relatively uncommon, but 
we argued that it was justified because ‘anti-Muslim 
prejudice [had] grown so considerably and so rapidly 
in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is 
needed’. According to Wikipedia, Islamophobia as a 
term only ‘reached public policy prominence’ with the 
publication of Runnymede’s report.
Twenty years on, it is of great concern to Runnymede 
– but more importantly to British Muslims – that anti-
Muslim prejudice has grown further and wider. Public 
and policy debate now addresses Islamophobia 
more directly, but not always in a productive or 
coherent way.
In the intervening 20 years much has changed. 
Three particular changes are worth highlighting in the 
context of this 20th-anniversary report.
The first change is that the context – domestically 
and, perhaps more importantly, globally – has 
transformed fundamentally. After 9/11 and 7/7, 
Muslims became a greater focus of policymakers in 
the UK and around the world, but framed largely in 
terms of terrorism or as a civilizational threat. This 
framing of Muslims is, of course, centuries old, but 
has re-emerged in new and toxic ways since we 
published our report two decades ago.
Of course, the terrorist threat is indeed real. Attacks 
in 2017 alone included those at Westminster Bridge, 
Manchester Arena, London Bridge, Finsbury Park 
and Parsons Green tube station, a frequency that 
inevitably increases public concern and fear, as 
well as requiring long-term support for the victims 
of these terrible attacks. For the most part the 
government, police, mayors, other officials and 
indeed victims’ families have responded sensitively to 
these incidents.
As this report is about Islamophobia we do not 
discuss these issues in much greater detail. The 
issue of terrorism in Britain and across the world 
of course deserves policy and public focus and is 
a significant challenge for our society. At the same 
time, it’s clear that the fear and threat of terrorism can 
be inflated by Islamophobia, and that Islamophobia 
can increase in the wake of terrorist attacks. One 
of the 2017 terrorist attacks referenced above – 
in Finsbury Park – was in fact an Islamophobic 
attack deliberately targeting British Muslims. Race 
hate crime figures show that Islamophobic crimes 
increase following a terrorist attack (Travis 2017), 
and there is increasing awareness – not just among 
political leaders and the police but among the wider 
public and media – that we must be more considered 
in reporting on terrorist attacks, and not jump to 
the conclusion that all incidents involving injury are 
necessarily acts of Islamist terrorism (or that all public 
decisions involving Muslims are inherently suspect).
The second change is that, compared with 20 years 
ago, British Muslims are a larger, better-organized 
and more settled community. Compared with 1997 
the population has grown considerably, to nearly 3 
million (from approximately 1.2 to 1.4 million), with 
a young median age and a large number born in 
Britain. Furthermore the British Muslim population, 
especially compared with 1997, is much more 
organized, with a wide range of public, private and 
civil society voices, ranging from the arts and media 
to sports and politics. As part of this growing, more 
socially mobile, younger and more activist community, 
they have also challenged Islamophobia directly.
The third key change is that we have much 
more data on British Muslims – their population, 
distribution, attitudes and outcomes, in the labour 
market, education, housing and health. The original 
Runnymede report had to rely much more on other 
forms of data and analysis, though even today 
data on British Muslims is not as comprehensive as 
we need. Most prominent in the 1997 report was 
extensive media analysis, demonstrating the extent 
of Islamophobia in the press. Some of the more 
vulgar cartoons seen then would be unlikely to be 
republished now, but on the other hand Islamophobic 
narratives are now reproduced and shared globally, 
and the reach of social media has amplified those 
voices. Perhaps most worrying is the pernicious and 
acceptable suspicion towards Muslims generally, with 
misleading or outright incorrect stories and headlines, 
sometimes even driven by poorly designed surveys 
or proactive but inaccurate investigative journalism 
(notably the recent case of a Muslim family adopting 
a Christian child; Grierson 2017).
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We do not include a chapter on the media in this 
report, in part because we now have so much further 
evidence on Islamophobia and in part because such 
data has been analysed and published elsewhere 
(Baker et al. 2013, Saeed 2007). However, this should 
not be interpreted as Runnymede being relaxed or 
uncritical about the extent and nature of Islamophobia 
that we still see in the British (and international) 
press. There are not enough Muslims (or members 
of other ethnic minorities, or indeed non-Oxbridge 
graduates) working in the British press and for British 
broadcasters, and stories about British Muslims are 
still likely to cast them as exotic or aberrant, when 
not directly associating them with terrorism. We have 
made a recommendation on how the media should 
better respond to Islamophobia, and seek to change 
its culture more widely. There should be no conflict 
between accuracy, non-discrimination and free 
speech, or in ensuring violations of these important 
press standards are provided with an adequate and 
proportionate response.
The original report was different from this report in 
some other respects too. This report, recognizing 
the range of issues that need to be addressed in 
relation to Islamophobia, is an edited volume. This 
means it contains a variety of chapters with a range of 
voices. The first two sections are a relatively coherent 
whole, with the first outlining what Islamophobia is 
conceptually or definitionally, and the second then 
mapping the evidence of Islamophobia in various 
social domains. The third and final section of this 
report gathers a more divergent but incisive range of 
some of the most important voices and arguments 
about Islamophobia as they’ve developed since 1997.
In contrast, the 1997 report was collectively 
produced by a Commission, as recommended by a 
previous Runnymede Commission on antisemitism. 
Robin Richardson, then Runnymede’s director, 
explains this background in Chapter 16, and also 
highlights how and why the Commission’s focus 
was then somewhat controversial. In particular, 
Runnymede followed many other race equality or 
anti-racist organizations in studiously avoiding too 
much discussion of or focus on religion or faith. 
Religion, faith and belief were seen to raise a different 
set of issues from those relating to race and ethnicity, 
which might even have more in common with gender 
or sexual orientation than with religion.
These challenges have, if anything, become more 
complex since 1997. The New Labour government 
that came into power in 1997 passed legislation that 
extended anti-discrimination protection on grounds 
of religion or belief in the 2006 Equality Act and the 
2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act. These bills 
were not without controversy, and the relationship 
between race and religion, and indeed between 
religion and other ‘equality grounds’ (gender, 
disability, sexual orientation and age), remained 
somewhat unsettled. The creation of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission in 2007 and the inclusion 
of religion and belief in wider ‘equality and diversity’ 
policies has somewhat papered over these issues.
This report – and the individual chapters –
focuses on Islamophobia specifically, as a form of 
discrimination that affects British Muslims and those 
who are perceived to be Muslim. It does not offer a 
comprehensive account of British Muslims or Islam. 
Rather it offers an overview of the way in which 
Islamophobia affects individuals and communities in 
ways that are either structural or interpersonal. The 
purpose of the report is to put forward a definition of 
Islamophobia, create a resource for those working to 
challenge Islamophobia and discrimination in all its 
forms, and improve public policy and discourse on 
the issues affecting Muslims in Britain.
Terminology	and	definition	
Islamophobia in 2017 is complex and multifaceted. 
In this report, we focus on the manifestations of 
Islamophobia that we describe as anti-Muslim 
discrimination or racism. There is not sufficient 
public understanding of the ways in which 
Muslim individuals and communities experience 
discrimination, and this should also be the focus of 
policymakers and anyone else seeking to, or in a 
position to, improve the lives of British Muslims.
It must be acknowledged that the term 
‘Islamophobia’ has itself led to some confusion. 
On the one hand, the term ‘phobia’ suggests a 
mental illness or a fear, rather than effectively picking 
out discriminatory attitudes and behaviours. The 
original report was clear and explicit about the link to 
discrimination, prejudice and exclusion; and the term 
can be interpreted similarly to the way ‘homophobia’ 
is, or rather should be, understood as discrimination 
towards lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) people.
More than the suffix ‘phobia’, the first part ‘Islam’ 
has generated greater and deeper challenges. Many 
have argued that Islam as a religion is a system 
of beliefs, and so can and should be subject to 
criticism. We don’t object to that formulation. At the 
same time, many who affirm their right to criticize 
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Islam as a religion don’t consider enough how 
Muslims do indeed face discrimination and prejudice 
that has real effects in their lives – from the labour 
market to educational outcomes to violence in the 
street. Runnymede believes the focus on ideas (or 
‘ideologies’) has obscured what instead should be a 
focus on people. 
Social phenomena are often defined by terms that 
don’t precisely correspond to those phenomena 
in a literal, dictionary way. Just as criticisms of 
‘antisemitism’ that argue ‘Arabs are Semites too’ 
are pedantic distractions, so too many criticisms of 
Islamophobia suffer from bad-faith literalism. 
In this context it is worth reminding ourselves 
of Runnymede’s 1997 definition. The original 
Islamophobia report states that the term refers to 
three phenomena:
• Unfounded hostility towards Islam;
• Practical consequences of such hostility in unfair 
discrimination against Muslim individuals and 
communities;
• Exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political 
and social affairs.
We mainly agree with this broad definition. In our 
view, the focus should be on the second and 
third phenomena. To clarify the scope of how 
Islamophobia should be understood in a social 
and policy context in Britain, we offer the following 
definition of Islamophobia.
Definition:	Islamophobia	is	anti-Muslim	racism.
This is obviously a short definition. We have also 
developed a longer-form definition, building on the 
United Nations definition of racism generally.
Longer	definition:	Islamophobia	is	any	
distinction, exclusion or restriction towards, or 
preference against, Muslims (or those perceived 
to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field	of	public	life.
We have offered these definitions to forestall further 
confusion about the nature of Islamophobia, but also 
to focus policy and social change on what could best 
tackle Islamophobia and so improve British Muslims’ 
lives. The definition therefore is not simply what 
Runnymede thinks is the best analytical account of 
what Islamophobia is, but also points to our various 
recommendations on how to respond to it. 
We recognize that Islamophobia as a form of racial 
discrimination is not the only challenge facing British 
Muslims. There are clearly widespread bigoted 
and false perceptions about Islam as a faith. These 
feed Islamophobia as a form of discrimination, for 
example justifying discrimination in the labour market. 
Justifying discrimination or inequality by referencing 
the cultural practices of minority groups is a defining 
characteristic of all forms of prejudice and racism.
As indicated above, our longer-form definition 
derives from the UN definition of racism. It is 
perhaps necessary to explain our use of the term 
‘racism’, and why we have chosen it over a possible 
alternative: ‘anti-Muslim hate’. 
Among sociologists it is common to talk about 
different forms of racism, processes of ‘racialization’, 
and even ‘racism without races’. The notion that 
‘race’ is a social construct is more familiar today and 
indeed widely affirmed even outside the university 
and across the political spectrum. Just because 
something is a social construct, that doesn’t mean 
it doesn’t drive or explain individual and group 
outcomes in the real world. In fact, it is sometimes 
argued that the relevance of race to social outcomes 
was first justified by Enlightenment thinkers who 
deliberately created an essentialized notion of race 
to deny the otherwise universal proposition of equal 
moral worth to those human beings who were 
enslaved and colonized by Europeans.
The UN definition above picks out the ways racism 
operates: not simply as an attitude or prejudice, but 
by denying people dignity, rights and liberties across 
a range of political, economic, social and cultural 
institutions. Referring only to ‘anti-Muslim hate’ (or 
even ‘anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination’) 
doesn’t fully capture the widespread (or structural) 
ways racial inequalities persist. It may also get 
things back to front: prejudicial attitudes about a 
group develop to justify the economic or political 
disadvantages experienced by that group.
This helps us understand how all forms of racism 
have contained a ‘cultural’ component. It is 
sometimes argued that current forms of racism are 
more ‘cultural’ than previous forms of racism based 
more on skin colour. It is understandable why far-
right groups might want to assert such a defence, 
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especially where public understandings of racism 
still focus on ‘colour’: they claim only to object to the 
culturally illiberal or otherwise undesirable practices of 
certain groups, but assert that they are not otherwise 
‘racist’. Yet all forms of racism have contained a 
cultural element, symptomatically by attributing 
pathological, dangerous or aberrant behaviours to 
groups ranging from black to Chinese to Jewish 
people. Nonetheless, the focus on culture as a key 
component of current forms of racism is useful for 
understanding why racism and its effects persist 
even as essentialist biological claims about race have 
become unfashionable. 
A definition of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism 
clearly, then, fits with historical and academic 
accounts of racism.
All forms of racism are based on non-scientific 
accounts of ‘races’ that seek to justify the persistent 
and extensive disadvantages and inequalities 
those groups face in society. It is of course true 
that there is a wide range of diversity among and 
within British (to say nothing of international) Muslim 
communities. At the same time, all Muslims are 
vulnerable to Islamophobia as a form of racism, and 
responding to that continued challenge is the main 
focus of this report.
Recommendations 
1.	The	government	should	adopt	our	definition	
of Islamophobia as anti-Muslim racism. As with 
many Black and minority ethnic groups, Muslims 
experience disadvantage and discrimination in a 
wide range of institutions and environments, from 
schools to the labour market to prisons to violence 
on the street. Policies to tackle Islamophobia should 
be developed in line with policies to tackle racial 
discrimination more generally, with the focus also 
on the real effects on people. Islamophobia is a 
complex issue, but so too are all forms of prejudice 
and discrimination.
2. Public services but also private and charity 
sector employers should collect more data 
on Muslims and other faith/non-faith groups. 
Given evidence of a specific ‘Muslim penalty’ across 
different sectors, and the diversity of the Muslim 
population, using existing census group ethnicity 
categories cannot capture the experience of Muslims 
in the public and private sectors. This should be part 
of wider efforts of public services and employers 
to improve their data collection, including response 
rates, on ethnic monitoring. Historically, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnic group categories were used as 
proxies for Muslim; these groups currently account 
for just over half (55%) of British Muslims.
3. The government should reintroduce a 
target to reduce child poverty, and develop a 
wider anti-poverty strategy. Given that over half of 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani children live in poverty 
(DWP 2017), and given that the rates of poverty 
among Muslims generally are much higher than the 
average, tackling poverty would greatly improve 
British Muslims’ opportunities and outcomes. 
Preventing poverty is especially important for children 
not just morally but because it is a good preventive 
strategy for reducing inequalities in later life and for 
improving integration.
4. Following up on its strong and commendable 
commitment to collecting race equality data, 
the government should adopt a wider strategy 
to tackle those inequalities which particularly 
affect British Muslims. This should be a central 
plank of its integration strategy. The Race 
Disparity Audit has revealed inequalities across 
a range of outcomes, from health, housing and 
environment to education, employment and criminal 
justice. Tackling these inequalities – including but 
not limited to barriers to accessing English language 
provision – should be a priority for every government 
department (and local authority), and should also be 
linked up across government departments in a wider 
strategy to tackle racial inequalities at every stage of 
the life course.
5. Employers and employment support 
organizations should address barriers to equal 
labour market participation. Policies addressing 
racial discrimination within the labour market will 
also improve outcomes for British Muslims. This 
includes: publishing pay gaps, name-blind CVs, 
ensuring long- and shortlists reflect the local 
working-age population, measuring managers’ 
ability to progress minorities as a key performance 
indicator, and accountability for outcomes not just 
by human resources or senior leadership but at 
every level of management.
6. Race equality, Muslim and other faith-
led civil society groups and organizations 
should work more closely together to build 
a common platform to challenge all forms 
of racism and prejudice. It is not enough for 
people or organizations to challenge only the form 
of discrimination that directly affects them; anti-
discrimination and equality are universal principles 
that must be defended even when doing so doesn’t 
have a direct effect on us personally. It is important 
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 9
to understand that different forms of racism have 
different attributes, whether anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim 
or anti-black, and that it is therefore reasonable and 
justifiable to understand and respond to specific 
forms of racism. But challenging racism requires 
challenging it in all its forms, and understanding anti-
racism as a wider human rights and equality position 
entails defending other groups that experience 
discrimination too.
7. Local mayors and Police and Crime 
Commissioners should ensure appropriate 
resources are allocated to tackling hate crime 
effectively at a local level. In addition to criminal 
justice sanctions for the most serious hate crime 
offenders, the government should utilize community-
based, restorative and rehabilitative interventions (see 
Walters et al. 2016) to tackle hate crime.
The Hate Crime Action Plan (Home Office 2016) 
commits to preventing hate crime by challenging 
the beliefs and attitudes underpinning such crimes 
and to working with young people and schools. This 
must involve addressing the core curriculum 
and ensuring the history of migration is taught 
effectively. See www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk. 
Finally, and in line with the concluding 
recommendations of the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the government 
should ensure that public	officials	do	not	partake	
in hate speech, and that they robustly challenge 
hate speech and condemn any hateful ideas 
or policies that promote intolerance and hostility 
(United Nations 2016).
8. There should be a full independent inquiry 
into the government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, which must be conducted with 
transparency. The government should recognize 
its statutory equality obligations as set out in 
the public sector equality duty (PSED) in the 
implementation of all counter-terrorism policies. 
Counter-terrorism measures must not lead to 
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin, in purpose or effect.
There is substantial evidence that among the 
government’s four counter-terrorism strands, 
the current Prevent policy is discriminatory, 
disproportionate and counterproductive. Given the 
mounting evidence, the independent review 
must answer whether the Prevent strategy 
should be withdrawn and how to better 
separate the state’s security apparatus from 
wider safeguarding or social policy strategies. 
The government should develop funding and support 
Muslim and other disadvantaged communities to 
improve opportunities, encourage civic participation, 
and so provide the grounds for effective integration, 
but these policies should not be conceived in terms 
of counter-terrorism, and should not target British 
Muslims only.
9. Full protection of freedom of speech and the 
freedom of the press is consistent with tackling 
inaccurate and discriminatory reporting. Media 
regulators should intervene more proactively 
in cases of allegedly discriminatory reporting, 
and	in	so	doing	reflect	the	spirit	of	equalities	
legislation, as recommended by the Leveson 
Inquiry. Where inaccurate or misleading content 
is published, corrections or retractions should 
be given equal prominence, and not relegated to a 
small box in an inconspicuous position.
A press regulator should investigate the 
prevalence of Islamophobia, racism and 
hatred espoused in the press. This should 
focus on accuracy and discrimination, but also 
consider whether individual stories have wider, 
negative effects on whole ethnic groups, and on 
wider social attitudes. The press and the wider 
media should publish data on the ethnic and class 
diversity of their journalists, editors and senior 
management, and establish targets in line with 
local working-age populations.
The government should establish a group of media 
practitioners, and representatives from the press, 
local authorities, and race equality NGOs, to initiate 
new strategies to combat racial prejudice in the 
media and negative public perceptions of minority 
ethnic groups. All politicians should show greater 
accountability for the impact on race relations of 
negative media coverage and misrepresentation of 
minority ethnic and religious groups. 
10. Tackling Islamophobia is a responsibility 
for all of us. There is a need for greater 
awareness of how Islamophobia and all forms 
of racism affect people’s lives in modern 
Britain. It is good that British Muslims increasingly 
challenge Islamophobia. However, to challenge 
and end Islamophobia and all forms of racism 
effectively, we all need to confront and condemn it 
where we see it, and commit to raising awareness 
in others of its wider effects. Tackling Islamophobia 
and all forms of racism is not only the responsibility 
of Muslims or ethnic minorities, but nor is it only 
the government or the state that must show 
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greater responsibility in tackling it. Employers, 
neighbours, teachers and fellow citizens must all 
work to raise awareness and to act to combat 
racism wherever and however it appears.
Before summarizing the evidence and argument of 
this report it’s worth saying something further about 
the original report’s first plank of Islamophobia, 
namely ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’. There 
is little doubt that this still exists – if anything such 
hostility now has a wider platform and has been 
developed and promoted in new, disturbing ways 
(see Chapter 10, and Chapter 13). 
In the intervening years, therefore, two contradictory 
concerns have emerged: it is both more necessary 
than before to explain and outline why Islam as such 
is not a threat to, or in inherent conflict with, ‘the 
west’; and, at the same time, to allow and defend 
criticism of Islam (and all religions and beliefs) as a 
clear consequence of free speech. One reason we 
have chosen to focus our definition is that so much of 
the debate about free speech and criticism of Islam 
is irrelevant, or at best orthogonal, to the question of 
whether Muslims in Britain (and elsewhere) face 
discrimination – and what we in Britain should do 
about that discrimination. 
The original report was of course concerned 
about this issue too. This is shown in the 1997 
Commission’s distinction between open and closed 
views of Islam, to differentiate between legitimate 
criticism or disagreement and unfounded prejudice 
or hostility. Even 20 years ago Runnymede 
recognized the limitations of the term ‘Islamophobia’, 
and the initial report’s focus was similar to that of the 
current volume: to name anti-Muslim prejudice so 
that it can be identified and acted against.
 An increasingly common argument is that Islam is a 
set of ideas and so there is no more a concept 
of Islamophobia than there is a concept of 
‘Communismphobia’ or ‘Christophobia’. Proponents 
of this view typically argue they are being rebuked for 
criticism of ideas, and many further argue that the 
term ‘Islamophobia’ itself is dishonestly used 
to shut down debate. The consequence of this 
line of reasoning, as Claire Alexander outlines in 
Chapter 2, is that it has become possible to hate and 
fear Islam without any reference to actual Muslims. 
The chapter traces the demonization 
of Muslim communities in Britain, linking the 
contemporary debate with the historical positioning 
of Muslims within the British imagination. Alexander 
sets out the consequences of the ‘separation of 
Islamophobia as ideology from Muslims themselves 
and, in a parallel move, the separation of anti-
Muslimism from the longer and broader historical and 
social context of racial discrimination and racism’. 
Report summary
Alexander’s chapter concludes Part I of our report 
where we outline what Islamophobia is conceptually 
and definitionally. Part II presents a summary of the 
evidence of Islamophobia in various domains, provides 
an account of how things have changed since 1997, 
shows the impact of Islamophobia on the individual 
and communities, and addresses a range of key policy 
issues. Throughout Part II we have included individual 
stories and perspectives on Islamophobia. We greatly 
appreciate the contributions of all who were willing to 
share their personal experiences with us. The case 
studies often make for difficult reading and highlight 
the impact of Islamophobia on Muslims or those 
perceived to be Muslim.
Twenty years of progress?
There has been a Muslim presence in the UK for 
hundreds of years; however, it was only after the 
2001 census that hard data was available on the 
demography of Muslim communities. In 1991 the 
national census did not include any questions on 
religion, and its addition in the 2001 census emerged 
out of campaigning by Muslim organizations. In 
Chapter 3, Serena Hussain covers the emergence of 
Muslims as a faith community, where previously they 
were viewed primarily in terms of their ethnicity. The 
chapter provides an overview of what we know 
about Muslims in Britain. Some of the key patterns 
covered include population size and demography, 
ethnicity, geographical spread, education, 
employment, health and housing.
When the 1997 Runnymede Islamophobia report 
was published there was a small emerging Muslim 
civil society, with limited expertise to respond 
adequately to the challenges identified. In the last 20 
years Muslim organizations have been catalysed to 
change and now are significant actors within the civil 
society landscape. Chapter 9, by Chris Allen, 
considers the journey these groups have undertaken 
over two decades, how key socio-political factors 
have shaped and/or hindered it, and the impact of 
counter-terrorism policies. Allen identifies two key 
crucial socio-political factors that have shaped how 
Muslim communities are perceived and, in turn, 
determined how they are able to engage in public 
and political spaces.
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The first is counter-terrorism policy, framing the 
Government’s thinking about Islam and Muslims, 
and the second is the requirement for groups 
to unequivocally accept and support certain 
government assumptions. As a result Muslim 
groups ‘were faced with having to be complicit and 
agreeable or be excluded from the discussion’. 
The chapter goes on to discuss the impact of top-
down approaches to structuring Muslim political 
representation. These factors have significantly 
impaired the capacity of Muslim groups and 
organizations to address Islamophobia, something 
that might not have been envisaged in 1997.
Another feature of the last 20 years has been the 
proliferation of political mobilizations against Islam 
by far-right groups and ‘counter-jihad’ movements. 
This has extended across many European and 
North American countries and included campaigns 
against mosques and halal meat and for ‘burqa 
bans’. Ed Pertwee, in Chapter 10, traces 
the extensive international networks that share 
organizational models, strategies and resources. 
Pertwee argues that this sphere of activity goes 
beyond casual prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims 
and is grounded in a developed political ideology, 
supported by complex organizational structures. The 
chapter provides an overview of this transnational 
movement, the political ideology underpinning it and 
its internationalization. A key aspect of the ideology 
is that it is premised on a vision of western crisis 
and conspiratorial narratives of left-wing collusion 
with Muslims to bring about the ‘Islamization’ of 
the west. It relies on the idea of Islam as a hostile 
‘alien’ culture. The impact of these counter-jihad 
movements has been violence directed towards 
Muslims, while their ideas are now influencing and 
entering the mainstream, as is most visible in the US 
with the election of Donald Trump.
Impact on the individual and community 
As outlined at the start of this chapter, despite 
widespread use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ there is 
very poor understanding of its impact on individuals 
and communities. Much of the public debate 
separates the phenomenon from Muslims themselves 
and fails to account for its practical consequences. 
This report includes a range of chapters mapping 
the impact of Islamophobia on Muslims, or those 
perceived to be Muslim, in some key domains.
British Muslims have some of the lowest employment 
rates and earnings for any group in Britain, 
and concurrently suffer significant economic 
disadvantage. Removing the barriers to economic 
integration must be a cornerstone of addressing 
inequality. Chapter 4, by Anthony Heath 
and Asma Mustafa, investigates the relationship 
between Islamophobia and poor labour market 
outcomes for Muslims. The evidence covered in this 
chapter disentangles religious penalties from ethnic 
penalties, including evidence from the Social Mobility 
Commission and numerous field experiments. In 
addition to particular barriers at application and 
progression stages, Heath and Mustafa also cover 
the impact of perceptions of discrimination on 
potential applicants and the ‘chill factor’. We do 
not suggest that Islamophobia is the only driver of 
poor labour market outcomes for Muslim people, 
but it is clear that without addressing Islamophobia 
outcomes will not improve. 
The relationship between Islamophobia and mental 
health is seldom addressed, despite the fact that 
much research has identified racism to be a focal 
element of ethnic inequalities in health. In  Chapter 5, 
James Nazroo and Laia Bécares chart the health 
inequalities experienced by Muslim people, and the 
relationship between Islamophobia as a form of 
racism and health. They show the harm that 
Islamophobia does to ethnic minority people’s health, 
both directly and through consequent social and 
economic disadvantage. A core aspect of their 
argument focuses on the need to address the stress 
associated with having a negatively racialized identity, 
and the importance of tackling structural inequalities. 
Hate crime is one of the most obvious dimensions 
of Islamophobia, and over the last few years the 
numbers of recorded incidents has seen a sharp rise. 
Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, in Chapter 6, identify 
patterns in Islamophobic hate crime as well as the 
impact on both the individual and community. On an 
individual level, Awan and Zempi highlight 
the increased vulnerability that is experienced as a 
result of being targeted for being (or appearing to be) 
Muslim, and the consequent implications for levels of 
confidence and self-esteem. They draw attention to 
mechanisms that victims use to decrease vulnerability, 
such as changing the way they live their lives or how 
they express their Muslim identity. The significant 
gendered element of Islamophobic hate crime often 
means that women’s options and life choices are 
particularly constrained. They also highlight how the 
harm associated with hate crime is not restricted to 
direct victims, but rather extends to all group members 
by impacting on notions of belonging and cohesion.
A core aspect of the state’s interaction with Muslim 
communities in Britain takes place through the 
security apparatus and counter-extremism policies. 
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One of the most criticized elements of this policy 
has been the government’s Prevent strategy – in 
particular since the establishment of the Prevent 
duty, which requires schools, universities, hospitals, 
local councils and prisons to prevent people being 
drawn in to terrorism. In Chapter 7, Barbara Cohen 
and Waqas Tufail address the discriminatory nature 
and impact of the Prevent policy. This includes its 
breach of the public sector equality duty, the impact 
on free speech and the poor quality of training 
currently on offer. The chapter highlights the 
relationship between the Prevent duty and the 
normalization of viewing Muslims with suspicion, 
reflected in the substantial over-representation of 
Muslims among Channel referrals. The chapter 
authors argue that it is in the interests of all citizens 
to be safe from terrorism, but that ‘it is contrary to 
both equality and human rights law that Muslims, far 
more than any other group, are expected to pay for 
such safety at the cost of being subject to suspicion, 
demonization, racial stereotyping and unwarranted 
interference with their private lives’.
Not long after the publication of the 1997 report, 
Muslims and their perceived lack of integration 
emerged as a key area of public policy concern. Over 
the last 20 years numerous inquiries and reports 
have characterized Muslims as leading ‘parallel lives’ 
and as distinctive in their behaviour and values. 
Chapter 8, by Ajmal Hussain and Nasar Meer, covers 
20 years of integration policies and the positioning of 
Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ within them. In particular 
they note how the integration debate is played out 
with reference to Muslim ‘no-go areas’ and images of 
niqab-wearing women. Schools have become the 
frontline of managing this, through transmitting so-
called ‘fundamental British values’ and the policing of 
transgressors. The ‘Trojan horse’ hoax symbolized 
the inflection of Islamophobia in the policing of Muslim 
mobilization. Most recently the Casey review 
highlighted the ‘mood in government that sees 
Muslims as “outsiders” who need to be brought 
“inside”’.
The last chapter in Part II addresses the gendered 
discourse in media and policy debates about Islam. 
Chapter 11, by Naaz Rashid, analyses how 
debates about the veil, gender violence and the 
‘war on terror’ contribute to stereotypes of Muslim 
women: as oppressed, passive victims, symbolic of 
Muslim communities’ alleged failure to integrate, 
and increasingly as potential extremists. These 
stereotypes deny Muslim women (and men) agency 
or the ability to make the moral 
and social choices other groups are assumed to 
enjoy. While she emphasizes the importance of 
addressing gender-based issues affecting Muslim 
women, Rashid highlights the need to centre the 
voices of Muslim women and to tackle sexism and 
patriarchal practices and structures wherever they 
exist. Tackling gender inequality without tackling 
Islamophobia is not sufficient for addressing 
the inequalities facing Muslim women. Rashid 
concludes by reaffirming the need to challenge all 
forms of gender and racial inequality.
Different conceptions of Islamophobia
At the beginning of this chapter we set out a 
definition of Islamophobia as a form of racism. That 
definition should be taken as Runnymede’s position, 
and one that informs all of our recommendations.
Part III of this report is a collection of essays that 
raise important questions about and challenges 
to our definition. We recognize that definitions or 
accounts of Islamophobia address a variety of 
complex issues, and that people genuinely and 
reasonably disagree about how Islamophobia should 
be conceived. Part III recognizes this diversity of 
views, and aims to foster a healthy and better-
informed debate about Islamophobia.
Runnymede is fortunate to be able to publish 
contributions from some of the most influential and 
insightful thinkers on Islamophobia: Tariq Modood, 
Shenaz Bunglawala, Kenan Malik, David Feldman 
and Robin Richardson. Some of the various 
questions that they address are: the role of group 
identity within an anti-essentialist struggle against 
Islamophobia; the focus on negative views about 
Islam as central to the experience of Islamophobia; 
the consequences of criminalizing dissenting 
speech; the commonalities and differences between 
antisemitism and Islamophobia; and the history of 
the original 1997 Runnymede Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia.
The authors may disagree on how precisely we 
should define and understand Islamophobia, but they 
all agree we need a better and more focused policy 
and public response to it.
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2 Raceing Islamophobia
Claire Alexander
Introduction: Islamophobia 
without Muslims?
The landmark 1997 Runnymede report Islamophobia: 
A Challenge for Us All defines Islamophobia as 
‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’. It continues, ‘It 
also refers to the practical consequences of such 
hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim 
individuals and communities, and to the exclusion 
of Muslims from mainstream political and social 
affairs’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4). Islamophobia, 
the report notes, is a relatively new word (tracing 
the emergence of the term to late 1980s America, 
though others have traced it to the early 20th 
century: see Meer 2015b), but one that refers 
both to a longer history of hatred and suspicion of 
Muslims, and to a more recent intensification of this 
phenomenon from the 1980s onwards. Capturing 
‘a new reality’ – the growth of explicitly anti-Muslim 
sentiment in Britain and elsewhere in the decade 
prior to its publication – the report seeks to hold 
two aspects in tension: antipathy towards Islam 
as a religious ideology and set of practices, and 
discrimination against Muslims. The latter, the report 
insists, is inseparable from the former, with ‘dread 
and hatred of Islam’ leading ‘therefore to fear or 
dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust 
1997: 2, my emphasis). Of the eight definitional 
distinctions between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views 
that define Islamophobia, there is an equal balance 
between ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’, and Islamophobia 
and anti-Muslim prejudice are used interchangeably 
throughout, linking ideology and people, thought and 
deed, in important ways (Runnymede Trust 1997: 4).
The 20 years since the publication of the 
Runnymede report have seen an intensification 
and banalization of Islamophobic sentiment, policy 
and practice in Britain, alongside the increased 
targeting, both violent and mundane, of British 
Muslims. However, we might argue that one of the 
most dangerous sophistications in Islamophobic 
discourse has been the separation of Islamophobia 
as ideology from Muslims themselves and, in a 
parallel move, the separation of anti-Muslimism 
from the longer and broader historical and social 
context of racial discrimination and racism. 
The consequences of this are (i) to decouple 
Islamophobia from racism, so that (as with 
migration, the other, and parallel, incarnation of early 
21st-century racism), it is apparently possible to 
hate and fear Islam without any reference to actual 
Muslims; (ii) to deny that anti-Muslimism is racism, 
because, in an update of the ‘new racist’ paradigm, 
it focuses on religious or cultural practices rather 
than inherent ethnic or racial characteristics; (iii) 
to separate out Muslims from other racialized 
minority groups, while parasitically building on long-
established racist discourses and images around 
black and South Asian migration and settlement; 
(iv) to erase the differences within and between 
‘Muslim’ groups, including histories, patterns of 
settlement, practices and politics; and (v) to deny 
the histories and practices of solidarity, resistance 
and resilience across black and Asian, Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities in Britain. An unintended 
consequence of the focus on Islamophobia, then, 
has been to undermine the struggle against racism 
against Muslims.
Islamophobia without racism?
The focus on Muslims in Britain is most usually 
traced to the Satanic Verses affair in 1989, which 
fractured the fragile liberal anti-racist consensus, 
and placed Britain’s largely South Asian Muslim 
communities under the spotlight. The nearly 30 years 
since the publication of Rushdie’s novel have seen a 
series of moral panics around British Muslims, first in 
the protests around the Gulf War in 1991; later, and 
most dramatically, in the aftermath of the attacks on 
the World Trade Center in 2001, the launch of the 
‘war on terror’ and the ‘homegrown’ terror attacks in 
London in 2005; and more recently in the response 
to so-called ‘jihadis’ heading to Syria to fight (or 
marry) for Isis.
These more ‘spectacular’ moments need, however, 
to be placed against a longer and broader backdrop 
of Muslim demonization in Britain and, I would 
argue, cannot be understood without this historical 
and discursive racist hinterland. As Nasar Meer 
(2013) has powerfully argued, the Muslim presence 
in Britain has long been seen as unwelcome and 
problematic – a perception predating, in fact, 
modern ideas of biological racism and running in 
parallel with long historical antisemitic antecedents, 
which have pathologized and persecuted religious 
difference marked through descent, ‘race’ and 
‘culture’. As the Runnymede report notes (1997: 
5), whether we see this discourse as continuous, 
or as conveniently resurrected, this history provides 
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a powerful repertoire of anti-Muslim sentiment that 
feeds seamlessly into contemporary Islamophobic 
discourse, rehearsing ideas of medieval cultures, 
barbarism and timeless antagonism to ‘the west’. 
At the same time, anti-Muslim or Islamophobic 
discourses draw on ‘modern’ racist and Orientalist 
(Said 1978) discourses emerging from colonialism, 
decolonization and mass post-war migration, in 
which Muslims form one strand in a broader tapestry 
of racist stereotypes, images and discourses. It is 
important to remember, for example, that ‘Muslims’ 
in post-war Britain were configured as ‘coloured’, 
then ‘black’, then ‘Asian’, then ‘Pakistani’ and 
‘Bangladeshi’ before they appeared as ‘Muslims’ 
(Alexander 1998, 2002) – and while the labels may 
have changed, the racist content of the category 
largely did not.
It is this racist ‘commonsense’ (Lawrence 1982) 
which places the ‘spectacular’ moments within 
a broader framework of marginalization and 
pathologization of ‘the Muslim community’ – what 
Michael Gove so memorably termed ‘the swamp’ 
within which extremist ‘crocodiles’ swim (Watt 
2014). This has positioned ‘the Muslim community’ 
as homogeneous, outside of and opposed to 
Britishness, and understood through stereotypes of 
poverty and the underclass, criminality, misogyny, 
cultural and generational conflict, identity crisis, and 
the clash of civilizations. These older racial and ethnic 
stereotypes have been dusted down and recycled to 
explain everything from the 2001 ‘riots’ (Alexander 
2004) to grooming, ‘gangs’, forced marriage, FGM 
(female genital mutilation), mythical Trojan horses 
(Miah 2017) and electoral misconduct. It is worth 
noting, for example, that explanations for the ‘Asian 
gang’ folk devil of the 1990s (Alexander 2000) drew 
on the same images of cultural dysfunction and 
identity crisis that demonized black youth in the 
1980s (Alexander 1996), urban ‘gangs’ in the 2000s 
(Alexander 2008), and Muslim ‘grooming gangs’ and 
‘fundamentalism’ in the 2010s.
(De )culturing Islamophobia
The de-raceing of Islamophobia can be traced to 
four interlinked conceptual sleights of hand: first, 
the reduction of our understanding of what racism 
is to explicit and violent interpersonal expressions 
of hatred focused on narrow biological markers, 
stripping out its social, structural and historical 
context (Song 2014); second, the denial of ‘Muslim’ 
as a racial or ethnic category (unlike, for example, 
Sikhs or Jews) and a corollary denial of Muslims 
being victims of racism as Muslims; third, the 
placing of Islam as a category of choice, rather 
than ascription, and as therefore separate from the 
embodied being of its adherents (‘culture’ rather 
than ‘race’); and fourth, and relatedly, the over-
emphasis on ‘Islamic culture’ or ‘Muslim culture’ as 
a foundational explanation for the slew of assumed 
pathologies discussed above.
Positioning Muslims/Islam as a chosen/assumed 
identity seemingly ascribes an element of volition, 
of choice, which seemingly removes them from the 
status of victim. Similarly, the recourse to ‘Muslim 
culture’ places the focus on beliefs and practices 
as distinct from Muslims themselves; it is here that 
what Sayeeda Warsi terms the acceptability of 
liberal ‘dinner-table’ Islamophobia (BBC News 2011) 
finds its alibi. At the same time, and paradoxically, 
‘culture’ assumes a collective foundation, which 
works to homogenize all Muslims, erasing differences 
in ethnicity, nationality, migrant history, legal status, 
socioeconomic positioning, religious practice or 
belief, location, gender, sexuality and so on. ‘Culture’ 
is lifted outside of its historical and social context, 
and assumed to be unchanging, anachronistic and, 
most usually, antagonistic to the ‘modern’ west. 
This is particularly apparent in the gendering of 
Muslim identities – e.g. in the recent discussions 
around ‘gangs’ and ‘grooming’, or on the hijab, 
marriage and English language competency. It can 
be seen too in the positioning of all Muslims as a 
‘suspect community’ through a series of policies 
around securitization and ‘tackling extremism’. In 
Britain, there has been an institution(alization) of 
surveillance of Muslim groups on the streets (as in 
the Birmingham ‘spycam’ affair; Hussain 2014), 
by police, in prisons, in the immigration system, in 
their own homes and on the internet (on suspicion 
of ‘Googling while Muslim’ as my colleague Wendy 
Bottero evocatively described it), and, particularly 
worryingly, across the education system from primary 
schools to universities. This has particularly affected 
young people, who bear the brunt of this hostility, 
creating a climate of fear and suspicion.
This has shifted attention away from broader social 
and economic structures and can be seen as 
‘blaming the victim’ or as exceptionalizing Muslims 
as a group, and as a ‘problem’. This vicious 
cultural(izing) circle thus works to place the blame for 
inequality or discrimination either on the individual’s 
way of life (or dress, or facial hair) or on the ‘way of 
life’ of the imagined group. At the same time, it offers 
an illusion of change and of choice – the cultural 
promise is that if only Muslims were more like ‘us’, 
then other problems of inequality, discrimination and 
exclusion would suddenly disappear. Islamophobia 
is largely understood to be a question of (their) 
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‘culture’. However – and here’s the cultural catch 
– because questions of culture are primarily 
understood through the essentializing lens of ‘race’, 
‘ethnicity’ or ‘religion’, they are seen to be internal, 
immutable and, therefore, not a problem that can 
be solved – privileging what the Runnymede report 
terms ‘closed’ over ‘open’ views of Islam (1997: 5). 
‘Muslim’ thus becomes a naturalized category linked 
to an assumed ‘mode of being’: as Paul Gilroy has 
previously argued about ethnicity, ‘the cultural flavour 
of today’s racism may mean that no mention is made 
of old-style biological races at all. There are of course 
colour-coded ways of talking about race without 
using the actual word’ (1993: 56). To paraphrase de 
Beauvoir (1953), today, it seems, ‘culture is destiny’.
Conclusion: re-raceing 
Islamophobia
Or, perhaps more accurately, Islamophobia suggests 
that ‘religion is destiny’ – apparently trumping and 
transcending ‘narrow’ appeals to ‘race’, ethnicity 
or nationality, while at the same time reducing the 
richness, textures and diversities of Muslim lives 
(Alexander et al. 2013) to conveniently packaged 
and caricatured ‘dog-whistle’ emblems of what 
Islam ‘is’, or has come to stand for in the dominant 
cultural imagination – beards and burqas, forced 
marriage and FGM, sharia law and jihadi outlaws. In 
so doing, it necessarily conjures the spectre of ‘race’ 
as a key signifier of religio-cultural difference – it is 
impossible, and indeed disingenuous, to separate 
either Islam from Muslims themselves, or ‘Muslims’ 
from the black and brown bodies who form the 
largest proportion of Muslims in Britain, and globally. 
To do so separates ‘Muslim’ bodies from the longer 
and broader histories of race and racism, and 
from the broader structures of discrimination and 
violence that place Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim 
communities as some of the most socially and 
economically disadvantaged and vulnerable in the UK 
today. At the same time, it erases the vibrant history 
of Muslim communities in Britain, and their role in 
shaping contemporary British cities, culture and 
society – from the contribution of Muslim lascars in 
imperial trade and two world wars to the multi-billion 
pound ‘Indian’ restaurant trade and the celebration 
of ‘chicken tikka masala’ as Britain’s national dish 
(Alexander et al. 2016). It ignores too the broader 
political solidarities across racial, ethnic and religious 
differences – from the Asian and African anti-colonial 
and independence movements of the early to mid-
20th century through the Asian Youth Movements 
of the 1970s and 1980s (Ramamurthy 2013) and 
the embracing of ‘political blackness’ (Alexander 
2002), to the contemporary anti-war and anti-racist 
campaigns, and the shaping of popular culture from 
Asian Dub Foundation and Fun-Da-Mental to Riz 
Ahmed and even Zayn Malik (Kim 2015).
This is not to deny the historical and contemporary 
specificities and contours of Islamophobic discourse, 
nor to deny the impact of Islamophobic rhetoric, 
policy and practice on the lives of British Muslims: 
quite the opposite. It is, however, to caution against 
what Meer (2015b) refers to as ‘making a fetish out 
of words’ and to consider the dangers of focusing 
too much on the borders of what Islamophobia is 
rather than what it does – as a form of, and alibi for, 
contemporary ‘race-making’ (Meer 2015b). Racism 
has always proven itself to be a multifaceted and 
malleable force of discrimination, as a form both 
of categorization and of persecution – what John 
Solomos and Les Back have termed a ‘scavenger 
ideology’ (1996). Contemporary Islamophobia builds 
on, feeds off, transforms and adds to a store of 
racial, ethnic and religious stereotypes – a ragbag 
of racist ideas, policies and practices selected 
according to convenience and wielded against a 
particularly (if not uniquely) visible and vulnerable 
community. Nevertheless, it is crucial that we 
recognize that Islamophobia is not simply ‘a Muslim 
problem’, that it implicates and affects everyone, 
and that, importantly, we must build alliances across 
other minoritized and discriminated people and 
groups, and all people of good will, to stand against 
racism in all of its forms. Islamophobia remains, 20 
years on, ‘a challenge for us all’.
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3 British Muslims: An overview
Serena Hussain
Introduction
There has been a Muslim presence in Britain for 
hundreds of years (Ansari 2004). However, it was 
not until the 1960s that visible Muslim settlements 
occurred. As a result of labour shortages after 
the second world war, citizens of the British 
Commonwealth, many of whom were Muslim, were 
recruited to take up work in the United Kingdom. 
Unsurprisingly, because of the availability of work in 
the industrial sectors, migrants headed for some of 
the main industrial centres and communities began 
to emerge in areas such as Greater London, the 
South East, West Midlands, West Yorkshire and 
Lancashire in England; central Clydeside in Scotland; 
the ports of South Wales; and Northern Ireland’s 
capital, Belfast (Hussain 2008).
Once the labour shortage was taken care of, the 
British government introduced legislation to end 
large-scale migration. However, families of workers 
were still permitted to join them, and did so until 
the 1970s. In addition to those from South Asia, 
who were primarily economic migrants, a different 
type of migration phenomenon occurred from the 
1970s onwards. Those coming from the Middle East 
to Britain appeared to have a much more diverse 
profile, originating from various national and social 
backgrounds. Arabs who had taken advantage of 
their financial gain from the oil crisis of 1973–1974 
invested in property and businesses. In addition, as 
political unrest increased in the region, professionals 
from the Middle East took up employment in Britain 
(Jalili 2004).
The number of refugees from Muslim lands began 
to grow as a result of ethno-religious and communal 
conflicts, famines, and natural disasters in a number 
of locations. This included refugees from Somalia 
and East Africa, as well as the Middle East; however, 
from the 1990s onwards, there began a much more 
apparent arrival of asylum-seeking communities 
in the form of European Muslims from Bosnia and 
Kosovo, as well as Kurds and Afghans. Despite this, 
as will be discussed below, the majority of British 
Muslim have their origins in South Asia as a result of 
the British colonial legacy.
Becoming a faith community
Until the 1980s British Muslims were viewed 
primarily in terms of their ethnicity and countries of 
origin, rather than as members of a collective faith 
group. In part this was due to an overall perceived 
decrease in the importance of religion in Britain. 
Weller (2004: 5) argued that, in keeping with the 
secularization thesis, there was an assumption that 
religion would overwhelmingly be removed from the 
public into the private sphere for all Britons, including 
any newcomers. However, as non-European-origin 
communities became more established in Britain, 
the emphasis on religious practice did not decrease. 
A well-known study conducted by Modood and 
colleagues using the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic 
Minorities (Modood et al. 1997: 356) demonstrated 
clearly that when compared with the sample of White 
British 16–34-year-olds – among whom only 5% felt 
that religion was ‘very important’ in how they lived 
their lives – nearly 20% of Caribbean-origin and 
around 35% of South-Asian-origin respondents in the 
same age group reported it being so.
For some groups the separation of religion from the 
public domain was particularly problematic, especially 
those for whom regular practice throughout the 
day, such as the five prayers, was a requirement. 
Modood et al. wrote, ‘Religion is perhaps the key 
area where the minority groups manifest a cultural 
dynamic which is at least partly at odds with native 
British trends’ (1997: 356). Authors such as Yousif 
(2000) and Merry (2004) discussed how minority 
groups would often have to repackage their faith 
practice as part of ‘cultural preservation’ in order to 
access public resources and support for faith-based 
activities (Merry 2004: 127).
There was a growing body of evidence from the 
early 1990s that not only supported Modood’s 
findings but suggested that religiosity and religious 
identification was becoming more salient than ethnic 
identity among second- and subsequent-generation 
Muslims (Hutnik 1985, Ballard 1994, Saeed et al. 
1999). A popular explanation for the apparent lack of 
religious acculturation was that Muslim communities 
in Britain were feeling more marginalized than other 
groups (Ballard 1994). Globally, developments such 
as communal tensions in South Asia, as well as 
the genocide of Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, 
highlighted persecution based on faith affiliation. In 
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Britain itself many Muslims felt unsupported in their 
reaction to Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses and 
faced a backlash from those who they felt prioritized 
freedom of speech above respect for minorities 
(Khan 2000).
In addition, data collected for the 1991 National 
Census of Population for England and Wales 
found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi (Muslim-
majority) groups were demonstrating higher levels of 
disadvantage across a number of measures. Such 
findings increased frustrations over inadequate service 
provision for Muslims living in Britain. The Muslim 
Council of Great Britain, established as an umbrella 
body for mosques and other Islamic organizations, 
began lobbying for greater religious-group monitoring. 
In 1997, the Runnymede Trust published findings 
which supported much of what was suspected 
among grassroots communities: that Britain’s Muslim 
groups faced discrimination on the basis of their faith, 
and that global events were affecting the way Muslims 
were being perceived. The report – Islamophobia: 
A Challenge for Us All – was one of the first 
publications to highlight how the way Muslims were 
both perceiving themselves and being perceived had 
moved beyond simply ethnicity and racism. 
The availability of ‘hard facts’ on Muslims was argued 
by the Muslim Council of Britain as an important step 
in recognizing the needs of this faith group in a more 
meaningful way. Active campaigning took place for 
the inclusion in government surveys of an official 
category for religious minorities, as many Muslims 
continued to be hidden among ethnic and country-
of-birth categories. Britons of Turkish descent, 
for example, ticked ‘White’ when presented with 
no specific category of their own. It was therefore 
impossible to know how many Muslims there were in 
Britain using ethnicity data alone, or what their needs 
as a faith group were.
The campaign for comprehensive countrywide data 
was an example of how Muslims emerged as political 
group of actors, pushing their concerns onto policy 
and research agendas. In 2001, for the first time, 
demographic data on Muslims across the length and 
breadth of Britain became available. This information 
was seen as an imperative tool in both understanding 
Table 3.1: The number and percentage of people belonging to a faith group in England and Wales
Faith group
Population 
count 2001
Percentage 
of total 
population, 
2001 
Population 
count, 2011
Percentage 
of total 
population, 
2011
Population 
change, 
2001–2011
Change in 
percentage 
of total 
population, 
2001–2011
All people 52,041,912 100 56,075,912 100 +4,034,000 –
Christian 37,338,486 71.75 33,243,175 59.28 −4,095,311 −12.47
Buddhist 144,453 0.28 247,743 0.44 +103,290 +0.16
Hindu 552,418 1.06 816,633 1.46 +264,215 +0.40
Jewish 259,928 0.50 263,346 0.47 +3,418 −0.03
Muslim 1,546,625 2.97 2,706,066 4.83 +1,159,441 +1.86
Sikh 329,356 0.63 423,158 0.75 +93,802 +0.12
Other 
religions
150,721 0.29 240,530 0.43 +89,809 +0.14
No religion 7,709,267 14.81 14,097,229 25.14 +6,387,962 +10.33
Religion not 
stated
4,010,658 7.71 4,038,032 7.20 +27,374 −0.51
Source: 2001 and 2011 National Census of Population for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics.
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and countering discrimination and disadvantage 
(Hussain 2008).
Understanding	the	Muslim	profile
In 2001 and 2011 the National Census for 
Population collected data on religious minorities. 
The remainder of the chapter will provide an 
overview of what we now know about Muslims in 
Britain based on the availability of comprehensive 
statistics on faith groups.
The 2001 census found there to be just over 
1.5 million Muslims in England and Wales. As 
demonstrated by Table 3.1, 77% of people in 
England and Wales reported belonging to a religion. 
The largest faith group was Christian, at 72% of the 
total population. This was followed by Muslims, who 
comprised just under 3% of the population, and 
Hindus (1%), with all other groups making up less 
than 1%. Those with no religion made up 15% of 
the population.
By 2011 the Muslim population increased to 
2,706,066, forming 4.8% of the total population of 
England and Wales. There were increases for all the 
minority faith groups, not only Muslims; however, 
there were examples of how the British press 
inflated the impact of the increase through alarmist 
commentary. Yet as Hussain and Sherif (2014) 
explain, the increase was in keeping with expected 
population growth due to the young demographic 
profile of minority groups, and Muslims in particular.
The increase in the number of Muslims significantly 
influenced by their younger demographic profile 
compared with the national population as a whole: 
33% of Muslims are aged 15 or under compared with 
19% of the total population. This is a consequence 
of the age at which most people migrate from 
one country to another; as discussed above, the 
majority of Muslims who migrated to Britain entered 
the country as labourers – overwhelmingly they 
were young men, who later brought their wives and 
children to join them. Although the earliest migrants 
have now reached retirement age (4% of Muslims 
compared with 16% of the population as a whole), 
births among Muslims continue to outnumber 
deaths, and as a result the population has increased 
rather than declined (Simpson 2013).
Ethnicity and country of birth
Today almost 50% of British Muslims are born in 
the UK, as was the case in 2001. In terms of other 
regions of birth, 28.5% of British Muslims were born 
in South Asia, 6.5% in the Middle East, 6% in other 
European countries and 10% in Africa. The ethnic 
profile of British Muslims is therefore one of the 
most diverse in Europe. Table 3.2 shows both the 
proportion of each ethnic group who are Muslim, 
and the share of British Muslims who belong to the 
various ethnic categories. Of the total White British 
population only 0.17% are Muslims. However, 
approximately 2.9% of British Muslims are White 
British. The majority of British Arabs (77%), British 
Pakistanis (91.5%) and British Bangladeshis (90%) 
are Muslim. Pakistanis make up the largest share 
of British Muslims (38%), followed by Bangladeshis 
Table 3.2: Muslims by ethnic group
Percentage of ethnic group who are 
Muslim
Percentage of Muslims who belong 
to ethnic group
White British 0.17 2.86
White Irish 0.36 0.07
White Gypsy or Irish Traveller 0.66 0.01
Other White 5.27 4.84
Mixed/multiple ethnic group 8.38 3.79
Indian 13.95 7.29
Pakistani 91.46 38.01
Bangladeshi 89.99 14.87
Chinese 2.04 0.30
Other Asian 23.27 7.19
African 20.94 7.66
Caribbean 1.23 0.27
Other Black 20.49 2.12
Arab 77.27 6.59
Any other ethnic group 33.65 4.14
Source: 2011 National Census of Population for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics.
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(15%), Africans (7.7%), Indians (7.3%), Other Asians 
(7%) and then Arabs (6%). The South Asian heritage 
groups therefore remain the most dominant in terms 
of regional origin, but their share in the whole Muslim 
population has declined since 2001, from 67.8% to 
60.2%. The Arab category was added in 2011 and 
therefore comparisons between censuses for this 
group are not possible.
Geography
Muslim are one of the most diverse faith groups 
in the UK, reflecting the countries of origin and 
migration types described above. However, there 
are some key similarities which will be discussed. A 
common feature among Muslims is that they remain 
an overwhelmingly urban population (Mercia Group 
2006). Table 3.3 shows the local authorities with 
the highest numbers and proportions of Muslims in 
England and Wales.
The areas listed in Table 3.3 have a long-established 
Muslim presence. However, Muslim communities 
can now be found across the entire country; and 
although in 2001 the Isle of Scilly was the only local 
authority to report no usual Muslim residents, in 2011 
this was no longer the case.
Of all Muslims in England, 25% live in Inner London, 
and 22% in Outer London; 10% live in Greater 
Manchester, 15% in the West Midlands and 11% in 
West Yorkshire. The census data provides insight 
into the ethnic diversity of Muslims in such areas. 
For Muslims, London is the most ethnically diverse 
city. Bangladeshis are the largest group among 
Muslims in Inner London. Outer London, however, 
demonstrates proportionately more Pakistanis, who 
make up around a third of the Muslim population 
here, with only 8% of Muslims being Bangladeshi. 
The figures for White, Other White and Black African 
in Outer London remain similar to their respective 
figures for Inner London.
Nearly 60% of the Muslims in Greater Manchester 
are Pakistani. This is followed by 15% who are 
Bangladeshi. The third-largest Muslim ethnic group 
here is Indian, at 11%, and all other Muslim ethnic 
categories each make up 5% or less. There is a 
similar Muslim ethnic makeup in the West Midlands, 
where the majority of Muslims are Pakistani 
(nearly 70%), followed by Bangladeshis (14%). 
Comparatively, there is a much smaller Muslim Indian 
population in this area, at 5%, and all other ethnic 
categories each constitute 5% of Muslims or less for 
this region also.
Table 3.3: Local authorities in England and Wales with the highest number and proportion of Muslim residents
Local authority Number of Muslims Local authority Muslims as a percentage 
of the population
Birmingham 234,411 Tower Hamlets 34.51
Bradford 129,041 Newham 31.97
Newham 98,456 Blackburn with Darwen 27.00
Tower Hamlets 87,696 Bradford 24.70
Manchester 79,496 Luton 24.60
Redbridge 64,999 Redbridge 23.30
Leicester 61,440 Slough 23.29
Kirklees 61,280 Waltham Forest 21.89
Brent 58,036 Birmingham 21.85
Waltham Forest 56,541 Brent 18.65
Ealing 53,198 Leicester 18.63
Enfield 52,141 Westminster 18.27
Luton 49,991 Oldham 17.73
Sheffield 42,801 Pendle 17.42
Leeds 40,772 Enfield 16.69
Westminster 40,073 Manchester 15.80
Oldham 39,879 Ealing 15.72
Blackburn with Darwen 39,817 Kirklees 14.51
Barnet 36,744 Haringey 14.17
Source: 2011 National Census of Population for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics.
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Three-quarters of Muslims in West Yorkshire are 
Pakistani, compared with only 5% Bangladeshi and 
10% Indian. Indian Muslims have high concentrations 
in Leicestershire and Lancashire. There were 
no counties in which Africans were reported to 
constitute the highest percentage among Muslims, 
but Merseyside came close. Here 17% of the 
Muslim community, the largest proportion, reported 
belonging to the White ethnic category, and 14% 
were Black African. 
What the data shows most significantly is that apart 
from the counties with the largest percentages of 
Muslims (as detailed above), the ethnic makeup of 
Muslims in other areas is diverse and by no means 
evenly distributed.
Education and employment
Both censuses confirmed that Muslims demonstrate 
a more disadvantaged profile than other minority faith 
groups. This had been suspected among Muslim 
advocacy organizations and academics working on 
ethnic minorities, based on outcomes for Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis. Some of the key areas in which 
this became apparent were education, employment 
and housing.
Hussain (2008) described how Muslims were more 
likely to leave school at the age of 16 with no 
qualifications compared with all other religious groups 
(see Table 3.4). For those aged 16–24, 22% of 
Muslims reported having no qualifications, compared 
with 16% nationally. Yet conversely, Muslims were 
found to be more likely to go on to further and higher 
education – 52% had done so, compared with 41% 
of the population as a whole.
However, between 2001 and 2011 the proportion 
of Muslims aged 16–24 without qualifications nearly 
halved to 11.5%, almost reaching the national figure 
of 11%.
Although the percentage of Muslims with degrees 
and higher degrees is greater than the national 
average, just over 15% compared with just under 
14% respectively, concerns regarding the rate of 
social mobility in other areas, such as employment 
outcomes, have been highlighted by several studies, 
including a recent report by the Social Mobility 
Commission (2017).
A breakdown of figures on economic activity 
provides an indication of disparity between groups. 
Nationally, 58% of those aged 16 and over are 
employed compared with 46% of Muslims. Looking 
at the youngest age cohort, 16 to 24, only 29% of 
Muslims are in employment compared with nearly 
51% of all people within the same age bracket. In 
part this can be accounted for by a higher proportion 
of Muslims in full-time education, but this does not 
explain the divergence in trends. Comparing figures 
for economic inactivity provides a clearer picture. 
For all people aged 16 and above 36% reported 
being economically inactive compared with 45% of 
Muslims. This figure is more stark for those aged 
16 to 24: in this age group 36% of all males are 
economically inactive compared with 52% of Muslim 
males, and 39% of all females compared with 60% of 
Muslim females (see Table 3.5).
The relatively large number of Muslims in the Indian 
ethnic category has allowed comparison with the 
non-Muslim Indian population. A research study
Table	3.4:	Qualification	by	religion
No qualifications, 16–24 year olds Level 4 and above,16–24 year olds
All 10.53 13.61
Christian 10.23 12.50
Buddhist 6.27 22.53
Hindu 4.13 31.49
Jewish 10.19 19.83
Muslim 11.05 15.21
Sikh 5.78 22.05
Other religion 6.44 18.34
No religion 11.37 13.35
Not stated 10.39 14.69
Source: 2011 National Census of Population for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics.
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Table 3.5: Economic activity 
All people 
16 and 
over
Muslim 16 
and over
All people 
16– 24
Muslims 
16–24
All males 
16–24
All 
females 
16–24
Muslim 
males 
16–24 
Muslim 
females 
16–24
Economically 
active
63.34 55.20 62.68 44.17 64.22 61.11 47.84 40.12
In 
employment
58.64 45.90 50.74 28.76 50.48 51.01 30.73 26.58
Employee 47.39 32.84 35.83 17.72 36.27 35.38 18.09 17.31
Self-
employed
8.89 9.44 2.39 1.50 3.48 1.28 2.16 0.76
Full-time 
students 2.37 3.63 12.52 9.54 10.74 14.35 10.48 8.51
Unemployed 4.70 9.30 11.94 15.41 13.74 10.10 17.11 13.54
Unemployed 
(excluding 
full-time 
students)
3.96 7.21 7.55 8.03 9.31 5.74 9.14 6.81
Full-time 
students 0.73 2.09 4.40 7.38 4.43 4.36 7.97 6.73
Economically 
inactive
36.66 44.80 37.32 55.83 35.78 38.89 52.16 59.88
Retired 21.35 5.80 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06
Economically 
inactive: 
Student 
(including 
full-time 
students)
5.27 13.27 30.73 45.21 31.69 29.75 46.67 43.60
Looking after 
home or 
family
3.95 13.68 2.74 4.94 0.31 5.23 0.45 9.91
Long-term 
sick or 
disabled
3.92 5.15 1.14 0.89 1.26 1.03 0.93 0.85
Economically 
inactive 
Other
2.17 6.91 2.65 4.74 2.47 2.83 4.07 5.47
Source: 2011 National Census of Population for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics.
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 commissioned by the Department for Work and 
Pensions found that geographical areas with higher 
concentrations of Indian Muslims demonstrate 
lower economic activity compared with the Indian 
average. Despite consisting of only 13% of the 
British Indian population, Indian Muslims made up 
approximately 90% of Blackburn East and Batley, the 
two neighbourhoods which had the lowest economic 
activity rates in relation to the Indian average 
(Simpson et al. 2006). The study concludes that ‘it is 
difficult to unravel consequences and causes here. 
Further research on cultural and religious aspects 
is also required, including on the ways in which 
workplaces take into account people’s religious 
needs’ (Simpson et al. 2006: 15).
Muslim women in all age brackets are less likely 
to be economically active not only than their male 
counterparts, but also than women from all other 
faith groups. When the figures are broken down 
by ethnicity, 37% of Pakistani, 37% of Bangladeshi 
and 35% of Arab women are economically active 
compared with 62% of Indian women and 57% of 
women nationally.
Studies have highlighted that Muslim women are 
more likely to report looking after the family and 
home, and the census figures, both in 2001 and 
2011, confirm this. Even within the youngest cohort, 
Muslim females are twice as likely to remain at home 
to look after their families, with 10% of 16–24-year-
olds reporting this to be the case, compared with 5% 
of all females in the same age range.
Exploring the type of employment classifications 
Muslims are concentrated in, compared with the 
population as a whole, also provides an insight 
into the social class structures for this faith group: 
6% of Muslims, compared with 10% of the 
national population, are found in higher managerial 
occupations; 5% of Muslims, compared with 7% of 
all people, are in higher professional occupations; 
2.5% of Muslims are long-term unemployed 
compared with 1.6% of all people; and 18% are full-
time students compared with 8% of all people aged 
16 and above.
Housing and health
In some respects the housing profile of Muslims is 
one of the key ways in which they differ by ethnicity. 
Of all households in England and Wales, 31% 
reported owning their homes outright, while 33.5% 
were homeowners with a mortgage. In comparison, 
just under 15% of Muslims own their homes outright, 
and 28% reported owning their homes with a 
mortgage. When it comes to living in social rented 
housing, 11.5% of Muslims compared with 8% of all 
households reported this tenure type.
This appears to show that Muslims are less likely 
to own their homes compared with the population 
as a whole and more likely to live in social rented 
accommodation. However, this is not representative 
of all Muslims groups and although Pakistanis are 
still less likely to own their homes outright compared 
with the national figure, at 23%, they are more likely 
to own their homes with a mortgage, with 40.5% 
doing so. When combining the overall figures for 
ownership, Pakistanis are on par with the population 
as a whole. However, only 9% of Bangladeshis 
report outright ownership, and 34.5% do so with a 
mortgage or loan. Furthermore, Pakistanis are less 
likely to live in social housing (7%) than both the 
population as a whole (9%) and Bangladeshis (19%).
Despite the differences in tenure types, Muslims 
do demonstrate a higher propensity to live in the 
most deprived neighbourhoods, are most likely 
to live in overcrowded housing (42% compared 
with the 12% national average) and score highly 
on indicators used for measuring poverty, such as 
living in households without central heating. Hussain 
and Sherif (2014: 442) explain how ‘higher rates of 
economic inactivity found amongst this faith category 
impact on family income and this, coupled with larger 
family sizes, means that [Muslims] are at a greater 
risk of poverty’. A recent Social Mobility Commission 
report (2017) described how almost half of Muslim 
households lived within the 10% most deprived 
locations in England, based on classifications used 
by the Index of Multiple Deprivation. Although all 
ethnic minority groups are more likely to live in 
deprived neighbourhoods, analysis by Heath and 
Li (2015) found that Muslims demonstrated the 
highest propensity to do so. The impact of poverty, 
disadvantage and higher levels of economic inactivity, 
together with growing evidence of anti-Muslim 
discrimination, have been explored by a number of 
studies since the initial statistics on Muslims were 
released more than 15 years ago.
Explaining the outcomes
More than two decades ago, Muslim advocacy 
organizations were calling for large-scale data on 
faith groups in order to provide hard facts on the 
disadvantage and discrimination faced by British 
Muslims. Yet despite the evidence provided by such 
data, Muslims remain as marginalized in Britain today. 
There are some obvious differences found among 
Muslims when looking at the data. A larger proportion 
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of this faith group are in full-time education compared 
with the national figure, yet a higher percentage of 
Muslims are unemployed. In addition, Muslims are 
more likely to be economically inactive, and of those 
who are in employment, lower percentages are found 
within the highest employment classes. A significantly 
higher proportion of Muslim women reported looking 
after the home compared with women of all other 
faith categories, and this is even the case among the 
youngest age group.
In the last 20 years, global events have 
mainstreamed the politicization of ordinary Muslims, 
as described by Meer and Modood (2009). This has 
led to a normalization of Islamophobic discourse 
and has cemented Muslims’ position as the ‘ultimate 
Other’ (Archer 2001). When exploring data on 
attitudes, Storm et al. (2017) reported that Muslims 
are on the whole viewed with more hostility than all 
other groups, by all other groups.
This no doubt has serious implications for an entire 
generation of British Muslims, who despite higher 
rates of participation in post-16 education, continue 
to face multiple barriers to employment and social 
mobility. Such findings have led scholars to explore 
whether Muslims experience something known as 
a ‘religious penalty’ (Cheung 2013, Khattab and 
Modood 2015, Storm et al. 2017). Discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4, analysis tells us that 
regardless of qualifications, Muslims are still more 
likely to be unemployed than other minority groups, 
as is the case for those from Black African and 
Caribbean ethnic backgrounds. Analysis has also 
demonstrated that regardless of qualifications and 
language proficiency, Muslim women are more likely 
to face challenges in the labour market. Therefore, 
the most measurable disadvantage of all in terms of 
employment outcomes can be said to be faced by 
Muslim women and Muslims who are black.
We know that successful integration into the labour 
market is paramount for the social mobility of minority 
groups (Heath and Li 2015); the consequences of 
economic mobility for better housing and residing in 
more desirable neighbourhoods, as well as for more 
positive health outcomes, are well documented. 
The mounting research on the lack of social mobility 
of British Muslims, despite better educational 
outcomes, led the Social Mobility Commission to 
conclude that young Muslims are being ‘hampered 
by discrimination’. The lead researcher for the study 
stated that, ‘Muslims are excluded, discriminated 
against, or failed at all stages of their transition from 
education to employment. Taken together, these 
contributing factors have profound implications’ 
(Social Mobility Commission 2017). The remainder 
of this report unpicks some of the challenges facing 
Muslims that have been highlighted here using 
comprehensive data on faith groups.
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4 Poverty and the labour market
Anthony Heath and Asma Mustafa
1 ‘Ethnic penalty’ measures the difference between ethnic minority group (e.g. Pakistani) and majority group (e.g. white) on a given topic 
(such as unemployment or employment rates) after taking account of a range of variables such as gender, age, generation, education and 
so on.
Introduction
Economic integration is vital in reducing barriers to 
employment, poverty levels and inequality in the 
labour market. Equality of opportunity, employability, 
unemployment rates, earnings levels and 
occupational positions are all highly relevant to and 
impact on household poverty levels, social mobility 
and occupational under-representation (Reynolds 
and Birdwell 2015).
British Muslims suffer from some of the lowest 
employment rates and earnings of any group in 
Britain. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
highlights a clear occupational disparity between 
British Muslims and the national average. Take 
for example the finding that 10% of the British 
population are in ‘higher managerial, administrative 
and professional’ occupations yet only 6% of British 
Muslims fall into this category. Over 50% of British 
Muslims experience household poverty, compared 
with the national average of 18% (Heath and Li 
2015). This is after adjusting for factors such as age, 
generation since migration, marital status, region of 
residence and educational level (see Figure 4.1). 
Our key question, then, is whether Islamophobia can 
in whole or part explain these Muslim disadvantages. 
Religious penalties
Scholars interested in explaining the disadvantages 
experienced by Muslim groups in Britain such as 
those of Pakistani or Bangladeshi background initially 
focused on ‘ethnic penalties’ in order to explain 
these disparities between ethnic groups (Heath and 
McMahon 1997, Cheung and Heath 2007).1 The 
remaining gaps between the minority group and 
a majority, after adjusting for age and educational 
qualifications, are termed ethnic penalties. However, 
at the turn of the millennium academics realized that 
ethnic group status was not sufficiently explaining 
the gaps, because empirically they were not 
separating between religion and ethnicity, which are 
highly correlated. They then turned their attention 
to disentangling religious from ethnic penalties 
Figure	4.1:	Overall	poverty	rate	by	religious	affiliation	in	the	UK
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(Lindley 2002, Simpson et al. 2006, Berthoud and 
Blekesaune 2007). 
Analyses of various data sources since then have 
proceeded to highlight the relevance of religious 
penalties in the labour market (Heath and Martin 
2012, Cheung 2013, Khattab and Johnston 2013). 
Khattab and Modood (2015) analysed unemployment 
data from 2002 to 2013, split into 14 different ethno-
religious groups. They highlight that the six groups 
with the highest rates of unemployment among both 
men and women are Muslims and black people, 
with black Muslims experiencing the highest rate 
of unemployment (for both men and women) (see 
Figure 4.2).
Though survey data is useful in emphasizing the 
disparity between groups, it does not usually explain 
where this disparity is rooted. A number of possible 
explanations have been suggested for the clear 
employment gap between Muslims and other groups. 
We will briefly touch upon other partial explanations 
before focusing on Islamophobia and discrimination 
in the labour market as the crux of this chapter. One 
explanation is that of human capital: given that most 
first-generation British Muslims arrived as migrants 
with lower socioeconomic class background 
compared with the wider population, the difference 
in education and human capital could account for 
differences in labour market outcomes (Connor and 
Koenig 2015). A second partial explanation is the 
role of social networks: if certain groups of people 
have weaker ‘bridging’ social capital in the form of 
links and connections with economically advantaged 
sections of society, this can negatively affect levels 
of knowledge about employment opportunities and 
where to search for jobs, support to obtain certain 
employability skills, and mentoring opportunities to 
enter higher-status jobs (Granovetter 1973, Cheung 
2013, Damstra and Tillie 2016). 
Discrimination
Using European Social Survey data, Connor and 
Koenig (2015) underline that human capital and 
migration play a partial role in explaining labour 
market disadvantages, but that Muslims may also 
be suffering from potential discrimination given 
the fact that disadvantage extends to the second 
(non-migrant) generation and not just to the first 
(migrant) generation. Discrimination could play a part 
at the point of recruitment through the deselection 
of candidates with ‘foreign-sounding’ names or 
whose residential address is in an area with a high 
level of minority ethnic and religious concentration. 
At interview stage, candidates could be rejected 
because they are visibly Muslim because of religious 
attire or grooming, for example. Yet these early 
stages of discrimination do not account for all 
labour market discrimination: we must also consider 
employees who are refused promotion within 
organizations due to their ethnic and religious identity, 
and employees who are actively marginalized in the 
workplace due to such discrimination.
Figure 4.2: Unemployment rate by ethno-religious background and gender of the economically active 
(economically inactive people excluded)
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Qualitative research exploring discrimination in 
the labour market has found that discrimination in 
the workplace means educated Muslim women 
in particular are not able to achieve what they 
should in the labour market. Researchers argue 
that British Muslim women are not achieving the 
‘return on education’ that they anticipate (Social 
Mobility Commission 2016). Another study by 
the Social Mobility Commission (2017) focused 
specifically on social mobility for young Muslims. The 
researchers conducted in-depth focus groups and 
interviews exploring young Muslims’ perceptions 
and experiences of education and searching for 
jobs. The analysis of data underlined the experience 
of discrimination in the job application process, 
especially when applicants had names that identified 
them as members of an ethnic or religious minority, 
or wore a headscarf. The interviews also highlighted 
that in-work cultural insensitivity, stereotyping and 
indirect racism were common. 
Chapter five of the House of Commons Women 
and Equalities Committee report Employment 
Opportunities for Muslims in the UK (2016) discussed 
tackling workplace discrimination. It explores 
community evidence for the existence of anti-
Muslim discrimination in the labour market, weighing 
most heavily on Muslim women. The experiences 
documented from witnesses in that report are 
also similar to witness testaments found five years 
previously in the report by the All Party Parliamentary 
Group (APPG) on Race and Community (2012). 
The latter report focused specifically on Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi and black women, yet the analysis 
underlined the discrimination experienced by ethnic 
and religious minority women at every stage of 
recruitment procedures. 
The most rigorous way in which to establish the 
occurrence of discrimination is to conduct a field 
experiment. In field experiments on discrimination, 
what the investigators do is to send matched 
applications from fictitious applicants for actual, 
real-life job vacancies. The CVs of the two fictitious 
applications indicate that the applicants have 
identical work-relevant skills and experience. A 
large number of these paired applications are sent 
out to a selection of randomly chosen vacancies 
and the researchers then compare the respective 
positive callback rates (for example, invitations to 
an interview) for applicants with ‘British names’ 
and those with ‘minority names’. A higher callback 
rate for fictitious applicants with ‘British names’ 
than for matched applicants with ‘minority names’ 
is pretty conclusive evidence of discrimination in 
recruitment. This is by far the best evidence available 
for discrimination on grounds of ethnic origins or 
faith, although it covers only the very first stage of the 
application process.
We do have quite a good series of field experiments 
testing for racial discrimination in Britain, going back 
to 1969. However, these were all based on ethnic 
background, rather than on religious affiliation. 
The research demonstrates that both black and 
Asian minorities experience quite substantial 
discrimination, whereas white minorities experience 
very little. Moreover, the level of discrimination has 
barely changed over time, despite legislation such 
as the 1976 Race Relations Act and the activities 
of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. 
Unfortunately none of these studies has explicitly 
compared Muslims with members of other faiths or 
those with no faith. To be sure, in some cases the 
studies have distinguished predominantly Muslim 
origins such as Pakistani or Bangladeshi. However, 
it is not clear that British employers can readily 
distinguish South Asian Muslim names from those of 
other South Asian faiths, or Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
names from those indicating other South Asian 
ethnic origins.
More extensive research has been done in France 
and Germany. A study conducted in France (Laitin 
et al. 2010) which submitted matching CVs in 
the name of a French Muslim Senegalese and a 
French Christian Senegalese found anti-Muslim 
discrimination in the French labour market. Another 
study conducted in Germany also showed much 
greater discrimination against applicants wearing 
a headscarf (Weichselbaumer 2016). In Germany 
it is normal for job applications to include a 
photograph. This means that, rather relying on 
differences in the names of the fictitious applicants, 
one can check whether the well-known Muslim 
symbol of a headscarf is associated with a greater 
risk of discrimination. The correspondence test 
investigated discrimination against Turkish women 
in Germany, especially against those who are visibly 
Muslim due to the wearing of a headscarf. The 
researchers selected two names and created three 
identities using the same woman, a model who 
was able to pose as either German or Turkish in the 
photographs. They designed an identity for Sandra 
Bauer (German, no headscarf), Meryem Ozturk 
(Turkish, no headscarf) and Meryem Ozturk (Turkish, 
with modern-style headscarf). The applications and 
documentation for all three identities were alike. 
One job application from one of the three identities 
was submitted to each of 1,474 accountancy or 
secretarial positions over a year. The results showed 
that the applicant with the German name Sandra 
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Bauer was called back at a rate of 18.8%, while 
Meryem Ozturk without the headscarf was called 
back after 13.5% of applications. The Meryem 
Ozturk who wore the headscarf was only called 
back for 4.2% of the positions applied for. The study 
showed that discrimination against an applicant 
with a Turkish name wearing a headscarf was 
roughly three times as great as that against a Turkish 
woman who was bare-headed. Since other research 
suggests that anti-Muslim sentiment in Germany 
is not all that different from anti-Muslim sentiment 
in Britain, one should assume that results in Britain 
might be quite similar. 
One recent field experiment in Britain was designed 
specifically to test for discrimination against 
Muslims. In a test designed for the BBC in 2017, 
two near-identical ‘fake’ candidate CVs were 
created in the names of Mohamed Allam and 
Adam Henton. These CVs were submitted to 100 
business manager job advertisements in the field 
of advertising sales in London. In just under three 
months, Adam Henton was offered 12 interviews, 
while Mohamed was invited to just four. It is striking 
that this is a higher rate of discrimination than that 
found in the great majority of the field experiments 
on ethnic and racial background. While this is far 
from definitive, it raises the possibility that there is 
an additional Muslim penalty.
Another recent and much larger study in 
Manchester, conducted by Mahmoud Abubaker and 
Christopher Bagley (2017), found similar results. 
However, rather than using fictitious CVs, they 
used a real CV, sending it under different names to 
different (but statistically matched) employers. They 
found that ‘Aminah’, a woman in her 20s, qualified 
at an intermediate level of accountancy, received 
a positive response to the online submission of 
her real CV in 151 of her 516 submissions (that is, 
a positive callback rate of 29%). In contrast, the 
English ‘Emily’ (whose CV was similar to Aminah’s 
in every respect, except her name) was successful 
in 306 of her 527 applications (a positive callback 
rate of 58%), for job descriptions and company 
characteristics which were, overall, similar for both 
applicants. These results in effect mean that Aminah 
would need to make twice as many applications 
as Emily in order to have the same likelihood of 
receiving a positive callback.
These two British studies do not provide quite such 
compelling evidence of an additional Muslim penalty 
as do the French and German studies. We are still 
awaiting results from a new study which further tests 
these distinctions. Nevertheless, coupled with the 
qualitative evidence gathered by the Social Mobility 
Commission, one needs to take very seriously the 
possibility that Muslims in Britain face particular 
barriers in gaining employment.
The chill factor
Perceptions of discrimination could also impact on 
potential applicants applying within certain industries. 
Inequality in the labour market, perception of anti-
Muslim attitudes and wider vocal bigotry have a 
very detrimental impact within certain job sectors. 
Muslims may actively avoid such job sectors, which 
they consider ‘hostile’ to Muslims or whose culture is 
perceived as ‘antagonistic’. In the academic literature 
this has been termed the ‘chill factor’ (Li and O’Leary 
2007: 557, McCrudden et al. 2004: 390):
the ‘chill factor’ – the various social and psychological 
factors that may discourage individuals from an 
under-represented group from applying to a firm – 
such as historical associations with a different group, 
real or expected discrimination from workmates in the 
opposite community, or disapproval from friends and 
family. (McCrudden et al. 2004: 398)
Muslims may unconsciously avoid applying for or 
aspiring to join certain employment sectors that they 
feel would provide an alienating work environment 
or where they would expect to be ‘pigeonholed’ into 
stereotypical work. This could include sectors such 
as the police force, the construction industry, acting, 
the armed forces and the media. 
Increasing securitization has caused a growing rift 
between Muslims and the security services. Police 
officers are often viewed sceptically within Muslim 
communities, with Islamophobic attitudes replacing 
institutional racism as a reason to avoid the police 
service as a career (Awan et al. 2013). Perceptions 
that police see Muslims as a ‘suspect’ community 
have had a detrimental impact on policing as a career 
choice (Kundnani 2009). 
The perception of institutional racism is one of 
the biggest hurdles for service career recruitment. 
If job sectors are exposed as having condoned 
discrimination for many years, it can take a 
generation of reform to recognize whether 
institutions have indeed improved. The Ministry of 
Defence, for example, has made concerted efforts 
to increase diversity in the armed forces. According 
to biannual diversity statistics in 2017, Muslims only 
make up 0.4% of the UK regular forces, compared 
with just under 5% of wider British society. Research 
on perceptions of the armed forces as a prospective 
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career option among British Pakistanis in the 
Midlands (Ishaq and Hussain 2002) revealed that 
32% of respondents avoided applying to the armed 
forces due to perceived racism. The same research 
also surveyed Scottish Pakistanis in Glasgow, 
asking why they thought ethnic minorities were not 
applying to join the armed forces, and 22% said the 
main reason was fear of experiencing racism. There 
was a similar trend among participants in more 
recent research on Muslims and the armed forces 
(Mustafa 2017). The report highlights that young 
Muslims perceive the armed forces as a sector that 
may not be welcoming to minorities and where they 
expect to experience marginalization due to their 
ethnicity or faith.
Conclusions
In 2015, the British government, along with a number 
of large corporations (HSBC, Deloitte, the BBC 
and the NHS, among others), pledged to operate 
a ‘name-blind’ recruitment strategy in the hope of 
reducing discrimination. However, while this initiative 
is to be applauded, this is a very limited pool of 
employers and we would like to see it rolled out 
further. Moreover, it covers only the very first stage of 
the application process. Weichselbaumer’s important 
research in Germany raises the possibility that if a 
Muslim woman were to arrive at interview wearing 
a headscarf, she might be subject to additional 
discrimination. The way forward, therefore, must 
be for firms to monitor the results of application 
processes in order to determine whether there is a 
level playing field for applicants from different faiths. 
The results of statistical analyses strongly suggest 
that Muslims experience an additional religious 
penalty over and above any ethnic penalty which 
they experience. Field experiments have not yet 
been published in Britain which can unequivocally 
demonstrate that these religious penalties are due 
to discrimination against Muslims, but the possibility 
needs to be taken very seriously. Moreover, if 
organizations were able to show that Muslims have 
the same chances of gaining entry and promotion 
as do members of other faiths, this might go a long 
way to countering the chill factor too. Organizations 
need to be proactive in demonstrating that they 
offer a level playing field. As Prime Minister Theresa 
May said when introducing the Race Disparity Audit 
(Cabinet Office 2017), ‘if the disparities can’t be 
explained, they must be changed’.
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Khadija’s story
Writer, British Black African, female
‘No-one is asking for favouritism, just that we’re given equal opportunity in the job market.’
As a black British Muslim woman, I face multiple challenges when it comes to my career opportunities 
and progression. I graduated with a 2:1 in my field and was writing during my time at university to build 
a portfolio and enhance my employability with different media outlets. I also volunteered regularly and 
worked as an editor for a publishing company on low pay. However, when I left university I was unable 
to even get an internship, let alone obtain an entry-level position in my field.
When I compare myself to white friends and colleagues I notice that I need to work twice as hard for 
what I want to accomplish. Maybe it’s my non-English name which means my CV gets overlooked. 
When I do manage to get through to interviews, the fact that I am an ethnic minority who also wears 
the hijab makes them less likely to offer me a job.
My family told me that wearing my hijab was holding me back in the job market and that if I wore 
it differently it would increase my prospects. But this is who I am and in 2017 why should I have to 
change myself into something that I don’t recognise?
There are so many institutional barriers that mean people like me are not given jobs based on our 
merits and skills. This makes me disillusioned with all of the promises made to me during university and 
leading up to graduation about what to expect in the world of work. Institutional, systematic racism 
and Islamophobia are prevalent but I refuse to give up. I continue trying my best to break the barriers 
that I face and find innovative ways of working in my field to make me stand out.
No-one is asking for favouritism, just that we’re given equal opportunity in the job market.
* Khadija’s name has been changed to protect her identity
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5 Islamophobia, racism and health
James Nazroo and Laia Bécares
Introduction
Racism has been argued to be a focal element 
of ethnic inequalities in health (Williams 1999, 
Krieger 2003, Nazroo 2003, Paradies et al. 2015), 
impacting on the health of ethnic minority people 
through differential exposure to socioeconomic, 
environmental, psychosocial and healthcare-related 
pathways. In this chapter we explore the implications 
of this for the health of Muslim people in the UK, 
with the intention of illustrating how Islamophobia, 
racism targeted towards Islam or Muslims, harms the 
health of Muslim people. The evidence we draw on 
is mainly from studies of racism and health, so the 
primary focus is on ethnic minority people in general, 
with discussion of a range of health outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions from this evidence are 
clear on the harm of Islamophobia to health.
Ethnic inequalities in health: 
disadvantages experienced by 
Muslim people in the UK
The existence of inequalities in the health status 
of different ethnic groups in the UK has been 
well established (Nazroo 2001, Erens et al. 2001, 
Sproston and Mindell 2006). For example, Black 
Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi people have 
between six and nine fewer years of disability-free 
life expectancy at birth than do White British people 
(Wohland et al. 2015) and are up to twice as likely 
as White British people to report poor self-rated 
health and to have a limiting longstanding illness 
(Bécares 2015). In addition, the limited evidence 
we have on variations in ethnic inequalities in health 
across religious groups suggests that Muslim people 
are at particular risk of poorer health (Nazroo 2001, 
Karlsen and Nazroo 2010). For example, alongside 
the higher risk for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people 
of a range of adverse health outcomes compared 
with other ethnic groups, Muslim Indian people have 
a higher risk of poor self-assessed health, limiting 
longstanding illness and diabetes than their Hindu 
and Christian (though not to the same extent Sikh) 
counterparts (Karlsen and Nazroo 2010).
These differences in health occur when the social 
determinants of health (factors such as education, 
social position, income and the local environment) 
are unequally distributed across ethnic groups, 
leading to unjust and preventable inequalities 
in health. One fundamental cause of health 
inequalities among ethnic minority groups is racism 
and racial discrimination.
The impact on health of 
experiencing racism
Racism is a persistent feature of life in developed 
countries, including the UK, even though the form 
and expression of underlying prejudice shifts over 
time (Karlsen and Nazroo 2014, Storm et al. 2017). 
One of the important shifts in the expression of 
racism over recent decades has been the rise of 
Islamophobia. Poynting and Mason (2007), among 
others, describe how Muslim people have become 
the primary focus for distrust and victimization in 
the UK and elsewhere, and studies show parallel 
increases in experiences of and fear of racism 
among Muslim people over the first decade of the 
21st century (Karlsen and Nazroo 2014). Muslim 
people are repeatedly described as the social group 
most frequently discriminated against (Kitchen et al. 
2005), and there is evidence that prejudice against 
Muslim people (as well as gay and lesbian people) 
is considered more socially acceptable than that 
against any other group (Abrams and Houston 2006).
Anti-Muslim prejudice, racism and discrimination 
affect the full range of social and economic outcomes 
experienced by Muslim people. In addition, there 
is now convincing evidence that experiences of 
racism and discrimination directly harm both mental 
and physical health (Paradies 2006, Paradies et al. 
2015). This occurs via several mechanisms: first, 
racism increases exposure to the internalization 
of negative messages that may lead to decreased 
self-esteem and poorer mental health (Jones 2000); 
second, exposure to racial stressors, such as 
interpersonal discriminatory treatment, may result 
in physiological changes and to the subsequent 
onset and worsening of disease (Clark et al. 1999); 
and last, racially motivated violence directly affects 
mental and physical health. Studies of racism 
and health found that those reporting to have 
experienced some form of physical racial attack 
had a prevalence of depression almost three times 
higher, and a prevalence of psychosis almost five 
times higher, than that of ethnic minority people 
reporting no harassment (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002). 
In the same study, the prevalence of psychosis was 
57% higher among ethnic minority people who 
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believed that the majority of British employers would 
discriminate against someone on the grounds of 
race, religion, culture or ethnicity than among those 
who did not (Karlsen and Nazroo 2002). Similarly a 
more recent investigation showed that experiences 
of interpersonal racism (specifically, verbal abuse, 
physical assault and discrimination in access to 
or within the workplace) and perceiving racism in 
wider British society (believing that British employers 
discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, race or religion) 
had independent effects on the likelihood of having 
both a common mental disorder (such as anxiety or 
depression) and a psychosis-related disorder (Karlsen 
et al. 2005). Specifically, in multivariate models (which 
included measures of exposure to three dimensions 
of racism and adjusted for age, household 
occupational class and current employment status, 
and gender), experience of racially motivated verbal 
abuse or physical assault was associated with 
between a two- and a threefold increase in the risk 
of common mental disorder and psychosis; reporting 
experience of employment-related discrimination was 
associated with an almost 50% additional increased 
risk; while believing the majority of British employers 
to be discriminatory was associated with around a 
twofold increase in risk.
Is the relationship between 
racism and health causal, or just a 
statistical association?
The majority of the literature examining the 
relationship between experiences of racism and 
health uses cross-sectional data, leading to concerns 
that the relationship might not be causal. It is 
possible that a third factor leads to an increased risk 
both of racism and of poor mental health – such as 
living in an ethnically isolated environment – or that 
the experience of poor mental health may lead to 
a greater perception of hostility and a consequent 
greater likelihood to report experiences of racism 
and discrimination. However, there is an increasing 
quantity of evidence from longitudinal studies and 
this uniformly indicates that experiences of racial 
discrimination predate poor health (Barnes et al. 
2008, Gee and Walsemann 2009, Kwate and 
Goodman 2015, Wallace et al. 2016) and that 
changes in experience of racial discrimination are 
associated with changes in mental health (Rosenthal 
et al. 2015), suggesting the relationship is indeed 
causal. Equally important is that a causal relationship 
makes theoretical sense – there is an extensive 
literature demonstrating the causal relationship 
between stressful events and the onset of both 
mental and physical health problems, and on the 
biological impacts of social and economic stress that 
leads to poor health. Indeed, there is evidence that 
chronic exposure to everyday racial discrimination 
is associated with poor sleep (Lewis et al. 2013), 
coronary artery calcification (Lewis et al. 2006) and 
hormonal stress responses such as altered diurnal 
cortisol patterns and a higher cortisol awakening 
response (Adam et al. 2015).
The cumulative impact of racism 
on health
Another, perhaps more important, limitation of the 
use of cross-sectional data is that it treats incidents 
of racism as discrete events, without considering 
how they shape people’s experiences across a 
life course. This points to the need to improve our 
understanding of how the accumulation of exposure 
to racial discrimination over time is associated with 
increased risk of poor health. Some cross-sectional 
studies have shown that the accumulation of 
exposure to racial discrimination across different life 
domains (such as at work, in educational settings 
and while seeking healthcare) leads to a dose–
response association between racial discrimination 
and poor health (Harris et al. 2012, Harris et al. 
2013). In addition, one longitudinal study has shown 
a dose–response relation between experiences of 
racial discrimination across domains and over time 
and risk of mental illness – the greater the number of 
domains within which racism was experienced and 
the greater the number of experiences of racism over 
time, the greater the impact on mental health (see 
Figure 5.1).
Indeed, the experience of racial discrimination 
should be conceptualized as a dynamic process 
that operates across time, across domains and 
even across generations (Bécares et al. 2015), 
and consequently as having cumulative effects on 
health. Studies that do not take this into account are 
likely to underestimate the overall impact of racial 
discrimination on the health of individuals.
The broader reach of racism
Having summarized evidence on the direct harm 
that racism and discrimination do to ethnic minority 
people’s health, we now consider how racism has 
an impact beyond that of the actual experience. One 
possibility is that living with a fear of experiencing 
racism, something that survey evidence shows is 
much more common than directly experiencing 
racism (Virdee 1997, Bécares et al. 2009), may have 
an impact on health. This may occur as a result of 
the anticipatory stress of a possible future racist 
encounter and consequent enhanced vigilance. 
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For example, one study found that those people 
who reported being worried about being harassed 
were almost two-thirds more likely to report poor 
health than those who did not (Karlsen and Nazroo 
2004). And another study showed that fear of racial 
discrimination, expressed through reporting feeling 
unsafe or avoiding spaces or places, had a larger 
cumulative effect on the mental health of ethnic 
minority people than direct experiences of racism 
(Wallace et al. 2016). Other UK-based studies 
have also reported the increased harm of fear of 
experiencing racial discrimination on health (Bécares 
et al. 2009a). These findings suggest that awareness 
of racial discrimination experienced by others, or 
previous exposure to racial discrimination over the life 
course, can have an impact on the mental health of 
ethnic minority people as a result of the vigilance and 
fear that they generate.
In addition to the importance of the anticipatory 
stress that fear of racism produces, studies have 
shown that vicarious exposure to racism is also 
harmful to health. Studies focusing on children 
show that ethnic minority children growing up 
in an environment where experiences of racial 
discrimination are common – that is, where their 
mothers, other family members or other people in 
the neighbourhood are racially insulted and treated 
disrespectfully and unfairly because of their ethnicity 
– are more likely to suffer from socio-emotional 
problems as they grow up than their peers from 
ethnic minority backgrounds whose families do not 
report experiences of racial discrimination (Bécares 
et al. 2015). The impact on children of vicarious 
exposure to racial discrimination has also been 
shown with other health outcomes such as obesity 
(Kelly et al. 2013), childhood illnesses (Priest et 
al. 2012) and adolescent mental health outcomes 
(Benner and Wang 2017). These findings show that 
racial discrimination that adults experience harms 
not only their health, but that of others close to them, 
including their children.
Racism, social and economic 
inequality, and ethnic inequalities 
in health
If we consider racism to be a system of structuring 
opportunity and assigning values to people and 
groups, based on phenotypic characteristics, that 
results in unfairly disadvantaging some individuals 
and communities, while unfairly advantaging others 
(Jones 2000), then it is also important to consider 
how these broader disadvantages impact on the 
health of ethnic minority people and shape the ethnic 
inequalities in health briefly outlined earlier.
Evidence has repeatedly shown that on average 
people from ethnic minority groups have lower 
incomes and are concentrated in environmentally and 
economically poorer geographic areas, live in poorer 
quality and more overcrowded accommodation, 
occupy less desirable occupations, and have a 
higher risk of unemployment and of longer periods 
of unemployment, than their ethnic majority 
counterparts. Elsewhere in this report the range 
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Figure 5.1: Changes in mental health functioning relative to those with no experience of racism
Note: a higher score represents a better mental health functioning. Source: Wallace et al. (2016).
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of social and economic disadvantages faced by 
Muslim people in the UK, and how these relate to 
Islamophobia, has been outlined. The impact of 
these social and economic disadvantages on the 
health of Muslim people is profound. The relation 
between social position and health is widely 
documented (The Marmot Review 2010) and 
socioeconomic disadvantage has been shown to 
make a major contribution to ethnic inequalities in 
health (Nazroo 2001, 2003).
However, although the direct impact of racism on 
health and of socioeconomic inequalities on ethnic 
inequalities in health have been well documented, 
and even studied together (Karlsen and Nazroo 
2002, Nazroo 2003), their joint effects within a 
broader conceptualization of racism have been rarely 
assessed. One exception is Wallace et al. (2016), a 
study that set out to assess the broad contribution 
of racial discrimination to ethnic inequalities in mental 
health. It did this by simultaneously modelling two 
dimensions of racial disadvantage that lead to poor 
health: the effect of direct experiences of racism on 
physiological changes (Clark et al. 1999) and the 
social and economic consequences of living in a 
racialized society (Nazroo 2003). The study found 
that adjusting for socioeconomic disadvantage 
and experiences of racial discrimination eliminated 
ethnic inequalities in mental health for Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi people and reduced inequalities for 
Black Caribbean people. The implication is that the 
ethnic inequalities in health that we observe can be 
attributed to processes of racism leading to social 
and economic inequality and personally targeted 
threat.
Causal pathways and 
opportunities to address ethnic 
inequalities in health
As summarized above, the stress associated 
with having a negatively racialized identity is, 
not surprisingly, associated with an increased 
risk of experiencing mental illness. This is in 
part a consequence of the social and economic 
inequalities associated with racialized identities 
as a consequence of structural and institutional 
racism, and in part a consequence of the direct 
impact on health of experiences of racism and 
discrimination. In the case of direct experiences of 
racism, the course of the pathway between socially 
inflicted trauma and health, beyond any immediate 
physical injury, is little understood. In general, it has 
been suggested that long-term exposure to inferior 
treatment and a devalued status is damaging to 
self-esteem, invalidates self-worth and may block 
aspirations. Such exposure may shape the content 
and frequency of stressful life events and may limit 
the range of feasible responses to them, as well as 
the social support available. All of these will have 
severe consequences for health. More specifically, 
the discriminatory act may produce a sense of threat 
within the victim that may cause various reactions, 
including fear, distress, anger, humiliation and denial. 
These reactions could produce a physiological 
response (be it cardiovascular, endocrine, 
neurological, immunological) that subsequently 
affects health.
It is also important to acknowledge here that 
racism, unlike other criminal acts, need not be 
personal to produce a threat, because it is targeted 
at phenotypic and cultural characteristics that are 
shared across individuals, communities and groups, 
rather than solely at an individual (Virdee 1997). 
Such attacks thus might impact more broadly on 
people’s identities, fear, humiliation, etc. In addition, 
people living in a climate of fear and insecurity may 
adapt by constraining their lives to avoid vulnerable 
situations, a response that may also lead to stress 
(Virdee 1997).
One response to such psychological vulnerability 
would be to argue that we should find ways of 
enhancing individuals’ resilience in the light of such 
negative events and circumstances. However, 
this response is based on a narrow perspective 
on resilience that sees it predominantly in terms 
of psychological resources. This type of response 
would shift the problem away from the racialized 
nature of society that directly or indirectly supports 
racism and discrimination, and away from community 
action, towards the individual at risk of experiencing 
racism, placing ever greater burdens on members 
of marginalized and racialized communities while 
leaving unchanged, and unchallenged, the underlying 
causes of racism and health inequalities. Instead, 
we should focus on community, societal and political 
responses. There are some clues in the literature as 
to the value of this.
One comes from the literature that suggests that 
ethnic minority people living together is protective 
for their health, a so-called ethnic density effect. So, 
after taking account of the concentration of poverty 
and deprivation in a neighbourhood, studies have 
found ethnic minority people who live in ethnically 
dense areas to have better mental health (Shaw et 
al. 2012) and, for some outcomes, better physical 
health (Bécares et al. 2012) compared with those 
who live in areas with lower ethnic density. A handful 
of studies have explored what might be driving this 
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ethnic density effect and these have shown that the 
main pathway is through a decrease in experiences 
of interpersonal racism and discrimination (Bécares 
et al. 2009b, Das-Munshi et al. 2010). Also, related 
to this, some research has shown that not only is the 
frequency of experiences of racism lower in places 
of higher ethnic density, there is also a tendency 
towards a weaker association between racism 
and health as ethnic density increases (Bécares et 
al. 2009b). Ethnically dense areas also have the 
potential to provide increased opportunities for social 
support, civic engagement and social cohesion, 
which is also protective of health (Stafford et al. 
2009). So, ethnic density, which is generally thought 
of in terms of the negative impacts of residential 
concentration, is perhaps better considered in terms 
of social networks and supportive communities, 
providing health-protective and health-promoting 
effects for ethnic minority people (Halpern and 
Nazroo 2000, Bécares et al. 2009b, Pickett and 
Wilkinson 2008).
Another clue comes from the evidence suggesting 
that ethnic minority people who explicitly recognize 
the racist nature of their experiences retain higher 
levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy, compared 
with those who internalize or deny their experiences 
(Krieger and Sidney 1996). The implication is that 
the public recognition of such events as racist, as 
the product of social factors unconnected to the 
targets of the action, is protective. Overall then, it 
seems that a public recognition of racism and the 
ways in which it operates in our society, together with 
a lack of tolerance for the expression of prejudicial, 
racist and discriminatory attitudes, is crucial to 
reducing exposure to and the impact of racism. 
Here grassroots political action, and central political 
leadership, may well be crucial.
Concluding comments
Here we have summarized the evidence showing 
the harm that racism does to ethnic minority 
people’s health, either directly or through 
consequent social and economic disadvantage; 
the pathways through which these effects operate; 
how racism is the fundamental driver of ethnic 
inequalities in health; and the need to respond to 
this. Although only a minority of racist incidents 
do physical harm, it is clear that living in a society 
where their identities are racialized does harm 
to the health of ethnic minority people – their life 
expectancy and their healthy life expectancy are 
shortened. Insofar as the racism experienced 
by Muslim people is shaped by Islamophobia, 
as argued elsewhere in this report, it is clear 
that Islamophobia harms health, a claim that is 
supported by the evidence that the impact of racism 
on health does not vary across ethnic minority 
groups (Bécares et al. 2009a).
The broad policy implication of this is clear: to 
protect the health of ethnic minority people we need 
to understand the nature of and address racism in 
our society.
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Layla’s story
Nurse, 23, London, British Arab, female
‘I work in healthcare because I want to help people and make them better but in my job I regularly face 
Islamophobia and racism’
I’m a born and bred East Londoner and despite London’s multiculturalism, the amount of Islamophobia 
I experience is astonishing. I work in healthcare because I want to help people and make them better 
but in my job I regularly face Islamophobia and racism, particularly after the terrorist attacks across 
Europe in 2016 and 2017.
For example, I had a middle-aged man who had various medical issues and he refused to 
acknowledge me as his nurse from his first night. When I asked why he told me to ‘fuck off back to 
your Paki country’. When I explained I’m not Asian and I’m only here to help him he got increasingly 
abusive, calling me a ‘Terrorist bitch’, ‘Terrorist cunt’, asking me whether I was having intercourse 
with Osama Bin Laden and taunting me throughout the night about me wearing the hijab. He 
refused to take any of the medication I had given him and said that he would ‘rather die than be 
nursed by a terrorist’. 
When I asked to be allocated a different patient my manager told me that it was unprofessional of 
me to make such a request. This should have made me upset but sadly it didn’t because I’ve also 
experienced Islamophobia and racism from a young age which has made it a normality within my 
everyday life. My classmates in secondary school mocked the hijab, the Qur’an and the Prophet 
Muhammad, peace be upon him. After the 2017 terrorist attacks in London, I’ve seen more and more 
of my own friends from university, colleagues that I work with and train with, express their contempt for 
Muslims on various social media. 
Many Muslims will tell you that they don’t pay much attention to the Islamophobic comments from 
strangers because of their ignorance, but you can’t play down comments from your own colleagues 
and friends who’ve know you for years. My family and some of my friends give me a lot of support but 
even though they’re no strangers to racism they can’t understand what I am going through. Offloading 
to them is not enough. Healthcare professional are bound by law to treat people in a non-judgmental 
manner even if patients are being abusive. But what about us? 
* Layla’s name has been changed to protect her identity
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6 Impacts of anti-Muslim hate crime
Imran Awan and Irene Zempi
Introduction
Hate crime has consistently been an issue for 
policymakers, academics and public and private 
sector stakeholders. Following the Brexit vote and 
terrorist attacks in Manchester and London in 2017, 
we have now seen a sharp rise in hate crimes and 
anti-Muslim attacks in Britain (Sharman and Jones 
2017, Littler and Feldman 2015). These incidents 
include mosques being targeted, Muslim women 
who have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face 
veil) pulled off, and two Muslims in London who were 
the subject of a horrific acid attack (Hooper 2017). A 
2017 analysis of Tell MAMA’s (Measuring Anti-Muslim 
Attacks) data found that it recorded 141 hate crime 
incidents after the Manchester attack, and after the 
London Bridge attack they rose sharply again (Dodd 
and Marsh 2017). According to a survey by the Pew 
Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
opinions about Muslims in Europe are considerably 
negative. For example, (52%) Spanish and (50%) 
German respondents rated Muslims unfavourably.
According to the survey, one in four people in 
Britain and the United States also hold unfavourable 
views about Muslims (Pew Research Center 2008). 
Research has shown that in most cases, the victims 
of Islamophobic hate crimes are wearing traditional 
Islamic clothing at the time of the incident, and 
the perpetrators are overwhelmingly white male 
(Awan 2016, Littler and Feldman 2015). Muslims, 
particularly those with a ‘visible’ Muslim identity, are 
therefore more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hostility, 
intimidation, abuse and threats of violence. Indeed, 
for repeat victims, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim 
hostility in a globalized world. From this perspective, 
it is crucial that we have a better understanding 
of anti-Muslim hate crime and its impact upon 
Muslim men and women, their families and wider 
communities, and that as a society we examine and 
identify ways to prevent and respond to anti-Muslim 
hostility in Britain. For example, measures to help 
increase reporting of anti-Muslim hate crime, the 
services offered to support victims of Islamophobic 
hate crime, the recording of Islamophobic hate 
crimes and the use of educational workshops 
in schools are important measures in tackling 
Islamophobic hate crime.
Individual impacts
Being a victim of any kind of crime can have 
devastating and long-term impacts upon individuals, 
including emotional, psychological, behavioural, 
physical and financial effects. However, evidence 
shows that ‘hate crimes hurt more’. Empirical studies 
of targeted victimization emphasize the more severe 
impact for victims of hate crime when compared with 
non-hate victims (see, for example, Smith et al. 2012, 
Chakraborti et al. 2014, Williams and Tregidga 2014). 
In the context of anti-Muslim hate crime, both virtual- 
and physical-world attacks upon Muslims ‘hurt’ more 
than ‘normal’ crimes as they are seen as an attack 
upon the victims’ Muslim identity (Awan and Zempi 
2015). From this perspective, the impact of anti-
Muslim hate crime may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime 
because of victims’ perceived and actual vulnerability 
due to their affiliation to Islam.
In addition to potentially suffering physical injury, 
victims of anti-Muslim hate crime can be affected 
emotionally. In particular, there are distinct emotional 
effects associated with this victimization, including 
feelings of fear, insecurity, anxiety, vulnerability, 
isolation and depression. Given that they are targeted 
because of the ‘visibility’ of their Muslim identity 
– which is easily identifiable, either in the virtual 
world or in the physical sphere, because of their 
Muslim name and/or Muslim appearance – victims 
are unable to take comfort in the belief that what 
happened to them was simply random and ‘could 
have happened to anyone’. Rather, they are forced to 
view this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity, 
and this has severe implications for their levels of 
confidence and self-esteem as well as their feelings 
of belonging and safety in the UK.
A key finding in research conducted by Awan and 
Zempi (2015) was that participants were multiple 
and repeat victims of both cyber- and physical-
world forms of anti-Muslim hate crime. Rarely did 
participants describe anti-Muslim hate crime as 
‘one-off’; rather, there was always the sense, the 
fear, the expectation of another attack. Repeat 
incidents of cyber- and/or physical-world anti-Muslim 
hate increase feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and 
anxiety among victims. Bowling (2009) states that 
repeated or persistent victimization can undermine 
the security of actual and potential victims, and 
induce fear and anxiety. The distressing nature of 
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anti-Muslim hate crime, coupled with the frequency 
with which these acts are committed, creates high 
levels of fear among actual and potential victims.
Participants in Awan and Zempi’s study also 
highlighted the relationship between cyber- and 
physical-world anti-Muslim hate crime, and 
described living in fear because of the possibility of 
online threats materializing in the ‘real world’ (Awan 
and Zempi 2015). Unarguably, the internet allows 
people to take on a new and anonymous identity, 
and to bypass traditional editorial controls, to share 
their views with millions. Online anti-Muslim hate 
messages can be sent anonymously or by using a 
false identity, making it difficult to identify the offender. 
The anonymity aspect in cases of online anti-Muslim 
hate messages is extremely frightening, as the 
perpetrator could be anyone and the online threats 
could escalate into the physical space.
In light of the profound negative impacts of anti-
Muslim hate crime, it is clear that the emotional scars 
can last for a long time. When another incident takes 
place, victims relive previous incidents of anti-Muslim 
hate crime. As a result, some individuals might suffer 
from depression, eating disorders, sleep pattern 
disturbances including insomnia and nightmares, 
flashbacks, and memory lapses. The continual threat 
of abuse can be emotionally draining for victims, 
who not only relive past incidents but also feel the 
need to be constantly on the alert. This shows that 
anti-Muslim hate crime can result in a cumulative 
experience of psychological trauma and emotional 
burn-out over time.
Seen in this context, anti-Muslim hate crime 
disrupts notions of belonging while maintaining the 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This highlights 
the immediate effect of anti-Muslim hate crime, 
which is to undermine victims’ sense of security and 
belonging, while the eventual impact is to create 
fear about living in a particular locality and to inspire 
a wish to move away (Bowling 2009). In this way 
spaces and places are created in which ‘others’ are 
made to feel unwelcome and vulnerable to attack, 
and from which they may eventually be excluded 
(Bowling 2009). Correspondingly, an additional 
cost that victims of anti-Muslim hate crime often 
experience is a change in their routines and lifestyles. 
In this case, the threat of both cyber- and physical-
world anti-Muslim hate crime is so ‘real’ that it can 
cause individuals to change the way that they live 
their lives, and even to take steps to become less 
‘visibly Muslim’.
In this context, individuals appear to manage 
impressions of their Muslim identity in public and 
online mainly through concealment, with the aim 
of reducing the risk of future abuse. Zempi (2014) 
found that Muslim women who wear the niqab 
often try to become less ‘visible’ by taking the niqab 
off. Relatedly, Zempi (2014) found that the threat 
of anti-Muslim hate crime had long-lasting effects 
for individual victims, including making them afraid 
to leave their homes and leaving them feeling like 
‘social lepers’ and ‘social outcasts’. As a result, 
common sensations cited by veiled Muslim women 
were those of panic attacks, worry, extreme anxiety 
and depression, which were said to derive from the 
fear of having to endure future victimization when in 
public. Thus women were often reluctant to leave 
the house through fear of being attacked, particularly 
on the street, in parks, in shops and on public 
transport. However, some women described feeling 
like ‘prisoners in their own home’. Although the 
experience and fear of anti-Muslim hate crime had 
‘forced’ these women to withdraw from wider social 
participation, this was seen as the ‘only way’ to 
decrease their sense of vulnerability as they felt that 
there was nowhere else that they could be safe from 
the threat of anti-Muslim hate crime. It is important, 
too, to highlight the gendered nature of anti-Muslim 
hate crime. Indeed, Zempi (2014) found that veiled 
Muslim women face anti-Muslim hostility not only 
because of their religion but also because of their 
gender and, specifically, gender performance.
Overall, this discussion illustrates how the enactment 
of geographical boundaries impacts upon ‘emotional 
geographies’ in relation to the way in which actual 
and potential victims perceive spaces and places 
inside and outside their ‘comfort zones’ (Hopkins 
2007). Rather than risk the threat of being attacked, 
many actual and potential victims choose to retreat 
to their ‘own’ communities and as a result become 
reclusive. Clearly, this limits the behavioural options 
and life choices of individuals, as it determines their 
area of residence, their vocational pursuits and leisure 
activities, their mode of transport, and even their 
access to educational opportunities. Concurrently, 
this reality often results in segregation in housing, 
transportation, education, employment and leisure 
activities. However, for Perry and Alvi (2012) this is 
not a voluntary choice; rather, it is the ‘safe’ choice. 
Whether cyber- or physical-world, the reality of anti-
Muslim hate crime creates ‘invisible’ boundaries, 
across which members of the Muslim community are 
not ‘welcome’ to step.
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Community and societal impacts
As discussed above, anti-Muslim hate crime may 
damage victims’ self-esteem, confidence and feelings 
of security far more than ‘ordinary’ crimes. In this 
regard, it is victims’ intrinsic identity that is targeted: 
something which is central to their sense of being 
and which they cannot or do not wish to change. 
The emotional, psychological and behavioural harms 
associated with anti-Muslim hate crime are not 
restricted to victims; rather, the harm extends to the 
wider Muslim community, both nationally and globally.
Awareness of the potential for anti-Muslim hate crime 
enhances the sense of fearfulness and insecurity 
of all Muslims due to their group membership. 
Consequently, the threat of anti-Muslim hate 
crime impacts upon notions of belonging and 
cohesion among Muslims, who are reminded of 
the appropriate alignment of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This 
shows that Islamophobic hostility affects not only 
the individual victim but also the community to 
which victims belong. Indeed, as Perry (2001) points 
out, hate crimes are ‘message crimes’ whereby 
a message of hate, terror and vulnerability is 
communicated to the victim’s broader community. 
Within this framework, incidents of anti-Muslim hate 
crime send out a terroristic message to the wider 
Muslim community. Specifically, the intent of hate 
crime offenders is to send a message to multiple 
audiences: the victim, who needs to be punished 
for his/her inappropriate performance of identity; 
the victim’s community, who need to learn that they 
too are vulnerable to the same fate; and the broader 
community, who are also reminded of the appropriate 
alignment of ‘us’ and ‘them’.
As such, anti-Muslim hate crime affects wider society 
on the basis that it isolates and excludes Muslims, 
thereby creating fear, resentment and mistrust of 
the ‘Muslim Other’. The separation of communities 
based on this dichotomy promotes a situation where 
both Muslims and non-Muslims live in fear of each 
other. This separation prevents ‘us’ and ‘them’ from 
interacting with each other and increases fear of 
engagement on both sides. As such, anti-Muslim 
hate crime promotes the notion of ‘parallel lives’ 
and self-enclosed communities. The separation 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ means that Muslims and 
non-Muslims have little or no experience of each 
other’s daily existence (Zempi and Chakraborti 2015). 
In addition, this separation contributes to a lack of 
shared experiences, with little opportunity for the 
emergence of shared values. In theory, the notion of 
community cohesion highlights the importance of a 
common sense of belonging and the need for shared 
values and integration. However, the pattern of 
separation described here shows that the community 
cohesion agenda is based exclusively upon the 
obligation of Muslim minorities to integrate, and as a 
result the problem of non-integration is seen to rest 
with Muslims themselves (Zempi and Chakraborti 
2014). This demonstrates the link between anti-
Muslim hate crime and community cohesion.
Conclusion
Ultimately, anti-Muslim hate crime attempts to divide 
the world into two homogeneous groupings, ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, while failing to recognize that the wider 
Muslim community comprises a number of fluid, 
overlapping and internally diverse national, racial and 
ethnic communities, which cut across any simple 
majority/minority division. Thus, the impacts of anti-
Muslim hate crime extend to society as a whole by 
promoting the separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
(Zempi and Chakraborti 2015). In this sense, the 
individual and societal impacts of anti-Muslim hate 
crime are the creation of disruption, fear, hostility, 
suspicion and isolation for both ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
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Sahar’s story
Molecular geneticist/campaigner, Cardiff, British, Arab, female
‘I want to see Muslim women confident within their identities, unapologetic about their choices, 
successful in every aspect of their lives, contributing to society and participating in public life.’
I am a Muslim woman of colour who chose to wear the face-veil (niqab) out of conviction of faith. I 
have been the target of much Islamophobic verbal, and sometimes physical, abuse in the streets, 
shopping centres and hospitals, so much so that I don’t know what life is without it. I have had people 
call me a ‘terrorist’, ‘bomber’ or shouting, ‘Go back to your country!’ with such vitriol and even grossly 
swearing at me. It is excruciating to live with. 
I once gave an interview with the BBC and someone passed by, looked fearlessly at the camera and 
shouted ‘Fucking bomber’. This is what happens in front of the camera: you can imagine would could 
happen behind it.
It was very difficult for me to go to university because of the fear of people and their reaction to me. I 
considered quitting many times, thinking that the university would be just an additional place of abuse. 
I used to cry on my way to university, and if I had not had my supportive father who pushed me to 
face my fears courageously, I think I would have returned home at the steps of my university building. 
During my time in university, I never faced discrimination from the staff or lecturers. In fact, my personal 
tutor went to great lengths to support me, well above and beyond his job description.
However, soon after graduation the struggle of finding a job began. At the beginning, I was not 
shortlisted for any job I applied for, so I took my CV to one of my supervisors asking for it to be 
reviewed. The first thing she said: ‘Sahar, your CV is good and your work with the Muslim community 
illustrates excellent leadership, organization and communication skills. But it’s too “Islamic”, and in 
the current hostile environment concerning Muslims, you cannot get anywhere with it.’ I reluctantly 
changed my CV, and was immediately shortlisted and offered an interview.
Many Islamophobes accuse me and others of raising the victim card, belittling my struggles, blaming 
my choice as a polarizing tool. I want to say to these Islamophobes, yes I am a victim of your hate and 
bigotry, that is not a card I am raising and I don’t have the victim mentality.
As a result of my experiences I decided to take a career break for one year to campaign against 
Islamophobia full-time. 
I just don’t want anyone to go through what I’ve been through. I want to see Muslim women confident 
within their identities, unapologetic about their choices, successful in every aspect of their lives, 
contributing to society and participating in public life. I will not spare any time or effort in achieving that.
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7 Prevent and the normalization of Islamophobia
Barbara Cohen and Waqas Tufail
2 UN Committees on the Rights of the Child and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association.
3 One exception is HM Government (2015a): paragraph 71 and footnote 14.
Introduction 
In order to understand Islamophobia in the UK, the 
state’s relationship with Muslim communities must 
also be examined. Following the commencement 
in 2001 of the ‘war on terror’, the UK government 
acted to restrict civil liberties and to enact laws giving 
the state enhanced powers to combat terrorism and 
to protect its citizens specifically against the threat 
posed by ‘Islamist extremists’, foreign and domestic. 
The state’s counter-terrorism focus upon Muslim 
communities over the past two decades has had a 
role in fostering and furthering Islamophobia, a form 
of racism that is readily identifiable in the UK today.
‘Prevent’, as a key element within ‘CONTEST’, 
the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, 
has been criticized as discriminatory and counter-
productive from the outset. Through its specific 
targeting of Muslim communities, Prevent has 
been regarded with suspicion as a tool to collect 
intelligence (Dawson 2016: 6). And the criticisms 
of Prevent have been stronger, more specific and 
more widespread since the approach made it the 
responsibility of schools, universities, hospitals, 
local councils, prisons, etc. to prevent individuals 
from becoming terrorists. From trade unions whose 
members are now legally mandated to work with 
Prevent to international human rights research and 
policy organizations (Rights Watch UK 2016, Open 
Society Justice Initiative 2016) and UN institutions,2 
the same concerns are raised again and again: 
Prevent is discriminatory in its operation, if not its 
intent, with the consequence that it alienates the very 
people it claims it wants to engage with; contrary 
to the ‘British values’ it extols, in its implementation 
Prevent involves denial of basic human rights.
Prevent, the public sector equality 
duty, the Prevent duty and 
Channel
Prevent has had two distinct phases. Initially it was 
concerned with preventing violent extremism, with 
the principal threat seen to come from ‘Islamist 
terrorists’. Prevent put the onus on Muslim 
communities, providing funding to support local 
programmes for young Muslims. Kundnani (2014) 
notes that during this period Prevent funding 
was compulsory for local authorities with Muslim 
populations of over 2,000, a practice he describes 
as ‘racial and religious profiling’ and which may 
well have been challenged as a potential violation 
of anti-discrimination legislation, had it been 
more widely known about at the time. Phase 2, 
from 2011, extended the focus of Prevent from 
‘violent extremism’ to broadly defined ‘extremism’, 
challenging ideas which the government saw as 
contributing to radicalization. Prevent now relies on 
frontline public sector institutions, having become 
a legal duty of these institutions under the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015).
The public sector equality duty
All of the public authorities subject to the Prevent 
duty are also subject to the public sector equality 
duty (PSED) in the Equality Act 2010:
a public authority must, in the exercise of 
its functions, have due regard to the need 
to … eliminate discrimination, advance equality 
of opportunity and foster good relations between 
different groups defined by race, sex, religion or 
belief, age, disability, sexual orientation, pregnancy 
or maternity or gender reassignment (protected 
characteristics) [our emphasis].
To comply with the PSED a public body is expected 
to consider the impact or likely impact on persons 
with one or more protected characteristics of its 
policies and practices, taking appropriate steps to 
remove or mitigate adverse impact. 
The PSED has been in force since April 2011. There 
is very little evidence that PSED requirements were 
taken into account in relation to Prevent, either when 
the revised strategy was developed, or at any time 
since, including when it was made a legal duty on all 
public authorities.3
The Prevent duty
The basic language of the Prevent duty is identical to 
that of the PSED: 
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a public authority must, in the exercise of is 
functions, have due regard to the need to 
prevent people being drawn into terrorism [our 
emphasis].
The strength of the obligations under the Prevent 
duty is no different to that of those under the PSED. 
However, differences in enforcement4 and in the 
politics of the day have resulted in authorities being 
incentivized to implement the Prevent duty with 
scant regard to the PSED, even when confronted 
with hard evidence of differential treatment of 
Muslims. Despite efforts by the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC), rarely does a public 
authority seek to meet its equality duties alongside 
its Prevent duties,5 with the inevitable consequence 
of discrimination becoming entrenched in the 
implementation of Prevent.
Under the CTSA, public authorities must have regard 
to the Home Secretary’s guidance on how to meet 
the Prevent duty. The current guidance describes the 
Government’s objectives and provides sector-specific 
guidance on compliance with the duty. 
Prevent guidance: opening the 
door to targeting of Muslims 
While the guidance states that Prevent is intended to 
deal with all kinds of terrorist threats, it is difficult not 
to read into it a clear targeting of Muslims. Noting that 
‘terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose 
a continued threat’, the guidance nevertheless places 
particular emphasis on the dangerous ideology of 
Islamist extremists (HM Government 2015c).
The guidance implies a progression from non-
violent extremism to terrorism – a progression that 
is implied to be proven, although this is denied as 
necessarily the case by government officials and 
strongly rejected by a range of experts (see for 
example Weaver 2015 and Gearty 2012). However, 
this link between ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’ is 
necessary to support the government’s emphasis 
on challenging ideas and pre-criminal activities as an 
effective means of preventing people being drawn 
into terrorism. 
The much-criticized wide definitions of the core 
concepts of Prevent in the guidance permit varied 
individual interpretations, including those infected 
by prejudice, leading to implementation based on 
4 For example, under the CTSA, section 30, but not the PSED, the Secretary of State can issue directions requiring compliance which can be 
enforced by the courts.
5 Recent research has found that none of the processes to give effect to the PSED were being followed in the implementation of Prevent by 
universities in England (Massoumi 2017).
Islamophobic stereotypes and discrimination. Basic 
uncertainty starts from the unclear and problematic 
definition of ‘extremism’ as,
vocal or active opposition to fundamental British 
values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs. (HM Government 2015c)
The guidance sets out how the duty should be 
met within the functions of a particular sector; the 
primary task for all sectors is to identify and refer 
people at risk of being drawn into terrorism. The 
relevance of the duty for safeguarding responsibilities 
is emphasized in guidance for local authorities, 
education, childcare and health. A recent report 
suggests that some teachers feel more confident 
about their role in Prevent when it is made part of 
safeguarding, a duty they already understand (Busher 
et al. 2017). Other observers of Prevent dispute 
the legitimacy of using safeguarding – intended to 
protect vulnerable children and adults – for purposes 
of counter-terrorism.
Impact on free speech
The guidance for universities reflects the 
Government’s belief that extremists are at work 
on campuses preaching ‘hate’ and radicalizing 
students and staff (Martin 2015). Importantly, the 
CTSA requires universities and the Secretary of State 
to have particular regard to the statutory duties of 
universities to ensure freedom of speech and the 
importance of academic freedom. However, there is a 
real risk that in meeting the Prevent duty universities 
will feel obliged to give lesser weight to protecting 
free speech, since they are advised by the guidance 
that in addition to identifying individuals vulnerable 
to radicalization, a university should not permit an 
event involving an external speaker to take place 
unless the university is ‘entirely convinced’ that any 
extremist views likely to draw people into terrorism 
can be fully mitigated (HM Government 2015b). 
Prevent officers are known to have actively worked to 
persuade venues to cancel legitimate events on the 
topic of Prevent and Islamophobia, sought to place 
student Islamic societies on university campuses 
under surveillance and requested details of event 
attendees. Prevent is infringing on the rights of 
citizens, and particularly those campaigning from 
within Muslim civil society.
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Channel: dubious criteria for 
assessing vulnerability to 
radicalization
An essential element of Prevent is ‘Channel’, 
which now operates under the CTSA. Channel is 
a multi-agency programme to assess the extent of 
vulnerability to radicalization of a person referred 
by the police, and, where appropriate, draw up a 
(de-radicalization) support plan or refer the person 
to health or social care services. Some uncertainty 
exists regarding the requirement for consent before 
intervention or sharing of personal information 
by Channel. The assessment of vulnerability by 
Channel is based on a framework comprising 22 
factors, grouped under ‘engagement’, ‘intent’ and 
‘capability’ (HM Government 2012b), which may 
or may not apply to a referred person. The lack 
of reliable evidence to support the validity of this 
assessment, which is applied to children and adults 
referred by non-specialists via the police, gives rise 
to real doubts regarding the integrity of the process. 
While there has been little academic research 
conducted on Channel (not least because of a lack 
of transparency and openness from government in 
terms of data), a study by Coppock and McGovern 
(2014) argues that it is ‘ill-conceived’, relies on 
‘pseudo science’ and, through its reliance on 
untested cognitive behavioural therapies, may in fact 
cause harm to its recipients. 
Without effective Prevent training 
the risks of discrimination are 
greater
Strictly, every person in a public-facing role within all 
of the authorities subject to the Prevent duty should 
be trained; this new responsibility is too serious, and 
the consequences too grave, for it to be carried out 
by people working in different disciplines who may 
be unclear as to what they are expected to do. This 
training should also include an anti-discrimination 
component and cover authorities’ responsibilities 
under the PSED. More than two years since the 
duty came into force there remain serious concerns 
in every sector regarding the quality, content and 
coverage of the training, which comes in a variety of 
packages put together by different agencies, without 
any validation or regulation. For example, a BMJ 
survey was told by an NHS Trust in London ‘94% 
of staff have had basic level one Prevent training’. 
However, that training consists of ‘information leaflets 
supported by a quiz’ (Gulland 2017).
Prevent and the normalization of 
Islamophobia
There are numerous accounts of Muslim students 
in schools and colleges and at universities being 
referred under Prevent for what emerge as the most 
mundane of reasons, including simply reading a 
particular library book or engaging in campus-based 
pro-Palestine or anti-racist activism. An inevitable 
outcome of the CTSA is that counter-terrorism is 
now within the country’s classrooms, lecture halls, 
hospitals and public libraries. No longer solely the 
preserve of the police, now teachers, lecturers, 
doctors, social workers and public sector staff more 
broadly form the core of the state counter-terrorism 
apparatus. With key Prevent operators often only 
informed by a one-hour Prevent presentation of 
dubious quality (carried out by private companies), 
it is unsurprising that acts of discrimination and 
prejudice occur in the over-zealous reporting of 
supposedly ‘suspicious’ individuals (Ward 2017). 
Within a national climate of anti-Muslim racism, 
where the necessity of Prevent is routinely associated 
by the government and media with Muslims and/
or Islam, there is evidence of frontline professionals 
relying on existing biases and stereotypes. There 
is a public debate that is yet to take place about 
the fact that the majority of these so-called 
‘suspicious’ individuals, behaving perfectly lawfully 
but deemed vulnerable to radicalization, are Muslim 
schoolchildren, left traumatized after being wrongly 
regarded as potential terrorists. 
Muslims consistently grossly 
over-represented among referrals 
to Channel
Whether as a result of a particular interpretation 
of the Home Secretary’s Prevent guidance, wholly 
inadequate training or anxieties regarding sanctions 
for non-compliance, the reality is that staff working 
within public sector institutions are disproportionately 
identifying Muslims of all ages as ‘extremists’ or 
‘vulnerable to radicalization’ and referring them, via 
the police, to Channel, the government’s so-called 
‘de-radicalization’ scheme.
The 2011 Census recorded Muslims as constituting 
4.8% of the UK population; with different age 
demographics to the population as a whole, it is 
estimated that Muslims comprise approximately 8% 
of the population under 18. Percentages of Muslims 
referred under Prevent are significantly out of line with 
these proportions.
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Statistics published by the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council6 show a significant increase in referrals 
between 2014/15 and 2015/16 (the latter including 
nine months when the Prevent duty was in force); 
there was an increase of nearly 90% in the total 
number of Channel referrals, including an increase 
of 250% in referrals of children under 10 and an 
increase of 114% in referrals of young people 
under 18, between these two years. This data also 
discloses consistently high proportions of Muslims 
being referred (or referrals based on a risk of ‘Islamist 
extremism’, which we submit is a reliable proxy for 
‘Muslim’), in both years (see Table 7.1).
For the two-year period March 2014 to March 2016, 
when the religion of persons under 18 referred 
to Channel was recorded, the total recorded as 
Muslim was nearly six times greater than the total 
recorded as belonging to any other religion. If we 
take population size into account, Muslim children 
were 44 times more likely to be referred compared to 
those belonging to any other religion.7
The explanation put forward to justify this wide 
disparity8 which was apparent before the Prevent 
duty came into force, was that ‘terrorists who 
claim to act in the name of Islam’, who pose the 
‘greatest threat to the UK, ‘specifically target 
Muslims’ and therefore the ‘support offered through 
Channel’ is predominately provided to Muslim 
communities. However, as 80% of Channel referrals 
are not taken as far as the ‘de-radicalization’ or 
‘support’ stage,9 the consistent gross over-referral 
of Muslims, especially Muslim children and young 
people, strongly reflects Islamophobic prejudice 
and stereotyping going well beyond an accurate 
assessment of the risks of extremism. With pressure 
on teachers, social workers, doctors and the police 
to refer individuals and no sanctions for over-referral, 
it is likely that the present pattern will continue. 
This will mean a state-sponsored programme 
which results in the wholly unnecessary intimidation 
6 NPCC, ‘Freedom of Information request to National Police Chiefs’ Council’, Ref. 000043/16. Available at: www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/
NPCC%20FOI/CT/043%2016%20NPCC%20response%20att%2001%20of%2001%2014042016.pdf.
7 NPCC, ‘Freedom of Information request to National Police Chiefs’ Council’.
8 NPCC, ‘National Channel referral figures’. Available at: www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx.
9 NPCC, ‘National Channel referral figures’.
and stigmatization of thousands of mainly Muslim 
children and adults who have done nothing wrong 
and who, as a result, may feel further alienated from 
British society.
Cumulative impact of Prevent
In contemporary Britain, Muslims are regarded as a 
policing and social policy problem, in requirement of 
state intervention. In terms of counter-terrorism, this 
manifests itself in Prevent, with the state demanding 
cooperation and partnership from the ‘Muslim 
community’ (no matter how much this totalizing term 
is rejected by Muslims themselves). However, this is 
also expressed through the longer-standing demand 
(predating the ‘war on terror’ period which saw the 
introduction of Prevent) for Muslim ‘integration’. 
Recent government reports pertaining to Muslim 
‘integration’ have argued that better integration 
would protect against the likelihood of extremism and 
radicalization (see Casey 2016). While such rhetoric 
is politically expedient, it is completely devoid of a 
supportive evidence base. It is within such a climate 
that British Muslims feel as though they are not 
accepted as British by their fellow citizens (Tufail and 
Poynting 2013).
Understanding Prevent as a racist, Islamophobic 
policy allows for an analysis not only of its misguided 
aims, but of the real harms and deleterious 
consequences experienced by Muslim communities 
in the UK.
Concluding remarks
Ensuring safety from terrorism is in the interests of all 
citizens, including Muslims. However, it is contrary to 
both equality and human rights law that Muslims, far 
more than any other group, are expected to pay for 
such safety at the cost of being subject to suspicion, 
demonization, racial stereotyping and unwarranted 
interference with their private lives. Of particular 
concern is the impact of Prevent on young Muslims, 
Table 7.1: Channel referrals for risk of Islamist extremism, 2014–2016
Year Total referrals % referred Referrals, 
under-18s
% referred  Referrals, 
under-10s
% referred
2014/15 2,183  70%  967 73% 87 80%
2015/16 4,117 68% 2,074 68% 311 77%
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who have grown up not only with a nearly constant 
stream of negative, Islamophobic headlines but also 
with a policy that necessitates their surveillance in 
schools, colleges and universities. Missing from the 
discussion of extremism, radicalization and terrorism 
is the burden Muslim minorities have had to endure 
through collectively being considered a terrorist 
threat. That such damaging treatment of Muslims 
under Prevent cannot be shown to reduce the risk 
of terrorism makes it all the more egregious, and it 
should be brought to an end. 
The Government, the police and other bodies 
involved in promoting Prevent (including some Muslim 
civil society organizations) should acknowledge that 
any benefit to the state which Prevent may provide 
is significantly outweighed by the harm it inflicts on 
Muslim communities, and hence on British society 
as a whole, making Prevent counter-productive in 
terms of its purported aims. The idea of ‘fundamental 
British values’ serves only as a rhetorical device when 
it is considered that Prevent is dividing, stigmatizing 
and alienating one sector of the population.
One of the most striking elements of public 
discourse concerning Prevent is how little official 
recognition there is of the harm it inflicts on British 
Muslim minorities in schools, universities and other 
societal settings. On the few occasions such harm 
is acknowledged, it is often downplayed as the 
result of a misunderstanding, an aberration or a 
one-off experience due to poor training. There 
remains an institutional reluctance to scrutinize the 
full impact of Prevent. 
As has been repeatedly recommended by academics 
and by human rights and civil liberties advocates, 
there needs to be a truly independent inquiry into 
all aspects of Prevent and its impact on Muslim 
communities, based on full disclosure by all of 
the agencies and institutions involved, ensuring 
an opportunity to hear evidence from all affected 
communities.
Given that the current government is committed to 
persisting with Prevent (and has even committed to 
‘strengthening’ it after an internal review), it should 
at the very least recognize its equality obligations 
and immediately revise its statutory guidance to 
require compliance with the PSED in meeting the 
Prevent duty. Any government attempt to challenge 
extremism should not be directed towards a 
particular racial or faith group and must address 
societal inequalities, exacerbated over the past 
decade by the political choice of austerity.
In a climate of normalized anti-Muslim racism, 
Prevent is only one example of the ways in which the 
state has been able to build on public insecurities to 
give false legitimacy to Islamophobia. To genuinely 
address the issues at hand, a change of direction is 
urgently needed. 
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8 Framing Muslim integration
Ajmal Hussain and Nasar Meer
It was only a few years after the Runnymede Trust 
published its groundbreaking report on Islamophobia 
in 1997 that there emerged a governmental view on 
the alleged failure of Muslim integration. Muslims had 
up until then perhaps been creeping into the national 
consciousness as an illiberal menace (Asad 1990) 
or as unruly youngsters on the streets (Alexander 
1998). Following the inquiries into civil unrest that 
occurred in some northern towns home to both small 
and large numbers of British Muslims at the turn 
of the millennium, a series of reports characterized 
these communities as self-segregating, adopting 
isolationist practices and generally leading ‘parallel 
lives’. The Ouseley report (2001) perhaps pioneered 
an approach found in other official post-riot accounts 
(cf. Cantle 2001, Ritchie 2001), in which Muslim 
settlement patterns were initially likened to those of 
‘colonists’ (Wainwright 2001, cf. Meer and Modood 
2009). It was a period in which ‘community cohesion’ 
approaches became salient, and their objectives 
were deemed to furnish commentators with the 
licence – not always supported by the specific 
substance of each report – to critique Muslim 
distinctiveness in particular (Meer 2006). When 
distilled, these criticisms would orbit around the 
claims that Muslims in Britain had less favourable 
views of – and therefore attachment to – Britain, 
and that they preferred to cluster together in self-
segregating communities. Later would come security 
discourses and policies, in which ‘integration talk’ 
served as a fulcrum on which the policy fate of 
Britain’s Muslims has come to rest (Meer 2015a).
What of integration?
Integration is a concept with a long history that goes 
to the heart of how we understand the kinds of 
social relations that characterize modern societies, 
from rural to urban, from kinship to community. 
This dynamic has been recast in thinking about the 
integration of ethnic minority diversity, and a large 
part of European politics is presently occupied 
with coming to terms with how this renews and/
or unsettles established social and political 
configurations. Here integration starts to become a 
debate that describes not only processes of change 
that occur among groups, but what a principled 
position on that change should look like. 
What are the public philosophies of integration policy 
and discourse in which Muslims have been located? 
Several are notable. One is that integration should 
proceed on the grounds of established configurations 
which diverse cultural, religious and ethnic minorities 
should seek to emulate, if not assimilate into. 
That is to say that where Muslim minorities ‘insist 
on retaining their separate cultures, they should 
not complain if they are viewed as outsiders and 
subjected to discriminatory treatment’ (Parekh 2000: 
197). A more nuanced and elaborate version of this 
position limits the comprehensiveness of assimilation 
to the public sphere, into which Muslims should 
assimilate in order to participate in the political 
cultures of a society, but without preventing them 
from retaining their diversity at the level of the family, 
and some parts of civil society. The insistence here 
is upon a prescribed ‘political culture, which includes 
[society’s] public or political values, ideals, practices, 
institutions, modes of political discourse, and self-
understanding’ (Parekh 2000: 200). Some perceived 
this mode of integration – comprising at least partial 
assimilation – as ascendant (Back et al. 2002), as 
a solution to the sorts of societal disunity allegedly 
associated with ethnic minority separatism in general, 
and Muslim alienation and estrangement (and 
ultimately violent radicalism) in particular. 
Such prescriptions for integration as comprising full 
or partial assimilation have not gone unchallenged, 
however, and indeed until relatively recently were 
viewed as less favourable than other modes of 
integration (Triandyfillidou et al. 2011). This would 
include approaches deemed as multicultural 
and which recognized that social life consists of 
individuals and groups, and that both need to be 
provided for in the formal and informal distribution 
of powers (CMEB 2000, Meer and Modood 2009, 
Modood 2013). This means that while individuals 
have rights, mediating institutions such as Muslim 
associations may also be encouraged to be 
active public players and may even have a formal 
representative or administrative role to play.
Governing Muslim integration
In the six UK governments that have held office 
since the publication of the Runnymede report, 
the integration of Muslims has not followed a 
uniform story of either assimilation or integration. 
There have also been important multiculturalist 
advances in terms of the incorporation of Muslim 
political organizations, even where the fate of these 
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achievements is marked by uncertainty. For example, 
a national body was created to represent mainstream 
Muslim opinion; with some encouragement from 
both the main national political parties, it led 
to a body to lobby on behalf of Muslims in the 
parliamentary corridors of power. This new body, 
the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), was accepted 
as a consultee by the New Labour government 
of 1997 till about the middle of the subsequent 
decade, following the invasion of Iraq. The MCB was 
successful in achieving its aims of having Muslim 
equality issues and Muslims as a group recognized 
in addition to issues of race and ethnicity; and of 
itself being accepted by government, media and civil 
society as the spokesperson for Muslims. Another 
two achieved aims were the state funding of Muslim 
schools on the same basis as Christian and Jewish 
schools (Meer 2009); and getting certain educational 
and employment policies targeted on the severe 
disadvantage of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (who 
are nearly all Muslims) as opposed to on minority 
ethnicity generally. Additionally, it played a decisive 
role in persuading Tony Blair to go against ministerial 
and civil service advice and include a religion 
question in the 2001 Census (Sherif 2011). This 
meant that the ground was laid for the possible later 
introduction of policies targeting Muslims to match 
those targeting groups defined by race or ethnicity – 
or gender. Even as the MCB fell out of favour, local 
and national consultations with Muslim groups grew 
rapidly (O’Toole et al. 2013). 
Alongside these practical developments of 
incorporating Muslim interests in certain policy 
areas, there has been an increased public visibility 
of Muslims in both the discursive and the everyday 
life of the nation. Where the Labour governments 
(1997–2010) were more active, the following coalition 
government (2010–2015) was slower, and its long-
awaited strategy on integration was not published 
until February 2012. In Creating the Conditions for 
Integration, then-Communities Secretary Eric Pickles 
defined integration as an antidote to extremism 
and intolerance (DCLG 2012). In this, there was 
no shift in the discourse about Muslims as a fifth 
column established by talk about parallel lives over 
the preceding decade. Indeed, the long-awaited 
integration strategy folded Muslims into a general 
national unease that had been suggested by 
Sayeeda Warsi a year earlier in her assertion that 
Islamophobia had ‘passed the dinner-table test’ 
(Batty 2011). What has come to define integration 
talk since has been a focus on creeping change and 
fear as dangers to the cohesiveness (and existence) 
of the nation. In this, the strategy echoed concerns 
with ‘Britishness’ propounded by New Labour since 
2006, while giving further succour to fears of an 
encroaching Londonistan (Phillips 2006) and Eurabia 
(Ye’or 2006). 
Accompanying the focus on Britishness, there has 
been a focus on informal care and support to build 
integration from the ground up. Pickles’ integration 
policy followed in the mould of the ‘Big Society’ 
paraded by then-Prime Minister David Cameron 
as part of the Conservative Party’s 2010 election 
campaign, with Pickles’ ‘Big Lunch’ following in this 
vein. Other everyday interventions included cultivating 
trust between different people living in the same area 
through the ‘Near Neighbours’ scheme. There was 
then a certain banality to this integration strategy. 
The reference to recognizable things in everyday 
life – lunches, bible prayers in school and council 
assemblies – represented a sidestep from lofty policy 
language such as ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ and 
‘parallel lives’.
There has also been a weighing-in of non-
governmental voices in integration debates. For 
example, in 2014 the Social Integration Commission 
published its report How Integrated Is Modern 
Britain? It noted the challenge to ‘get policy right’ 
in an area considered to be more about informal or 
voluntary choices that people make rather than solely 
policy decisions. Its short report foregrounded the 
importance of social interactions while problematizing 
the ideas that more diverse areas are automatically 
integrated, and that only ethnic minorities should 
be concerned with becoming integrated (Social 
Integration Commission 2014). Further, we have 
come to see the debate about integration being 
played out in more popular terms with references to 
places with sizeable Muslim populations as ‘no-go 
areas’ (The Guardian 2015), and images of niqab-
wearing women as out of place and Muslim/Pakistani 
men as sexual predators. Integration is, thus, 
visceralized in feelings, emotions and beliefs about 
others, and overwhelmingly Muslims. 
The populism surrounding integration debates has 
been capitalized on by the UK’s main political parties, 
and alarmingly successfully by the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP), for which it also takes on more of a 
parochial tone, with UKIP party leaders seeking to 
position it as an explicitly anti-Islam party (Sloan 
2017). The emergence of populist politics fed by 
images of ‘Little Britain’ or ‘Little England’ has meant 
that integration talk takes on more of a disciplinary 
tone too. It is not enough that the school gates 
become a site of intercultural exchange: classrooms 
have become the front line. Alongside the creeping 
in of changes to the curriculum to include lessons on 
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citizenship and integration, schools become spaces 
not only for transmitting so-called ‘Fundamental 
British Values’ (DfE 2015) but also for the active 
policing of transgressors (Alexander et al. 2015: 
4). The ‘Trojan horse’ hoax in 2014 epitomized the 
challenges to active Muslim participation at the very 
local level (Miah 2017). Both examples illustrate 
how majoritarian codes inflected with Islamophobia 
are crafting strategies that, in effect, police Muslim 
mobilizations and claims-making, most apparently 
here in the field of education. 
Meanwhile, the ‘Muslim question’ continues to inform 
the current musings of former influencers of policy 
on integration. Trevor Phillips, for example, who 
introduced the term ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ 
into the UK policy sphere in the 2000s, has more 
recently returned to update his prophecies about an 
imminent clash of values represented in the threat of 
Muslims. In Race and Faith: The Deafening Silence 
(2016) Phillips argues that the ‘organic integration’ 
that accompanied post-war immigration is no longer 
suitable for 21st-century Britain faced with the 
Muslim question. In Phillips we hear echoes of David 
Cameron at the Munich Security Conference in 2011 
when he too called for an approach that was more 
‘muscular’ (Cabinet Office 2011).
Trevor Phillips has maintained a voice in integration 
debates through commentary and media. For 
example, he recently presented the Channel 4 
programme What Muslims Really Think (13 April 
2016), in which he offered a distorted picture of 
Muslim attitudes toward a range of issues, including 
same-sex relationships, faith schools, polygamy 
and, of course, religious-inspired violence, that have 
come to define liberal notions of citizenship. Not 
surprisingly the programme prompted responses 
from Muslims and liberals alike who challenged the 
validity of the sample and the interpretation of the 
results. The Muslim question has also featured in 
the reality TV programme Muslims Like Us, which 
aired on BBC 2 in December 2016. It sought to 
explore a group of selected Muslims’ relationship 
to Britishness through bringing together an unlikely 
range of Muslims and non-Muslims in one (not so 
Big Brother-like) house. 
Much of the national focus on Muslims in relation 
to questions of integration and Britishness 
discussed above was addressed in the most recent 
government-commissioned exercise on integration 
– the Casey Review published in December 
2016. The report opens with a confession that it 
will be difficult reading for Britain’s Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities, whom it characterizes 
as self-segregating, with inadequate leadership, 
and misogynistic. The Casey Review continued with 
the policy approach of viewing communities and 
individuals as agents for change. Notably, Casey’s 
approach to integration involved the promotion of 
resilience, mainly among the young and school-aged 
– a group accustomed to ‘rolling with the punches’ 
in an era of reduced public provisions as well as 
spaces in order to be political and affect change 
(Schilling and Simone 2015). There does seem to 
prevail a mood in government that sees Muslims as 
‘outsiders’ who need to be brought ‘inside’.
What does the evidence tell us?
If we turn away from the discursive accounts towards 
a more applied analysis of Muslim integration, 
we should ask: what indicators are best suited to 
measuring success and failure of Muslim integration? 
The indicators identified by the commentators 
above combine behaviour (in this case residential 
settlement – or where people chose to live and 
form communities) and attitude (in terms of how 
people identify, and how strongly). Using these two 
indicators, what can we say about patterns of Muslim 
integration in Britain?
Residential settlement
Residential settlement is commonly identified as 
a visible sign of non-integration. A prevailing view 
is that Muslims tend to cluster and develop very 
strong ‘bonding capital’ (with kith and kin) at the 
expense of ‘bridging capital’ (with other non-Muslim 
groups and communities). The 2011 census tells us 
that 4.8% of the population self-defines as Muslim 
(over 2.7 million of the UK population), and it is true 
that a considerable percentage of British Muslims 
are concentrated in certain local authorities in East 
London, the North West, Birmingham and West 
Yorkshire (as well as in areas that border these). 
But it does not follow that this clustering is tightly 
configured and nor does it mean that the pattern 
is fixed. If we analyse the demographic distribution 
using the Index of Similarity, which measures ethnic 
group concentration, the broad tendency is actually 
for Muslims to be less separate than other religious 
groups, and indeed to be more likely to display a 
pattern of dispersal (e.g. settlement away from family 
of origin).
As Jivraj (2013: 18) summarizes, ‘the Muslim 
population is relatively evenly spread through England 
and Wales (Index of Similarity of 54%), which means 
that the separation factor has decreased since 2001’. 
As a comparison, the current Index of Similarity 
for British Hindus is 52%, British Sikhs 61% and 
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British Jews 63%. Claims that British Muslims have 
been particularly reluctant to mix with other groups 
therefore seem unsubstantiated, at least when 
considering residential location.
Identity and integration
This behavioural tendency is further supported by 
polling on the kinds of neighbourhoods Muslims 
would ideally choose to live in. For example, when 
asked, ‘If you could live in any neighbourhood in this 
country, which comes closest to describing the one 
you would prefer?’, Muslims are nearly 10% more 
likely than non-Muslims to want to live in ‘mixed’ 
neighbourhoods (of Muslims and non-Muslims) and 
half as likely to want to live in exclusively Muslim 
neighbourhoods as other groups are to want to live in 
neighbourhoods exclusively reflecting their ethnic or 
religious groups (Gallup 2011).
If we move to a further attitudinal indicator 
concerning self-identification with Britain, we 
find that Muslims are in many respects highly 
integrated. In analyses of the UK Government’s 
Citizenship Survey, Heath and Roberts (2008: 2) 
found ‘no evidence that Muslims … were in general 
less attached to Britain than were other religions 
or ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities show clear 
evidence of “dual” rather than “exclusive” identities.’ 
These authors point instead to hyphenated 
identities, showing that 43% of Muslims say they 
belong ‘very strongly’ to Britain and 42% that they 
belong to Britain ‘fairly strongly’. Taken together, 
these figures are higher for Muslim respondents 
than the equivalent figures for Christians or those 
of ‘no religion’. What is especially interesting is that 
this confident British Muslim identity has developed 
alongside pan-Muslim solidarities, the idea of 
the Muslim ‘ummah’ or ‘community of believers’. 
This has proved quite consistent with the widely 
accepted body of findings, reiterated by Wind-
Cowie and Gregory’s (2011) conclusion, that ‘overall 
British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic 
and optimistic about Britain than are the white 
British community’.
As our discussion reflects, the obvious problem 
with measuring Muslim integration is that it quickly 
becomes a ‘vortex’ issue that sucks in a range 
of others (Saggar et al. 2012). One of these is, of 
course, ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalization’. For, despite 
evidence that Britain’s Muslims are integrated 
according to conventional measures, international 
conflict, political violence and shifting national 
identity are in many respects the real drivers of 
anxiety over Muslim integration. What is insufficiently 
registered, however, is that they are the exception 
and not the norm. 
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Adam’s story
London, male
Growing up I didn’t really describe myself as Muslim or think much about my Muslim background. 
Before 9/11 it seemed easier to have a relaxed or even inactive relationship to Islam. Since then, I have 
experienced Islamophobia in various ways. I am regularly stopped by border officials and questioned, 
often for more than 20 minutes, and a few times for much longer. People have made assumptions 
about my views, beliefs or practices, typically presuming I am backward, illiberal or sexist.
As a non-practising Muslim, I also hear non-Muslims loosen their tongues about Muslims, asking me as 
a part-insider about what I really think about Muslims, and if they (i.e. Muslims) really think or do various 
terrible things. They assume I share their identity and sympathize with their arguments about Muslims.
Once, after giving a work presentation, which didn’t even address religion or Muslims, the first question 
from the audience was ‘what is your view on female genital mutilation?’ I was initially baffled by the 
question, but then I realized I was being asked whether as a Muslim I supported it, and that this was 
viewed as a reasonable and justifiable question following a presentation that had nothing to do with 
such issues.
This sort of thing has happened on a few occasions but, in general, secular Muslims like me don’t 
have the same intensity of Islamophobia compared to more obviously practising Muslims. But it also 
shows how no matter what a Muslim actually says or thinks, including whether or not we practise or 
believe in any religion, we are still always vulnerable to Islamophobic presumptions about Muslims.
One way I have dealt with Islamophobia is to affirm that I am in fact a Muslim. However I self-identify, 
and whatever my religious or other beliefs, that can’t override the nature and extent of Islamophobia 
in modern Britain (and beyond). I’ve also become more conscious about not wanting to be defensive, 
ashamed or in denial of my background: of course I’ve got a Muslim background, and just as being a 
Catholic or a Jew in the UK isn’t only or even mainly a question of religious belief or practice, Muslims 
too shouldn’t be asked or required to deny their ‘Muslimness’.
I’ve also become more irritated with my fellow secular and agnostic citizens, many of whom I think 
are blind to the discriminatory and terrible consequences of Islamophobia on real people’s lives. I still 
don’t believe in religious principles and this can be a challenge too: some Muslims don’t see me as 
part of their community, and a few will even reject me more explicitly. I haven’t often challenged people 
– whether Muslim or non-Muslim, religious or secular – very much about their Islamophobia, and I 
feel some of this is due to my concerns about expressions of Islamophobia or other prejudice being 
directed at me.
Secular Muslims like me are not always less vulnerable to Islamophobia where that takes the form 
of street-level racism and prejudice. But our relatively ‘invisible difference’ from the white British 
community means we don’t suffer as much as more observant Muslims (just as orthodox Jewish 
people are more targeted by racist attackers than are secular Jews).
Our experience isn’t perhaps the most common or most pressing one, but I hope that secular and 
religious Muslims can better find common ground, and of course be joined by non-Muslims in better 
challenging Islamophobia when we see or experience it.
* Adam’s name has been changed to protect his identity
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9 The challenges facing Muslim communities and 
civic society
Chris Allen
On revisiting the original Runnymede report, the 
specific reference to Muslim communities and 
civic society groups and organizations is striking. 
Comprising just five recommendations, the 
overarching emphasis was on Muslim organizations 
being tasked with discussing the report and 
‘identify[ing] the recommendations on which 
they themselves can take immediate initiatives’ 
(Runnymede Trust 1997: 18). This perhaps 
suggested that the scope for Muslim communities 
and civic society was limited. In fact, every part of the 
report was directly relevant to Muslim communities 
and civic society. While the report intoned that 
Islamophobia was a challenge for us all, that 
challenge was far greater for Muslims and those 
seeking to campaign and advocate on their behalf. 
This chapter reflects on this far-from-insignificant 
challenge, to consider how Muslim organizations 
and civic society groups and organizations have 
been able to respond to and address Islamophobia. 
Focusing on how Muslim groups and organizations 
have changed – and indeed have been catalysed to 
change – over the past two decades, the chapter 
also considers the key socio-political factors that 
have not only framed how Muslim communities have 
been perceived but also hindered their progress in 
addressing Islamophobia. Some consideration will 
also be given to the constraining impact the spectre 
of counter-terror and counter-extremism policies 
and legislation have had on Muslim groups and 
organizations when trying to address Islamophobia.
Reflecting on Muslim communities and civic society 
at the time of the report’s publication, there was 
little recognition of Islamophobia among them. 
Consequently, few groups and organizations had 
the expertise necessary to adequately respond 
to the challenge of addressing Islamophobia, not 
least through campaigning and lobbying at the 
national political level. Lewis (1994) rightly suggests 
that by the late 1980s, much of Muslim civic 
society was typically concerned with religious and 
theological matters, or, alternatively, that civic society 
organizations were established to provide some form 
of welfare. Hamid (2013) similarly acknowledges how 
in the 1980s various Islamic youth movements began 
to emerge in response to specific theological and 
religious concerns. 
It was only after the ‘Satanic Verses affair’ that things 
began to change, catalysing Muslims to organize 
and campaign on shared issues at the national 
level on the basis of Muslims being a distinct socio-
political constituency. One organization of note to 
emerge out of this was the UK Action Committee 
on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA). Calling for legislation to 
make religious discrimination unlawful prior to the 
publication of the Runnymede report (Weller 2006), it 
was supported by the Commission for Racial Equality 
in lobbying government to use the 1975 White Paper 
on racial discrimination as a suitable basis upon 
which similar protection could be afforded to religious 
communities and individuals (Allen 2013).
As Weller puts it, the publication of the Runnymede 
report ‘moved the terms of the debate quite 
significantly … [introducing] into public discourse 
the notion that, alongside shared dynamics of 
discriminatory experience, there may also be 
particularities of Muslim experience signalled by 
the word “Islamophobia”’ (Weller 2006: 306). 
While this was so, the real challenge facing Muslim 
communities and civic society was the fact that very 
few groups or organizations had the appropriate 
expertise to take forward the report’s findings. 
Admittedly, the report was right in suggesting there 
was much that Muslim groups and organizations 
could do within their own communities. But if 
Muslims were to have any real impact or make 
real progress in addressing the social realities of 
Islamophobia, then they needed to engage national 
government, the media and others.
As regards engaging national government, the 
electoral success of Tony Blair’s New Labour 
government was seen to be a positive development 
not least because it was far more receptive to 
religion and markers of religiosity than almost 
any of its predecessors (Allen 2013). This was 
initially evident in its willingness to engage in 
formal Muslim–government relations via the newly 
formed Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which 
was described as New Labour’s protege (Silvestre 
2010). The Muslim Association of Britain was also 
established around the same time, albeit without 
being attributed the same status as the MCB, but 
campaigning to address Islamophobia was not a 
priority for either – at least not in the late 1990s. 
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The same of course was also true of other Muslim 
organizations at the time.
It is difficult to evidence the extent to which the 
Runnymede report catalysed Muslim communities 
and civic society to begin organizing and 
campaigning on the need to address Islamophobia. 
Nonetheless, within a few years of the publication a 
handful of Muslim groups and organizations began 
to emerge for whom addressing Islamophobia was 
a central tenet. The first of these was the Islamic 
Human Rights Commission (IHRC). Known previously 
as the Human Rights Committee, it was successful in 
launching a report entitled Anti-Muslim Discrimination 
and Hostility in the United Kingdom at the House of 
Lords in 2000. While it has continued to campaign 
about Islamophobia and associated issues to the 
present day, it is fair to say that the IHRC has had 
a limited impact in the national political spaces. 
Another body to emerge around the same time was 
the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK (MPACUK). 
Formed in 2000 as an e-group, its initial remit was to 
monitor the British media for Islamophobia. Having 
continued since – broadening its remit to advocate 
for greater Muslim participation, among other aims 
– its impact in the national political spaces has also 
been limited.
One other organization of note also emerged in 
the wake of the Runnymede report’s publication. 
Having the potential to be the most significant, the 
Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) was 
formed in 2001. With a clear remit to raise awareness 
about Islamophobia, it also sought to campaign and 
lobby government on behalf of Muslims and their 
communities. The first organization to specifically 
address Islamophobia, it had some initial success 
in getting the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
passed. Various factors resulted in FAIR failing 
to reach its potential, however, and it was largely 
defunct within a decade.
The demise of FAIR again opened a significant gap in 
campaigning and lobbying to address Islamophobia. 
More significant were two crucial socio-political 
factors that not only shaped how Muslim 
communities were perceived but also determined 
how Muslim communities and organizations were 
able to engage in public and political spaces.
The first of these began in the wake of the 9/11 
terror attacks before coming to greater prominence 
following the 7/7 attacks in London. Not only did 
the terror attacks result in Muslims and the religion 
of Islam coming under intense public and political 
scrutiny, but it significantly shifted the focus of 
formal Muslim–government relations. New Labour’s 
thinking about Muslims and Islam became almost 
wholly framed by matters of security, counter-
terror and extremism. The same was largely true 
of New Labour’s political and policy interventions. 
As numerous studies have shown, this reinforced 
many of the public’s fears and anxieties about 
Muslims and Islam (Briggs et al. 2006, Spalek and 
McDonald 2009, Allen 2013, Kundnani 2015), 
and it also went some way to reinforcing many of 
the negative stereotypes that seemed to inform 
most ‘Islamophobia-thinking’ (Allen 2017). In truth, 
addressing Islamophobia was not a priority for New 
Labour, illustrated by the fact that it rarely referred to 
Islamophobia throughout 13 years of government. 
When the government did address Islamophobia, 
it was always part of a wider conversation about 
strengthening counter-terror legislation or Muslim 
communities needing to do more to challenge 
extremism (Allen 2017). It could be argued that when 
Islamophobia was referred to, it was little more than a 
‘bargaining chip’ in the process of co-opting Muslims 
into endorsing and supporting policies (Khan 2009; 
Kundnani 2015).
The second significant socio-political factor was 
concurrent. While organizations such as the MCB 
had been afforded preferential status, cracks in the 
relationship were soon evident. Struggling to find 
the best way to navigate its protege role from the 
start of the ‘war on terror’, the MCB lost credibility 
as a result, both with the politicians who had 
endorsed it and with the grassroots communities 
that had supported it (Altikriti 2012). When the 
government eventually severed ties with it, a far 
more competitive environment for Muslim groups 
and organizations emerged as the New Labour 
government sought a new interlocutor. Seeking 
to fill the void, a number of new organizations 
emerged, such as the British Muslim Forum and 
the Sufi Muslim Council. It was also the first time 
that ‘ex-extremist’ groups such as the Quilliam 
Foundation emerged. It should be stressed (see 
Gilliat-Ray 2004) that New Labour’s engagement 
with Muslims – and indeed other faith-based groups 
and organizations – was undertaken on the basis 
of an unquestioned, taken-for-granted premise. 
Groups and organizations had to be a certain size, 
have a particular narrative around the heritage 
and history of their faith and communities, and 
have representatives with the right connections, 
experience and wealth. More importantly, they 
also had to be willing to unequivocally accept and 
support certain governmental assumptions. As 
Woodhead (2010) comments, if they did not – as 
per the MCB – New Labour’s conditional and 
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shifting alliances became apparent. Rather than 
being able to determine and shape formal Muslim–
government relations, then, Muslim groups and 
organizations were faced with having to be complicit 
and agreeable or be excluded from the discussion. 
This was not conducive to beginning conversations 
about addressing Islamophobia and making it a 
political priority.
Allen and Guru (2012) note the detrimental impact 
of increased competition between Muslim groups 
and organizations, and set out how formal relations 
with Muslim civic society were significantly different 
from those undertaken with minority communities 
historically. Most obvious was how New Labour’s 
approach enabled the state to have a hand – 
initially, a less-than-direct one – in structuring and 
organizing Muslim political representation and 
subsequent agendas. Silvestre (2010) notes that 
such an approach sits in contention with those 
of other European states, where formal relations 
reflect levels of self-organization among Muslim 
communities; in such a context, not only do those 
Muslim communities drive the process but they also 
maintain a sense of autonomy in determining what is 
important to them. Only where little self-organization 
is apparent do governments typically intervene 
and impose a ‘top-down’ approach. Yet as Allen 
and Guru (2012) note, New Labour’s latter years in 
government saw it seek to create its own Muslim 
groups through which to engage on the matters 
that were important to the politicians. Criticized as 
smokescreens behind which politicians sought to 
establish institutionalized forms of Islam or ‘types’ of 
Muslims (Allen and Guru 2012), what emerged from 
this were a number of groups that had little credibility 
or traction with grassroots communities, including 
the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and 
the Young Muslim Advisory Group.
The combination of the shadow of counter-terror 
and counter-extremism with the shift in how formal 
Muslim–government relations were engineered and 
constructed seriously and detrimentally affected 
not only the extent to which Muslim communities 
and their groups and organizations were able 
to address Islamophobia but, more importantly, 
whether they were able to even begin the processes 
of engaging on the issue. As well as restricting 
what issues were important to Muslims themselves, 
the political mechanisms preferred by New Labour 
also restricted whose voices could be heard and, 
in consequence, who received funding, on what 
basis and for what purpose. As regards the latter, 
any funding of Muslim civic society was almost 
entirely for counter-terror or counter-extremism 
activities: very little indeed was made available to 
support those seeking to address Islamophobia. 
Consequently, not only did Muslim communities 
have to take responsibility for addressing 
Islamophobia but they had to do so with their own 
resources and monies: another significant departure 
from how national government had historically 
supported minority communities working towards 
addressing discrimination. Admittedly, this did 
not stop those such as the IHRC working with 
grassroots communities, or the activities of those 
such as Muslim Engagement and Development 
(MEND, formerly iENGAGE). But what it did do 
was to seriously constrain the opportunities for 
such organizations’ advocacy work to be heard in 
political spaces.
After the 2010 general election, some evidence 
of potential change emerged when Baroness 
Sayeeda Warsi made her now infamous ‘dinner-
table test’ speech, stating that, ‘Islamophobia has 
now crossed the threshold … For far too many 
people, Islamophobia is seen as a legitimate – even 
commendable – thing.’ Her comments were seen 
as something of a watershed moment. Many within 
Muslim civic society even saw this as a statement 
of intent by the coalition government (Allen 2017). 
Warsi’s comments were catalytic, evident in the 
creation of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) 
on Islamophobia and the Cross-Government Working 
Group on Anti-Muslim Hate soon afterwards.
Having been actively engaged with both the APPG 
and the Cross-Government Working Group, the 
author found his optimism that things might be 
changing soon dissipated. While a number of factors 
are worthy of consideration – see Allen (2017) for 
a more detailed analysis – it cannot be denied 
that pertinent to this was the fact that the coalition 
government adopted a largely similar approach to 
that of its political predecessor as regards engaging 
Muslim communities. While swiftly disbanding New 
Labour’s self-constructed top-down groups, the 
coalition did, however, continue to engage only 
those meeting on the basis of similar unquestioned, 
taken-for-granted premises. Given that these groups 
and organizations were not always best placed to 
campaign and lobby government for change, despite 
the coalition seemingly affording greater importance 
to the issue of addressing Islamophobia, the result 
was little different from what had come before. The 
same governmental constraints and criteria that had 
rendered Muslim civic society largely impotent under 
New Labour had much the same effect under the 
coalition also.
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Two somewhat contrasting civic society 
organizations deserve some recognition: Tell MAMA 
(‘MAMA’ being an acronym for ‘measuring anti-
Muslim attacks’) and MEND. Initially funded by the 
coalition government, MAMA was established to 
provide a third-party reporting service to victims and 
witnesses of Islamophobia that enabled them to not 
only record details of the incident but also obtain 
further advice and support. Similarly to the service 
provided by the Community Safety Trust (CST) 
for victims of antisemitism, MAMA publishes data 
annually from which trends and developments can 
be identified and, hopefully, duly responded to. While 
MAMA has come under intense media and political 
scrutiny and criticism, there is little doubt that it has 
made significant progress in raising awareness about 
Islamophobia as being akin to other forms of hate, 
while also making a significant contribution towards 
evidencing the scale and prevalence of Islamophobia.
MEND too has run a number of initiatives and 
campaigns that have helped raise awareness about 
Islamophobia and what to do if individuals become 
victims. In addition, MEND made an extremely 
comprehensive and compelling submission to the 
Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics 
of the British press, detailing how issues relating to 
Muslims and Islam are typically misunderstood and 
misrepresented in much news coverage. It is worth 
noting that all eight of MEND’s recommendations 
were included in the Inquiry’s final report, which was 
sealed by Royal Charter in October 2013. Despite 
this, MEND, like MAMA, is another organization that 
has come under intense media and political scrutiny.
On critical reflection, Muslim communities and civic 
society groups and organizations have faced an 
insurmountably difficult task in trying to address 
Islamophobia in the two decades since the 
publication of the original Runnymede report. The 
socio-political factors that continue to cast a long 
shadow over this period, combined with the political 
mechanisms that not only restricted and constrained 
but also demarcated on the basis of distinguishing 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ Muslims through affording 
political legitimacy to particular groups, created 
an environment where Islamophobia was far from 
being a political priority and where Muslims could 
not meaningfully engage. While it would be easy 
to point the finger of blame at Muslim communities 
and their groups and organizations, doing so would 
misrepresent the realities of how difficult the task 
has been for Muslim civic society in particular: far 
more difficult than might have been envisaged 
back in 1997. While many were able to ‘identify 
the recommendations on which they themselves 
can take immediate initiatives’, the barriers and 
obstacles they have encountered in seeking to do 
so have meant that Islamophobia remains not only a 
challenge but indeed a very widespread problem for 
British society today.
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Tariq’s story
Social scientist, London/Leeds, US American, brown male
‘You constantly question whether something that happened was indeed an attack or not.’
Anti-Muslim sentiment has had a significant impact on my life in the UK in two ways. The first, more 
direct verbal abuse, has been easier to handle and address than the second, diffuse and innocuous 
underlying psychological abuse.
I have been verbally abused for being perceived or ‘found out’ as Muslim. All but one of these was in 
the ‘gay scene’, by drunk, white men or women. Most times it was easier for my mental and physical 
wellbeing to remove myself from the situation. What was more disappointing in these situations was 
the silence of observers, suggesting indifference.
The underlying anti-Muslim attitudes coated in a veneer of professionalism that I have experienced 
in academia have had much worse effects. The most poignant example, is my abuse for four years 
during my PhD by my research tutor. Along with other Muslim or South Asian students, I was the 
target of repeated attempts to derail our academic career and mental wellbeing.
The research tutor actively made anti-Muslim or racist comments behind our backs, but nobody would 
confront him because of his power. In front of others he would make certain comments about my 
beliefs or origins that were easily veiled as ‘banter’ or seemed completely innocuous to those unaware 
of what he was trying to do. One example was his insistence I drink at every occasion and repeated 
questioning as to why I wouldn’t drink. When I would emphatically decline his offers in a tone indicating 
he should stop asking, I would be made to seem like the one committing a faux-pas. This is the least 
psychologically violent example.
Repeated gaslighting and ‘undetectable’ structural anti-Muslim actions by others are psychologically 
abusive because they undermine one’s sense of reality. They can never be ‘proven’ and so go 
unaccepted and undetected. You constantly question whether something that happened was indeed 
an attack or not.
I have gone through therapy to address some issues, but others will likely not be able to be addressed 
in the short term. I know that I’m not the only one who has suffered this way. I don’t see this as a 
badge of victimhood, but rather a testament to resilience in the face of structural inequality. The way 
forward can only be through recognizing and shunning the latent racism and anti-Muslim sentiment 
pervasive through UK society and attacking it not as an isolated phenomenon, but as intimately 
interlaced with other problems such as xenophobia and classism.
*Tariq’s name has been changed to protect his identity and the descriptors are based on self identification.
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10 Islamophobia across borders
Ed Pertwee
The early years of the 21st century have seen an 
extraordinary proliferation of political mobilizations 
against Islam in many European and North American 
countries, including campaigns against the building 
of mosques and minarets, and for imposing ‘burqa 
bans’. This shows that anxiety about the place of 
Islam in ‘western’ societies transcends national 
boundaries. Furthermore many actors involved in 
these campaigns have built extensive international 
networks, and have long been sharing organizational 
models, strategies, tactics and resources. 
Significantly, many right-wing political parties, protest 
movements and advocacy groups across Europe 
and North America have come to view themselves 
as part of a transnational ‘counter-jihad’ movement 
dedicated to resisting what they perceive as the 
‘Islamization of the west’. This sphere of activity goes 
beyond casual prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims: 
it is grounded in a developed political ideology, 
supported by a complex organizational infrastructure, 
and goes far beyond simply issuing Islamophobic 
pronouncements.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the 
key actors involved in this movement and the main 
elements of their political discourse, situating these in 
relation to other parts of the resurgent political right. 
The chapter will go on to discuss some examples of 
transnational networking, before concluding with a 
consideration of the movement’s political impact.
Movement overview
The political geography of the counter-jihad 
movement is primarily transatlantic, although its 
wider political networks extend to countries such 
as Australia and Israel. The movement first began 
to coalesce in the mid- to late 2000s, but it had 
important political and intellectual antecedents. One 
political forerunner was the late Dutch politician Pim 
Fortuyn, who was one of the first to campaign on 
the theme of Islam as a threat to ‘western liberal 
values’, before being murdered by Volkert van der 
Graaf in 2002. Key intellectual resources for the 
movement include the ‘clash of civilizations’ literature 
developed by conservative American academics like 
Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis during the 
1990s. Another key reference point is the ‘Eurabia’ 
conspiracy theory elaborated by the British author 
Gisele Littman (‘Bat Ye’Or’) and popularized by her 
disciples, including the American author and blogger 
Robert Spencer and the Norwegian blogger Peder 
Jensen (‘Fjordman’).
In organizational terms, the European counter-jihad 
movement includes both party-political and street-
based activist wings. Its key political figurehead 
has long been Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for 
Freedom in the Netherlands. Some European parties 
that have formed links with the movement include the 
Sweden Democrats, the Belgian Vlaams Belang and 
the Swiss People’s Party. Other parties, such as the 
Alternative for Germany, the Austrian Freedom Party 
and the French Front National, have also mobilized 
against ‘Islamization’.
The street-based, activist wing of the movement has 
included ’Stop the Islamization of …’ campaigns and 
‘Defence Leagues’ in various European countries. 
The template for many of these groups was provided 
by the English Defence League (EDL), a street protest 
movement formed in the English town of Luton in 
the summer of 2009 (Jackson 2011). Other ‘Defence 
Leagues’ were formed in countries including 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Germany 
but none of these matched the mobilizing power 
of the EDL. Claiming to be ‘leading the counter-
jihad fight’ in Europe, the EDL staged a series of 
provocative demonstrations in multi-ethnic towns 
and cities across England, including Birmingham, 
Leicester, Dudley and Bradford, which often 
involved violent clashes with anti-fascist counter-
demonstrators and the police (Goodwin 2013). At 
its peak around 2011 it was able to mobilize up to 
3,000 people at a time, but it went into long-term 
decline after its key leaders left in late 2013 and 
is today a shadow of its former self. However, the 
June 2017 ‘UK Against Hate’ demonstration in 
Manchester promoted by former EDL leader Stephen 
Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’), and the similar ‘Unite 
Against Extremism’ event in London organized by 
the ‘Football Lads Alliance’ the same month, are 
reminiscent of the circumstances surrounding the 
emergence of the EDL (Smith and Shifrin 2017).
A slightly different organizational model has been 
provided by the German Pegida movement (Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), 
formed in October 2014 in the city of Dresden in the 
former East Germany (De Genova 2015). At its peak, 
in January 2015, Pegida was able to mobilize up to 
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25,000 people for its rallies, which were preceded 
by silent processions through the city centre. 
These ‘evening strolls’ often attracted middle-class 
residents of Dresden, including families with children, 
in contrast to the EDL’s largely male and working-
class support base. Pegida groups have since been 
formed in other German cities and in countries 
including Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the UK, albeit on a much smaller scale.
In organizational terms, the North American counter-
jihad movement is quite different from its European 
counterpart. It is dominated by professionalized 
advocacy organizations that are often well resourced 
and well connected. One key organization is the 
Center for Security Policy (CSP), a Washington-
based thinktank run by former Reagan administration 
official Frank Gaffney. The CSP produces alarmist 
literature alleging Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of 
the US government, a ‘green scare’ reminiscent of 
the anti-communist hysteria of the Cold War-era 
‘red scare’. In 2016 it launched a public counter-
jihad campaign with an accompanying website, 
counterjihad.com. Another thinktank is the David 
Horowitz Freedom Center, which sponsors Robert 
Spencer’s Jihad Watch blog.
At the grassroots level, ACT for America claims 
to have organized hundreds of thousands of 
supporters into several hundred local ‘chapters’ 
across the US. In June 2017 it organized a ‘March 
Against Sharia’ in multiple US cities (Siddiqui 
2017). Smaller activist organizations include Stop 
Islamization of America, a US offshoot of the 
European ‘Stop Islamization’ groups, led since 2010 
by Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller, another 
influential counter-jihad blogger.
Political ideology
This group of actors is organizationally and 
ideologically distinct from the neo-Nazi far right. 
Many counter-jihad organizations are strongly pro-
Israel, and the movement’s leadership in America 
includes several prominent Jewish activists and 
even Arab Christians. Many of these actors have 
emerged from the American religious right rather 
than the white nationalist movement or ‘alt-right’. 
However, the counter-jihad also encompasses some 
political parties and movements that have histories 
of association with European fascism, such as the 
Sweden Democrats.
What unites this eclectic group of organizations 
and individuals is an apocalyptic vision of western 
crisis, decline and impending ethno-religious war, 
and conspiratorial narratives of left-wing collusion 
with Muslims to bring about the ‘Islamization’ of the 
west. The discourse of the counter-jihad groups 
is haunted by a nightmare near-future in which a 
culturally eviscerated and demographically inundated 
Europe has been transformed into ‘Eurabia’, its 
population reduced to the status of second-class 
citizens (‘dhimmis’) living under ‘sharia law’. In 
weaker versions of the narrative, Eurabia is brought 
about through the short-sightedness and naivety of 
western political elites and their excessively liberal 
immigration policies. In stronger versions of the 
narrative, Eurabia is imagined as the outcome of 
a deliberate plot by the political left and Muslims 
to undermine the national sovereignty of western 
nations through a ‘stealth jihad’. These conspiracy 
theories ignore many inconvenient facts, not least 
the political marginality and sociocultural diversity 
of Muslim populations in the west. For instance, a 
British Muslim of Pakistani origin might struggle even 
to communicate with a French Muslim of Algerian 
origin, making an international Muslim conspiracy 
extremely unlikely, to say the least (Underhill 2009).
This apocalyptic and conspiratorial discourse has 
a number of important historical resonances. For 
example, the dystopian fantasy of Europeans 
becoming second-class citizens in their ‘own’ 
countries under Muslim rule will undoubtedly remind 
British readers of Enoch Powell’s imagined future in 
which ‘the black man will have the whip hand over 
the white man’. Similarly, the notion of Muslims as 
a ‘fifth column’ secretly plotting the destruction of 
western nation states recalls a key trope of classical 
antisemitism. However, European racism and 
antisemitism are not the only historical analogies that 
might be drawn here. For instance, recent hysteria 
about Obama being a secret Muslim is strongly 
reminiscent of McCarthy-era paranoia concerning 
Eisenhower being a secret communist.
Religious themes and motifs have become 
increasingly prominent within the European political 
right in the context of anxieties about Muslims 
and Islam. For instance, some European far-right 
politicians now speak of western identity in ‘Judeo-
Christian’ rather than ‘white ethnic’ terms, borrowing 
from the language of the American religious right. 
Much of this new political discourse is vague and 
arguably euphemistic, but its ambiguity is perhaps 
one of the things that enables conservative American 
Christians and Jews (who are typically strongly 
pro-Israel) and European white nationalists (who 
often have histories of association with Nazism and 
antisemitism) to coexist within the same political 
networks. A shared sense of the need to defend 
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‘western civilization’ against Muslims and the political 
left can give rise to some otherwise unlikely political 
alliances. For instance, the journalist and provocateur 
Milo Yiannopoulos is both gay and Jewish (according 
to Jewish law, as his maternal grandmother is 
Jewish) but built close links with white nationalists 
and neo-Nazis during his tenure as a writer for 
Breitbart News (Bernstein 2017).
Internationalization
The international proliferation of political mobilizations 
against Islam, like the international growth of far-
right activism more generally, is sometimes seen as 
a consequence of the post-2008 global economic 
crisis, or as a direct response to jihadist violence. 
However, many of the counter-jihad groups formed 
long before the economic crisis, and some of their 
most successful mobilizations have occurred in times 
and places where the threat of jihadist violence had 
seemed to be receding. When the EDL was formed 
in 2009, the July 2005 London bombings were four 
years in the past, while the implementation of fiscal 
austerity still lay in the future. When Pegida mobilized 
in late 2014, it did so in a country where there had 
been no recent jihadist terror attacks and where the 
economy was growing.
Instead, the idea of Islam as a hostile, ‘alien’ culture 
has been important, and it is often refracted through 
specific, local experiences. For instance, the EDL 
grew out of the United People of Luton, a local 
protest group set up in response to a demonstration 
by offshoots of Al Muhajiroun, which had protested a 
homecoming parade by the Royal Anglian Regiment 
in Luton town centre. The first Pegida protests were 
organized after the movement’s founder witnessed 
an anti-ISIS demonstration by supporters of the 
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in Dresden city centre, 
which he saw as symptomatic of the importation 
of ‘foreign’ religious conflicts into Germany. Stop 
Islamization of America gained international notoriety 
through organizing protests against the Park 51 
development (popularly known as the ‘Ground Zero 
Mosque’), a proposed Muslim community centre 
near the former site of the World Trade Center, which 
opponents claimed was being built on ‘hallowed 
ground’. The importance of these specific, local 
conditions is one reason why organizational models 
and tactics developed in one context do not always 
translate to other, dissimilar contexts.
Online spaces like websites, blogs and social 
media have been instrumental in enabling these 
local, contextual experiences to be compared, 
analogized and woven together into broader 
narratives of national or civilizational endangerment 
and capitulation to ‘Islam’. Online spaces that have 
been important in the development of the movement 
include the US-based blogs Jihad Watch, Atlas 
Shrugs and Gates of Vienna, the Belgian website 
The Brussels Journal, the German blog Politically 
Incorrect and the Finnish blog Tundra Tabloids. In 
some cases, these virtual interactions have given 
rise to real-world organizations and networks. For 
example, the International Civil Liberties Alliance 
was formed in 2006 by contributors to the Gates 
of Vienna blog. Over the subsequent few years it 
sponsored international counter-jihad conferences in 
Copenhagen (2007 and 2009), Brussels (2007 and 
2012), Vienna (2008), Zurich (2010), London (2011) 
and Warsaw (2013).
These international gatherings brought some far-
right European parties and movements together with 
right-wing American activists, writers and bloggers 
for the first time. They also provided spaces in 
which to develop common tactics and strategies 
for resisting ‘Islamization’. For instance, the 2010 
conference in Zurich included a presentation 
entitled ‘The anatomy of an EDL demo’, which 
used a demonstration in Newcastle upon Tyne as 
a case study of street-based activism. The talk 
covered topics such as logistics and transportation, 
relationships with the police, networking and 
merchandizing opportunities, how to deal with 
counter-demonstrations by anti-racist groups, and 
ways of creating a cohesive group identity.
Other transnational networks emerged in the late 
2000s and early 2010s as outgrowths of existing 
national organizations. For instance, the International 
Free Press Society was founded in 2009 as an 
extension of the Danish Free Press Society. Its 
advisory board included Bat Ye’Or, Geert Wilders, 
staff from the Centre for Security Policy and some 
of the most influential counter-jihad bloggers. Stop 
Islamization of Nations was set up in 2012 to unite 
the American and European ‘Stop Islamization’ 
groups and there were also efforts to form a 
federation of European Defence Leagues around 
the same time. It is worth emphasizing that many 
of these attempts at transnational networking 
have been episodic and some of the organizations 
described here are now in abeyance.
Political impact
One measure of the impact of counter-jihad street 
movements in Europe is the violence they have 
directed towards Muslims and others who ‘look 
Muslim’, and the disruption they have caused to 
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the communities they have targeted. These groups 
have sometimes also had specific local impacts, for 
instance where they have played an instrumental 
role in campaigns against mosque developments. 
Their impact on wider public and political discourse 
is harder to assess, but it is unlikely to have been 
a coincidence, for example, that former UK prime 
minister David Cameron chose to give a major 
speech criticizing ‘state multiculturalism’ on the day 
of a large ‘homecoming’ demonstration in Luton by 
the EDL (Helm et al. 2011).
The political influence of the US counter-jihad 
movement is far greater than that of its European 
counterpart. During the 2016 US presidential 
election, the Center for Security Policy supplied 
advisors to Republican candidates including Ted 
Cruz and Donald Trump. When Trump announced his 
support for a ban on Muslim immigration to the US 
he did so citing a poll published by the CSP.
The links between the Trump administration and 
the US counter-jihad movement are extensive, 
so only a few key examples can be given here 
(for a more extensive discussion see Beauchamp 
2017). Mike Flynn, Trump’s first national security 
advisor who was forced to resign after misleading 
administration officials about the nature of his 
conversations with the Russian ambassador, was 
at the time of his appointment a sitting board 
member of ACT for America. CIA director Mike 
Pompeo has spoken at ACT for America’s annual 
conference and sponsored events for the group 
inside the Capitol building. Shortly after Trump’s 
victory, ACT boasted in an email to supporters 
that it had ‘a direct line to President-elect Trump 
through our allies such as … Mike Pompeo’. 
Trump himself has met with ACT for America’s 
leader, Brigitte Gabriel, at his Mar-a-Lago resort.
Other administration figures with links to the counter-
jihad movement include former White House chief 
strategist Steve Bannon and senior policy advisor 
Stephen Miller. Several of these individuals were 
reported to have been closely involved in drafting 
Trump’s Executive Order banning immigration to 
the US from seven Muslim-majority countries. 
Reportedly, the Trump administration has also been 
considering designating the Muslim Brotherhood a 
‘foreign terrorist organization’. This is a policy that 
the CSP and other counter-jihad organizations have 
been pushing for years and, if carried through, would 
likely have a devastating effect on Muslim civil society 
groups in the US.
Finally, we cannot ignore the potential for 
conspiratorial narratives of Muslim infiltration and 
left-wing collusion to inspire individual acts of 
extreme violence. The Norwegian mass murderer 
Anders Breivik extensively cited counter-jihad writers 
and bloggers in his ‘manifesto’, and rationalized 
his massacre of Norwegian Labour Party youth 
activists on the basis that they were potential 
future collaborators in the ‘Islamization of Europe’. 
Breivik had a number of EDL supporters among 
his Facebook friends and posted on EDL message 
boards using the pseudonym ‘Sigurd Jorsalfare’ 
(‘Sigurd the Crusader’), the name of a 12th-century 
Norwegian king (Jackson 2011).
Conclusion
Rather than thinking of anti-Muslim political 
mobilizations in isolation, it is important to see 
them as part of a transnational political movement 
with intellectual, political and activist ‘wings’. This 
movement has an ideology that draws on historical 
forms of racism and nativism, but it has also gone 
beyond these to develop its own political language. 
The political influence of the movement varies from 
country to country, but it is undoubtedly in the US, 
under the administration of Donald Trump, that 
its direct impact on public policy is currently most 
visible. The speed with which its apocalyptic and 
conspiratorial narratives of western capitulation 
to ‘Islamization’ have entered the US political 
mainstream, using the Republican party as an 
electoral vehicle, provides an important warning 
for those of us living in countries where the political 
influence of these ideas is currently more limited. 
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Jasvir’s story
Lawyer, London, British Punjabi, male
‘I felt unsafe on my everyday journeys’
As a Sikh man who wears a turban I experience a hyper-visibility. Over the years various national or 
global events have precipitated an intensification of abuse directed at me. Most recently I found myself 
the target of a high level of abuse following the 2016 Brexit referendum. Much of the abuse levelled 
at me takes on an Islamophobic tinge. Abuse took place both online and on the street as I attempted 
to go to work. As I walked past people they would make monkey sounds. I was left unsure of how to 
react. Not knowing if responding would provoke further abuse or put me at further risk. 
Online, following a tweet I sent commenting on the incidents of South Asians being attacked after the 
referendum I faced a barrage of abuse. This included comments such as ‘Once you niggers fuck off 
back to curry land …’ and people calling me Taliban or Bin Laden. It felt the same as the environment 
after the London bombings. 
The experiences were deeply unpleasant and I felt unsafe on my everyday journeys. I became more 
aware of my surroundings and felt a sense of vulnerability far greater than I ever did before. Although 
I reported cases of abuse to the police, the incidents made me self-aware of my own safety in the 
weeks immediately after the referendum, as well as saddened by what I could see happening in 
modern Britain.
Recently, some far-right groups have been running campaigns to get their followers to differentiate 
between Sikhs and Muslims. This is a strategy that tries to sow divisions in communities. When I have 
been targeted I never say ‘I’m not Muslim – don’t attack me’ – no one should be attacked or harassed. 
We need to address all forms of discrimination and make sure that communities stand together against 
such awful behaviour. 
It is vital for me to feel that I am playing my part in a united response from faith communities against 
racism and that we promote solidarity.
Hatred against one person is hatred against all.
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11 ‘Everyone is a feminist when it comes to Muslim 
women’: Gender and Islamophobia
Naaz Rashid
The claim that Islam oppresses women, in ways 
significantly different from and worse than the 
ways in which women are treated in other religions 
and cultures, is a recurring theme of much press 
coverage and comment. (Runnymede Trust 1997: 28)
Introduction
The 1997 Runnymede report into Islamophobia 
described the dominance of gendered discourse 
in public debate about Islam. Twenty years on, 
gender continues to dominate discussions of Islam 
in both media and policy debates. Concurrently, 
racial violence disproportionately targets Muslim 
women, especially those wearing the hijab. Gendered 
stereotypes can also be a barrier in the labour 
market (APPG on Race and Community 2012). 
These discussions continue to take place against 
longstanding policy debates about multiculturalism, 
Britishness and integration, as well as, more 
recently, discussions about radicalization. In this 
short chapter I examine how debates about the veil, 
gender violence and the ‘war on terror’ contribute 
to stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed, 
passive victims, symbolic of Muslim communities’ 
alleged failure to integrate, and increasingly as 
potential extremists. This type of framing does not 
capture or foreground the needs or experiences of 
Muslim women, and therefore struggles to win their 
support. Defending gender equality should be a 
more principled position, aligning with other equality 
and human rights perspectives, notably anti-racist 
ones. There is too often a contradiction between 
the discourse of gender rights and whether a 
commitment to such rights is borne out in reality.
Gendering anti-Muslim racism
Anti-Muslim racism reflects continuities and 
parallels with other types of racism. Different 
ethnic, cultural or religious groups come to 
experience ‘racism’ through a process of 
racialization whereby certain generalizations or 
stereotypes are created about them, through 
media, academic and policy narratives, based on 
differences in physical characteristics, appearance 
or other social distinctions. 
Importantly, this process of racialization is gendered. 
In the case of anti-Muslim racism this means that 
the stereotypes of Muslim women and Muslim men 
are different but mutually constitutive of one another. 
That is, they are formed in relation to each other. 
Muslim women are seen as ‘oppressed’, passive 
victims and Muslim men are seen as exceptionally 
misogynistic. Both stereotypes, however, stem from 
generalizations about Islam as a uniquely patriarchal 
religion (Kumar 2012). This widely held stereotype 
denies Muslim women (and men) agency and the 
ability to make the moral and social choices other 
groups are assumed to enjoy.
The issue of gender rights notably brings together 
Islamophobia from across the political spectrum, 
including both its far-right and its liberal forms. Liberal 
Islamophobia assumes that Muslim communities and 
‘culture’ are inherently against certain liberal values 
(which are frequently seen as the exclusive preserve 
of the ‘west’) such as democracy, human rights, free 
speech, and gender and sexual equality (Mondon 
and Winter 2017). This narrative is also reflected 
in far-right anti-Islam sentiments. In his infamous 
appearance on the BBC’s Question Time in 2009, 
for example, Nick Griffin, then leader of the British 
National Party, suggested that Islam did not fit in 
with British society because of its views on women, 
among other things (BBC News 2009).
Veiling (hijab/niqab)
While there have been no concerted efforts to ban 
the veil in the UK, it remains a source of concern 
and controversy. The veil is regarded as problematic 
for a variety of different reasons. First, it is seen as 
oppressive and representative of the presumed 
inferior position of women in Islam. This narrative 
relies on denying Muslim women wearing the veil 
any agency, the presumption being that all women 
are being forced to wear the veil by male family 
members. While there will of course be instances 
where this happens, as Tahira argues, ‘The veil 
cannot be seen as a black-and-white-issue; each 
woman who wears it has a different story and I would 
like to see these women recognized as individuals’ 
(BBC 2017). Equally, it could be argued that Muslim 
women are being pressured to remove their veils out 
of fear of anti-Muslim discrimination or violence.
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Second, wearing the veil, and the niqab in particular, 
is frequently seen as a sign of a lack of integration 
and a failure to conform to British values. In 2006, 
Jack Straw, Labour home secretary at the time, 
infamously asked a niqab-wearing constituent to 
remove her niqab. As well as saying it would make 
him more comfortable, he described face veils as ‘a 
visible statement of separation and difference’ that 
made ‘better, positive relations between the two 
communities more difficult’ (Meer et al. 2010). Media 
coverage of integration invariably includes stock 
photos of women wearing niqabs, thus making the 
association very explicit. Unsurprisingly, the veil has 
been incorporated into discussions about inclusivity 
and Britishness.
Third, the veil has raised security concerns and has 
been associated with extremism. While there may be 
valid practical questions about whether it should be 
worn in particular professions (e.g. by nursery nurses) 
or contexts (e.g. in court or during security checks 
at airports), these can be largely accommodated. 
More problematic is that the veil continues to be 
associated with religious conservatism and therefore 
potentially non-violent extremism. For example, Tony 
Blair, in a defining speech on integration after the 7/7 
London bombings, implied that veil wearing was a 
possible sign of extremism when he said, ‘it is not 
sensible to conduct this debate as if the only issue 
is this very hot and sensitive one of the veil. For one 
thing, the extremism we face is usually from men not 
women’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2006).
More recently, the Channel 4 newsreader Fatima 
Manji (who wears a hijab) was the subject of an 
inflammatory attack by Kelvin MacKenzie in The Sun 
in which he suggested that it was not appropriate 
for her to be presenting the news following the 
terrorist attacks in Nice in 2016. He asked, ‘Was it 
done to stick one in the eye of the ordinary viewer 
who looks at the hijab as a sign of the slavery of 
Muslim women by a male-dominated and clearly 
violent religion?’ In response, Manji, supported by 
Channel 4, complained to the press regulator, the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), 
suggesting that ‘The purpose of the article appeared 
to be to incite hatred against Muslims in general, 
Muslim women in particular, and me.’ IPSO, however, 
rejected the complaint against the Sun columnist, 
thereby arguably legitimating the association 
between wearing a hijab and support for terrorism 
(Greenslade 2016).
These very public debates, which frequently do not 
include the voices of veil-wearing women, inform wider 
public opinion and continue to make veiled Muslim 
women targets of discrimination and racial violence.
Forced marriage and honour-
based violence
Two forms of gendered violence dominate the 
policy landscape when discussing gender equality 
in Islam. These are forced marriage and honour-
based violence (HBV). Forced marriage is distinct 
from arranged marriage in that coercion of either 
a physical or an emotional nature is used to force 
someone into marriage. ‘Honour’ violence, refers to 
instances of domestic violence or familial/child abuse 
where the motivation of protecting family ‘honour’, or 
izzat, is used as an extenuating factor.
Both these issues are rightly a matter of public 
concern and there are many third sector women’s 
organizations which undertake valuable work 
alongside government agencies to support women 
(and also occasionally male victims of such violence). 
And while it is important to recognize the culturally 
specific nature of these forms of gendered violence, 
in the climate of anti-Muslim racism such crimes have 
been sensationalized and racialized as distinct from 
a wider spectrum of gender violence. For example, 
such crimes are regularly described as ‘cultural 
practices’, separate from forms of domestic violence 
or child abuse which are committed across society 
more generally but which are never deemed to be 
cultural phenomena. These crimes are instead widely 
seen as the exclusive preserve of Muslims, reflecting 
the exceptionalism accorded to Muslim misogyny. 
While the increased attention given to honour killings 
in the media has opened up the issue of individual 
human rights for these women, it has also had the 
effect of exacerbating Islamophobia and fear of the 
‘Other’ (Meetoo and Mirza 2007).
It is also striking that these issues are discussed 
in the context of the UK’s counter-terrorism 
agenda. There may be valid questions about the 
relationship between extremism, gendered violence 
and toxic masculinity. Such discussions, however, 
usually only address Muslim men, and where non-
Muslim men are involved this is not generalized 
into a wider stereotype.
Finally, while violence against Muslim women is 
regularly invoked and instrumentalized in order to 
show the ‘backwardness’ of Muslim communities, 
this is not matched by a corresponding commitment 
to funding organizations working to tackle such 
violence, unless under the auspices of the Prevent 
agenda. This can be seen in the high-profile 
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campaigns against closure by organizations such as 
Apna Haq (Dugan 2015).
Gendering the ‘war on terror’
The original Prevent strategy and the specific 
initiatives which were introduced to engage with 
Muslim women between 2008 and 2010 were 
framed in terms of ‘empowerment’. The narrative 
of empowerment resonates with the idea that all 
Muslim women are oppressed. These initiatives 
were not premised on the idea that girls and women 
were at risk of being drawn into terrorism: that threat 
was seen to emanate principally from young men. It 
was only as mothers, sisters and wives that women 
and girls were engaged with, as people who might 
‘prevent’ male family members from becoming 
involved in terrorism.
This representation of Muslim women can be seen 
in David Cameron’s controversial comments about 
Muslim women being ‘traditionally submissive’ in 
2016 (Hughes 2016). As PM at the time, he was 
promoting funds to teach Muslim women English in 
order to combat extremism. Just as David Blunkett 
blamed Asian (Muslim) parents for not speaking 
English at home for the urban disturbances which 
took place in the northern former mill towns of 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001 (Akbar 2002), 
so too have non-English-speaking Muslim mothers 
been blamed for the radicalization of Muslim youth.
In early 2015, reports of three 15-year-old British 
Muslim girls from the east end of London who had 
gone to join ISIS in Syria dominated the national and 
international news. These girls formed part of an 
increasing number of British Muslims travelling to join 
ISIS. The incidence of Muslim schoolgirls travelling to 
Syria sits in stark contrast to the way in which Muslim 
girls were presented in earlier Prevent initiatives. 
Muslim girls are increasingly being characterized as 
both ‘dangerous’ and ‘in danger’ (Mirza 2015: 40). 
Now that the targets of the Prevent agenda have 
widened to include young people leaving the 
UK to join ISIS, counter-terrorism policies have 
been reframed as being about ‘safeguarding’. 
This conflates concerns about radicalization and 
terrorism with those about female genital mutilation 
(FGM), forced marriage and HBV. In a speech about 
extremism in July 2015, David Cameron provided 
more information about the number of cases of FGM 
and HBV than he did about the number of young 
people who had been ‘radicalized’ (Dearden 2015). 
While there is no denying that these are issues 
which require policy interventions, the conflation with 
extremism and radicalization suggests that they are 
being instrumentalized as part of a broader anti-
Muslim narrative.
Conclusion
In this short chapter I have explored contemporary 
mainstream public debates about gender and Islam. 
Earlier in 2017, UKIP’s election manifesto included 
a ban on the ‘dehumanizing’ burqa and full face 
coverings in public places partly on the grounds 
that veils ‘prevent intake of essential vitamin D from 
sunlight’. The manifesto also proposed introducing 
a screening programme of annual non-invasive 
physical check-ups for girls identified to be at risk 
of FGM (Maidment 2017), thus illustrating how 
everyone claims to be a feminist when it comes to 
Muslim women (Rashid 2016). 
There is clearly a need to address many of the issues 
affecting Muslim women, to improve their wellbeing 
and tackle issues of gender inequality. However, 
these issues need to be approached more carefully, 
by both media and policymakers. Currently, the effect 
of many of the public and policy debates on Muslim 
women is to locate the problem of gender inequality 
squarely within Islam rather than in patriarchy 
more generally. In doing so, patriarchy becomes 
particularized to Muslims, thus feeding anti-Muslim 
stereotypes, which then adversely affect Muslim 
women. It is hard to see how this either benefits 
Muslim women or, ultimately, addresses concerns 
about gender equality.
Instead, policy responses need to develop and 
support a wider analysis of gender inequality in 
relation to Muslim women. It should be clearly 
recognized that Muslim women exist as actors in 
wider society, not just as members of ‘the Muslim 
community’. This means that for Muslim women, 
gender inequality is inextricably linked to anti-
Muslim racism and one cannot be tackled without 
dismantling the other. They are also subject to 
patriarchy in wider society, not only from within 
their communities. In addition, they are affected by 
economic inequality; BME women (including Muslim 
women) are most adversely affected by austerity-
driven budget decisions – hardly an indicator that 
their needs and preferences are at the forefront of 
policymaking (Hall et al. 2017).
In addition, policy discussions need to avoid 
simplistic generalizations and to centre the voices 
of Muslim women. That is not to suggest that all 
Muslim women think the same; recognition and 
reflection of the diversity among Muslim women 
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is key to addressing their stigmatization. There 
are already many Muslim women’s organizations, 
activists and academics who are undertaking that 
task themselves. From organizations which have 
encouraged Muslim girls to learn fencing (Maslaha: 
http://maslaha.org/muslim-girls-fence) to hijab-
wearing spoken word artists (The Brown Hijabi: 
https://thebrownhijabi.com/), there is certainly 
resistance to the simplistic narratives about Muslim 
women discussed in this chapter.
This is not only a question of good social-scientific 
and policy analysis, but one of solidarity. People 
who purport to be feminist when it comes to 
Muslim women, while at the same time affirming 
Islamophobic tropes and failing to address wider 
gender or other inequalities, are inconsistent. Tackling 
gender inequality generally will indeed benefit Muslim 
women, but those benefits will be incomplete 
unless anti-Muslim racism is directly challenged 
too. Because of the way that Muslim women are 
particularly affected by anti-Muslim racism, we must 
reaffirm the need to challenge all forms of gender 
and racial inequality, to improve the lives of Muslim 
women and all people affected by social inequalities 
and injustice.
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PART III: DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF 
ISLAMOPHOBIA
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12 Islamophobia and the Muslim struggle for 
recognition
Tariq Modood
It was not very long ago that Anglophone scholars 
of racism understood racism in terms of biology, and 
specifically in terms of the black–white binary. At the 
same time, other scholars, especially in continental 
Europe, understood racism in terms of antisemitism, 
especially in the recent biologized forms that Europe 
manifested in the 20th century. When it began to 
be clear that these two paradigms were failing to 
capture some contemporary experiences, such 
as anti-Asian cultural racism in Britain or anti-Arab 
cultural racism in France, some scholars began to 
move away from these paradigms. Even so, the pull 
of these biologistic models was so strong that even 
today many scholars of racism understand cultural 
racism in quasi-naturalistic terms, seeing culture 
as a ‘code’ for the biological racisms that they find 
more intelligible. Western European Muslims have 
found these scholarly hegemonies an especially 
galling obstacle to getting academia and fellow 
citizens to understand the exclusionary discourses 
and misrecognitions that Muslims are subject to. 
Following the assertive Muslim agency triggered 
off by the Satanic Verses affair and other Muslim 
controversies, as Muslims responded to such 
hostilities and articulated their misrecognition, they 
were constantly told, especially in Britain, that there 
is no such thing as anti-Muslim racism because 
Muslims are a religious group and not a race. Hence 
Muslims could legitimately ask for toleration and 
religious pluralism but not for inclusion in anti-racist 
egalitarian analyses and initiatives. While this view 
continues to be expressed even today, and some 
deny that there is a racism that could be labelled 
‘Islamophobia’, it no longer has the hegemony it 
once did.
In that sense, the concept of Islamophobia and the 
study of Islamophobia has come of age. It is being 
studied in terms of its specificity, untrammelled by 
narrow paradigms of racism, based on other times 
and other oppressions, and studied alongside 
more familiar racisms such as antisemitism and 
anti-black racism. While, then, understanding some 
contemporary treatment of Muslims and aspects 
of their societal status in terms of ‘racialization’ is 
an advance, the conceptualization of Muslims in 
the west should not be reduced to racialization 
or any other ‘Othering’ theoretical frame such as 
Orientalism. By definition ‘Othering’ sees a minority 
in terms of how a dominant group negatively 
and stereotypically imagines that minority as 
something ‘Other’, as inferior or threatening, 
and to be excluded. Indeed, the dominant group 
typically projects its own fears and anxieties onto 
the minority. Minorities, however, are never merely 
‘projections’ of dominant groups but have their 
own subjectivity and agency through which they 
challenge how they are (mis)perceived and seek to 
not be defined by others but to supplant negative 
and exclusionary stereotypes with positive and 
prideful identities. Oppressive misrecognitions, 
thus, sociologically imply and politically demand 
recognition. Our analyses therefore should be 
framed in terms of a struggle for recognition or a 
struggle for representation (Modood 2005).
Recognition of course does not mean thinking of 
Muslims as a group with uniform attributes or a 
single mindset, all having the same view on religion, 
personal morality, politics, the international world 
order and so on. In this respect Muslims are just 
like any other group – they cannot be understood 
in terms of a single essence. No one in the social 
sciences thinks that identities are based on cognitive 
or behavioural properties that are shared by all 
who may be members of a relevant group such as 
women, black people, gay and lesbian people and 
so on. If group members do not share a common 
essence then they cannot be simply demarcated 
from non-group members because there will be 
many cases where individuals are not simply on 
one side of the boundary or the other. So, groups 
cannot have discrete, or indeed fixed, boundaries as 
these boundaries may vary across time and place, 
across social contexts, and will be the subject of 
social construction and social change. This ‘anti-
essentialism’ is rightly deployed in the study of 
Islamophobia and Muslims. It is a powerful way 
of handling ascriptive discourses, of showing that 
various popular or dominant ideas about Muslims, 
just as in the case of women, gay people etc., 
are not true as such but are aspects of socially 
constructed images that have been made to stick on 
to those groups of people because the ascribers are 
more powerful than the ascribed. Anti-essentialism 
is an intellectually compelling idea, and a powerful 
resource in the cause of equality.
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It is also common, though, for authors to accuse 
each other of essentialism. This is because there 
are different versions of anti-essentialism. Some 
sociologists interpret the ‘anti’ to mean that all 
groups are fictitious constructions and that the task 
of sociology is to ‘deconstruct’ them. If we take this 
approach there is no space left for genuine group 
identities, and so none for recognition or group 
accommodation. I think groups are necessary 
both to social science and to anti-racism or 
egalitarian politics, and so I work with an alternative 
interpretation of anti-essentialism derived from the 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1968). His concept 
of family resemblance offers a way of recognizing 
that just as it does not make sense to say that 
games or languages do not exist because they 
do not share a common, definitional essence, so 
the lack of group essences and discrete, bounded 
populations with unchanging characteristics is 
not a good reason to assert in an a priori way that 
groups do not exist. Rather, we have to have a more 
flexible, looser and more variable notion of a group 
and of group membership that allows for open-
textured and overlapping boundaries and overlapping 
memberships. If it seems difficult to reconcile this 
with our a priori concept of group, let us call the 
entities ‘groupings’. The key point I drew from 
Wittgenstein was that once we stopped demanding 
that groups measure up to our impossible definitions 
we would lose the temptation to conclude that 
groups suffer from an ontological deficiency, that they 
do not ‘really’ exist (Modood 2013). Another way 
of putting it is that just as the complete self-made 
individual of some liberal theories does not exist, 
it does not follow that individuals do not exist, that 
we have to give up ‘individual’ from social science 
vocabularies; so, similarly, with groups.
Essentializing often takes the form of ‘Othering’ 
or ‘racialization’, the ascription of various negative 
features and roles that are supposed to define a 
group of people. These can take many different 
forms. Some of the most common are to do with 
having lower intelligence, with being less capable 
of disciplined, responsible behaviour, and with 
a propensity for criminal or violent behaviour. In 
relation to Muslims, some of the negative traits are 
an obsession with religion over other aspects of life, 
moral conservatism, especially in relation to sexuality, 
patriarchy, and a tendency to act on religion or 
politics in extreme and violent ways.
Analysis of Othering is clearly an important tool 
when it can be deployed to show the operation of 
these negative perceptions in the media, in news 
reports, in political discourses and the way public 
concerns are raised and expressed (e.g. in relation 
to ‘radicalization’ or women’s dress), in television 
programme content, in the activities of the security 
services and so on. There is, however, a limitation 
to such analyses of Othering or racialization, namely 
that sometimes there is a lack of agreement between 
those doing the Othering and those being Othered 
about whether certain features are necessarily 
negative. Most people will agree that to describe a 
group as less intelligent is to say something negative 
about it. But is this the case with religious strictness 
and moral conservatism? Here it is possible that the 
dominant group may take one view of the matter, 
namely that such attitudes and behaviours are 
negative and backward, but the minority – that is to 
say, substantial numbers within the minority – may 
refuse the suggestion that such characterizations are 
negative. In recent years, we have seen this most 
starkly in Europe, in the dominant society’s view 
that the wearing of the headscarf or the burqa by 
Muslim women is a sign of oppression. Despite the 
dominant society delivering this judgement through 
the popular and intellectual media, the numbers of 
women engaged in such practices has increased 
and the increase has been accompanied by the 
women in question saying that they are donning such 
clothes out of choice, and not in compliance with the 
demands of Muslim men.
To accept, to qualify or to resist such Muslim 
women’s perspective is to invoke a normative 
framework. In recent years aspects of feminism and 
liberalism (e.g. ‘western feminism’ and ‘muscular 
liberalism’) have been cynically and insincerely used 
to critique and undermine various Muslim practices 
and claims for accommodation, including issues of 
women’s dress. However, not all such appeals have 
to be cynical or insincere. They can be principled 
and reasonable (without necessarily being valid). 
Without trying to spell out in any detail the sincere 
and insincere versions of these highly complex and 
varied ‘isms’, I am simply making the point that 
some such normative framework is necessary. An 
analysis of Othering, e.g. of how the fact of living 
within a hegemonic secularism subtly influences 
Muslim subjectivity, is incomplete without an appeal 
to a normative framework, for without that we cannot 
know to what extent the influence is a result of an 
exercise of self-interested power, of domination, 
and to what extent it is an aspect of benign social 
change on the part of Muslims themselves, who on 
a reasoned basis come to adapt their practices and 
modify their sense of what it means to be a Muslim. 
To stick with my earlier example, to argue that the 
hijab, or niqab or burqa, are or are not a form of 
oppressive Othering is not just a matter of empirical 
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inquiry or discourse analysis but implicitly or explicitly 
appeals to how to distinguish between what is 
negative and what is positive in the characterization 
of Muslims. If it is implicit, it needs to be made 
explicit. Either way the normative presuppositions 
need to be questioned; that is to say, they cannot be 
taken for granted but stand in need of argument and 
justification. Without such justification not only may 
an analysis of Othering be incomplete or distorted, 
but it may itself be an exercise in Othering, namely in 
seeing the groups in question as prejudicially Othered 
as, for example, religious conservatives when that is 
exactly how the group may wish to think of itself and 
to be respected for being.
This will of course be an empirical matter. But it 
may also be a refusal to accept the group on its 
own terms. That may not be wrong as such. My 
point is that to accept or not to accept will require 
a normative argument and so perspectives such 
as Orientalism or anti-Islamophobia are incomplete 
without normative argument. Thus, the kind of 
normative disavowal that one finds in the influential 
work of, say, Talal Asad is misplaced. He has been 
a powerful force for getting us to rethink secularism 
but his conceptual framework does not explicitly 
help us to determine whether secularism is a good 
thing, or which version of secularism is better than 
another. Or, to put it another way, everyone will 
agree that Islamophobia must be distinguished 
from reasonable criticism of Muslims and aspects 
of Islam, yet not only is this a difficult distinction to 
make but it begs the question of what are reasonable 
criticisms that Muslims and non-Muslims may make 
or discuss, in relation to some Muslim views about, 
say, gender or education or secularism. Not only 
must the study of Islamophobia not squeeze out the 
possibility of such discussion, but by showing us 
where it becomes Islamophobic – by caricaturing, by 
assuming that all Muslims think in a particular way, 
by creating a climate in which reasonable dialogue 
is impossible – it should help to guide us on to the 
terrain of reasonable dialogue. Merely identifying the 
unreasonable and the populist is not enough; our 
frames of analysis should lead us to the reasonable, 
to what criticisms may be made of Muslims and/or 
Islam and what criticisms that Muslims want to make 
of contemporary western societies too are worthy 
of hearing. The minority in question must be able to 
negotiate, modify, accept criticism and change in its 
own way; a dialogue must be distinguished from a 
one-sided imposition.
Let me give another example. It is generally agreed 
that Islamophobia is part of the backlash against 
multiculturalism, and this is indeed important to 
bring out given that, especially in Britain, ‘race’ and/
or class perspectives have tended to dominate 
analyses in relation to minorities. We need, however, 
to go beyond identifying the racisms and insecurities, 
cultural and material, that are among the sources 
of anti-multiculturalism. We need also to identify 
principled and reasonable concerns that may be part 
of anti-multiculturalism or criticisms of aspects of 
multiculturalism. This means a normative reference 
point for evaluating criticisms of multiculturalism 
and for offering reasoned and effective responses 
to such criticism (Modood 2013). This may be 
to offer suitable and reflexive understandings of 
multiculturalism that are able to take criticisms on 
board, while also pointing out the weaknesses in 
the criticisms. Or it may be to offer an alternative 
standpoint. What is not adequate is to merely identify 
and rhetorically condemn the backlash without 
considering what is right and wrong in the criticism of 
multiculturalism – or, to return to the main example, 
popularly expressed criticisms and anxieties about 
Muslims and Islam.
Islamophobia should therefore be studied within 
a normative framework, and not just one that 
exposes the normative presuppositions of others 
while evading the challenge of justifying one’s own 
normative presuppositions. The framework I use is 
that of multiculturalism, or a struggle for recognition 
and institutional accommodation. In the 1970s and 
1980s a certain type of anti-racism developed in the 
academy and in certain polities like Britain. While 
critically alerting society to various forms of direct 
and indirect racism, it tended to frame non-white 
minorities in terms of racism, even to the point of 
creating a singular subject as the victim of racism, 
namely ‘blacks’, as if such groups of people had 
no identities of their own that were equal to those 
identities ascribed to them by white people (or by 
the political project of blackness). I have indicated 
that there is a danger that ‘anti-Islamophobia’ could 
go the same way as the earlier form of anti-racism, 
and some of the ways that this can be avoided 
– namely, to ensure that Islamophobia does not 
become the primary analytical frame for the study 
of Muslims in the west but that it is situated within a 
broader ‘struggle for recognition’ frame, a normative 
framework which prioritizes groups fighting negative 
outsider perceptions by giving normative and political 
weight to insider identifications in all their plurality. 
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13 What’s in a name?
Shenaz Bunglawala
Twenty years on from the reintroduction of the term 
‘Islamophobia’ into public and policy discourse, 
are we closer to approaching analytical rigour in 
the framing of the concept and the formulation of 
metrics of assessment to enable reasoned and 
reliable comparative analysis on whether ‘conditions 
for Muslims in Europe’ are worsening, as Douglas 
Murray (2006) infamously called for, or improving? 
As we reflect on the intervening period since the 
word was first put into contemporary circulation to 
name and challenge hostility towards Muslims and 
its practical consequences, is it time to consider 
jettisoning ‘Islamophobia’ in favour of any of the 
myriad of substitute terms that have since been 
coined? Is ‘Islamophobia’ more a hindrance than 
a help to those of us concerned about negative 
outcomes for individuals who are, or are assumed to 
be, of Muslim background?
In its report of 1997, the Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia deemed that sufficient 
evidence existed to substantiate their assessment 
that ‘anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so 
considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a 
new item in the vocabulary is needed’ (Runnymede 
1997). The Commission’s introduction (note: not 
invention) of the term Islamophobia into policy 
discourse from 1997 has provoked many varied 
reactions to the phenomenon (or lack thereof, as 
some would have it), its usefulness in capturing 
historical, contingent and contextual antipathy 
towards Islam and Muslims which reverberate to the 
present day, and its application in differing contexts 
in the multi-layered policy landscape where its 
corrective purpose is its most visible form. The 1997 
report primarily engaged a policy discourse and 
proposed corrective strategies, with its emphasis 
on national and local government initiatives and 
interventions by Muslim and non-Muslim civil society 
organizations to tackle Islamophobia in the UK, 
having identified its existence, form and breadth. 
It is perhaps worth reflecting on the prevalence 
of the concept in the contextual spheres where 
its corrective purpose is directed, if only to offer 
insight into the domains where contestation of and 
mobilization around the concept have in some 
ways projected themselves on the utility ascribed to 
Islamophobia. Disagreements over conceptual clarity 
and analytical rigour notwithstanding, ‘Islamophobia’ 
is a term more widely used by British Muslims than 
in policy discourses about tackling discrimination or 
prejudice experienced by Muslims. In other places, 
Islamophobia is referred to in policy documents with 
an assumptive bias, with the implication that the term 
is sufficiently well understood not to require clear 
definition. In more recent developments, we find a 
reversion to categories of race and discrimination 
based on ethnic markers. What accounts for these 
shifts, and what do they mean to the value and 
significance of Islamophobia as a concept?
It is the case that more attention has been 
devoted to problematizing the term itself than to 
the phenomenon it seeks to describe. There’s the 
preoccupation with the suffix, connoting ‘irrationality’, 
which some would argue inadvertently advantages 
those whose hostility is cold and calculated, bearing 
no relation to the irrational at all.
There’s the normative disquiet about supposedly 
placing religion above criticism and thus rendering 
Islam superior to all else that it might reasonably, 
and rightly, be considered fair to criticize. Moreover, 
with the continued use of conflations to circumvent 
the use of the word ‘Islamophobia’, might we make 
better progress in tackling the impact by displacing 
the obsession with one word and making use of 
substitutions?
There’s ‘anti-Muslim racism’, for those who want 
hostility towards Muslims to be recognized, as a 
process and in outcomes, as similar in type to colour-
based racism.
Or ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’, for those who favour a 
milder terminology to capture bias motivations that 
hinder equal access to goods, services and life 
chances.
‘Anti-Muslim discrimination’ has its uses too, 
although the term would appear to be too narrowly 
construed and too weak to reflect the broad range 
of adverse outcomes, from violent assault to 
recruitment bias, that is currently evoked by the more 
wide-ranging use of ‘Islamophobia’.
I want to show that while these different terms 
have gained currency over the last 20 years, 
retaining the word ‘Islamophobia’ to describe 
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‘unfounded hostility towards Islam [and] also to 
the practical consequences of such hostility in 
unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and 
communities and to the exclusion of Muslims from 
mainstream political and social affairs’ (Runnymede 
Trust 1997: 4) is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is necessary because analysis of media reporting on 
Islam and Muslims shows that ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’ 
are more likely to be negatively framed in the British 
press (Baker et al. 2013, Baker and McEnery 2015b) 
than ‘Muslims’, thus placing group association 
and (perceived) group membership at the core 
of collective stereotyping and its consequences. 
Secondly, with the growing propensity in the British 
media to blame ‘extremist Islam’ for radicalization 
and terrorism, and the frequent use of the phrases 
‘Islamist extremism’ or ‘Islamist terrorism’ in 
political discourses, reverting to a victim-centred 
terminology (focusing on the ‘Muslim’, not ‘Islam’), 
risks bifurcating the counter-narrative and dislodging 
it from contextual factors that are themselves 
collectivizing and homogenizing when it comes to 
Islam and Muslims.
If the point of departure for identifying Islamophobia 
in practice is the presence of ‘Muslim or Islamic 
identifiers’ (Allen 2010: 62), then reporting on Islam 
and Muslims in the British press offers plentiful food 
for thought. Media and its bias against Muslims 
occupied considerable attention in the 1997 report, 
and, were the exercise of the Commission to be 
repeated 20 years on, it would probably find much 
the same today. I rely on two pieces of academic 
research using corpus linguistics to illustrate 
the importance of retaining the use of the term 
‘Islamophobia’ precisely because it centres the focus 
of hostility on Islam, and consequently Muslims.
In their analysis of a corpus of 200,037 articles, or 
146 million words, on the representation of Islam and 
Muslims in the British national newspapers between 
1998 (a year after the publication of the Runnymede 
report) and 2009, Baker et al. (2013) find no mention 
of the term ‘Islamophobia’ in the period 1998–2003. 
Islamophobia makes its first appearance in the 
corpus in 2004, reappearing in 2005 and 2006, the 
first of these denoting the publication of the follow-up 
report, before falling off the radar, while terms such 
as ‘discrimination’ and ‘diversity’ becoming more 
notable among ‘hate and tolerance’ keywords. 
Baker et al. (2013) found that ‘Islamophobia’ (and 
related terms ‘Islamophobic’, ‘Islamophobe’, 
‘Islamophobes’) occurred 2,169 times, or 12.73 
10 I am grateful to Professor Paul Baker of Lancaster University for the average frequency per year figures for the two corpora.
times per million words, in the 1998–2009 corpus. 
There were 1,574 occurrences of the term itself, 
suggesting that it occurred more frequently than 
its related terms. In a random selection of 100 
occurrences analysed closely, Islamophobia was 
used ‘sarcastically or to deny that the concept exists’ 
a third of the time (33 occurrences). Frequency of 
usage is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition 
to probe the term’s acceptance and penetration in 
public discourse.
In a later study, which I commissioned in 2015, by 
Baker and McEnery (2015b) analysing corpus data 
for the period 2010–2014 (consisting of almost 80 
million words) ‘Islamophobia’ (and the related terms) 
appeared 1,706 times, or 18.61 times per million 
words, indicating that, proportionally, discussion 
around the concept has increased over time. A 
similar analysis of 100 occurrences in the second 
corpus found that incidence of sarcastic uses 
or denial of the term fell from a third to a fifth (21 
occurrences). The term itself occurred in the corpus 
1,087 times, again appeared in the corpus more 
frequently than the related terms. 
Comparing the average frequency of occurrences per 
year in the two corpora reveals an almost doubling 
in the number of mentions of Islamophobia, from 
131.66 (1,574 mentions across 12 years, 1998–
2009) to 217.4 (1,087 mentions across 5 years, 
2010–2014).10
Given the concentration in occurrences of 
‘Islamophobia’ as a term in the first corpus in the 
period 2004–2006, what might account for its revival 
in the second corpus?
Table 13.1 illustrates the frequency of mentions 
of the word ‘Islamophobia’ (and related words 
‘Islamophobic’, ‘Islamophobe’ and ‘Islamophobes’) 
by British national newspapers in 2010–2014, as well 
occurrences per million words. 
We can see that the left-wing newspapers (Guardian, 
Independent, Mirror and Observer) mention 
Islamophobia a third more often than the right-
wing papers, a combined total of 1,051 mentions 
compared with 659 mentions (61.5% compared 
with 38.5% in right-wing newspapers), though the 
left-wing newspapers’ overall contribution to the 
corpora comprises 42.6% of the total and that of 
the right-wing newspapers 57.4%. It is fair to say 
that Islamophobia is more likely to be a matter of 
interest on the left of the political spectrum than on 
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the right. This is not surprising given the locating 
of Islamophobia within debates centred on race, 
equality, diversity, integration and identity, issues that 
are more likely to be encountered on the left than on 
the right.
If one of the assumptions made in the first decade 
since the Runnymede report was that the media 
was where the report’s binary construction of the 
concepts of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam were 
‘at their most useful’ (Allen 2010: 54), because of 
the ability to ‘to identify Islamophobia in certain given 
situations’ (Allen 2010: 52), the paucity of mentions 
of the concept in the media over the greater part of 
the two decades since the 1997 publication would 
suggest that its ‘usefulness’ has been limited to 
classifying and analysing media content, rather than 
succeeding in popularizing the concept in everyday 
discourse or raising awareness about what it is and 
why it matters.
To look closely at how Islamophobia has been 
constructed in the media over the two periods 
of analysis, we can look to the collocates, or 
word associations, used alongside the keywords 
(Islamophobia, Islamophobic, Islamophobe, 
Islamophobes). Collocates are words which appear 
alongside a keyword more often than can be put 
down to mere chance. Table 13.2 shows the top 20 
collocates of the keywords in the two periods. 
The collocates show the association of Islamophobia 
with racism and other forms of group-based 
antipathy, such as antisemitism, homophobia, 
sexism and xenophobia. The collocates also show 
how Islamophobia is reported as increasing, with 
‘rampant’, ‘rise’, ‘risen’ and ‘upsurge’ appearing 
in the first corpus and ‘rife’, ‘virulent’ and ‘tide’ 
appearing in the second. Islamophobia appears 
as taking institutional form in the first corpus, 
presumably relating to the second report published in 
2004, where the term ‘institutional Islamophobia’ was 
coined (Runnymede Trust 2004). In both corpora, 
the top 20 collocates refer to significant events in 
relation to tackling Islamophobia. In the first corpus 
the words ‘Commission’, ‘forum’ and ‘against’ refer 
to the second commission and the establishment of 
the first Islamophobia monitoring body, the Forum 
Against Islamophobia and Racism. In the second 
corpus, the words ‘Warsi’, ‘dinner-table’, ‘hotline’, 
‘tell’ and ‘mama’ refer to the speech by Sayeeda 
Warsi in 2011, in which she declared Islamophobia 
Table 13.2: Top collocates for ‘Islamophobia’ and related terms, 1998–2014
1998–2009 2010–2014
antisemitism, racism, racist, accusations, xenophobia, 
forum, against, homophobia, institutionalised, institutionally, 
Mido, institutional, bullying, rampant, prejudice, 
Commission, rise, risen, upsurge, verged
racism, racist, antisemitism, incidents, dinner-table, 
Warsi, mama, hotline, virulent, accusations, rife, chanting, 
homophobia, socially, tell, homophobic, collective, sexism, 
witch-hunt, tide
Source: McEnery and Baker (2015b).
Table 13.1: Frequency of use of ‘Islamophobia’ and related words in British national newspapers, 2010–2014
1998–2009 2010–2014
Newspaper Number of cases Occurrences per 
million words
Number of cases Occurrences per 
million words
Express 100 15.57833 89 25.35279
Guardian 602 24.72824 724 36.67562
Independent 430 16.80218 183 24.00714
Mail 214 12.43014 85 15.80155
Mirror 60 7.4373 33 10.58573
Observer 137 13.34634 111 31.56634
People 1 1.507859 2 5.94838
Star 17 6.368315 17 12.64952
Sun 49 9.76406 42 10.16676
Telegraph 201 12.46448 181 14.33871
Times 358 12.08566 243 13.09181
Source: McEnery and Baker (2015b).
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had passed the ‘dinner-table test’ (Batty 2011, BBC 
News 2011), and to the coalition government’s 
support for a third-party initiative to record anti-
Muslim hate crimes, the Tell MAMA hotline.
Turning to my second point, about collectivizing and 
homogenizing discourses, there are two findings from 
the corpus linguistics analysis that I wish to focus on. 
The first relates to the prevalence of radicalization 
as a subject in the corpora and the rise in ‘extremist 
Islam’ as the dominant explanatory factor. In the 
2010–2014 analysis, Baker and McEnery found 
that when ‘Muslims are discussed as a collective 
group the most salient pattern is in the context of the 
radicalisation of young British Muslims’ (Baker and 
McEnery 2015a).
When analysing the causes of radicalization offered 
by the British press, Baker and McEnery found an 
‘increasing attribution of blame for radicalisation on 
extremist Islam – in 1998–2009 this occurred in 1 
in 3 cases. By 2014 it is 2 in 3 cases’ (Baker and 
McEnery 2015a).
Secondly, and related to the first point, references to 
extremism were also found in negative association 
with the term ‘Islamic’. Baker et al. (2013) found that 
in the 1998–2009 corpus, references to extremism 
occurred next to the word ‘Islamic’ one in six times, 
thereby concluding that ‘Islamic is now difficult to use 
in a neutral way as it is so heavily laden with negative 
overtones and disapproval’. The negative association 
persists in the second corpus.
It is hard to see, given the breadth of subjects that 
would fall under the descriptive power of the term 
‘Islamic’ (food, dress, lifestyle, schools, finance, etc.) 
how a focus on Muslims but not Islam would provide 
redress for both the object of hostility and its victims. 
Would it be reasonable to expect Muslims to adopt 
a utilitarian approach to challenging biased attitudes, 
focusing on the victims (Muslims) but not the object 
of hostility (Islam)? 
There is some evidence that public policy discourse 
is moving in this direction, with Islamophobia rarely 
appearing in policy documents and references to 
race or ethnicity prevailing over religion in reports 
assessing ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious bias’ and 
their effects. The hate crime strategies published in 
2012, the updated version in 2014 and the revised 
strategy in 2016 make no mention of Islamophobia 
(HM Government 2012a and 2014, Home Office 
2016), and the cross-departmental working group 
set up to provide a consultative forum for civil society 
organizations, policymakers and academics is named 
the ‘Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group’.
It seems to me circuitous and disingenuous to omit 
Islamophobia from explicit mention in such formats: 
much more so when the wider context of negative 
associations centring on ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’ is 
taken into consideration. Anti-Muslim hatred cannot 
be divorced from the pervasiveness of anti-Islam 
discourses, in our print media and as explanations for 
radicalization in our political discourse.
There is a normative and positive reason for Muslim 
civil society organizations to adopt ‘Islamophobia’ 
as favoured terminology while its relevance in policy 
discourses, for the most part, seems to be waning. 
Disputed definitions aside, ‘Islamophobia’ presents 
Muslims with an opportunity to address both the 
causes and the effects of anti-Muslim animosity. The 
1997 report, with its typology of open/closed views 
of Islam, did precisely this by presenting the effects 
on Muslims of closed views. While the definition 
offered by the report may have been too expansive to 
be useful, the centrality of negative views about Islam 
for Muslims as victims was instrumental to devising 
initiatives to tackle the causes as well as the effects. 
At a time when the terms ‘Islam’, ‘Islamic’, ‘extremist 
Islam’ and ‘Islamist’ are prolifically used and laden 
with negative overtones, is it so surprising that 
‘Islamophobia’ retains its potency in naming the 
object of hate? 
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14 Fear, indifference and engagement: Rethinking 
the challenge of anti-Muslim bigotry
Kenan Malik
The original 1997 Runnymede Trust report observes 
of the word ‘Islamophobia’ that ‘it is not ideal’ but 
is nevertheless ‘a useful shorthand way of referring 
to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear 
or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust 
1997). I want to argue in this chapter that the word is 
not just ‘not ideal’ but deeply problematic, and one 
that makes it more difficult to challenge bigotry and 
discrimination against Muslims.
The term has come to be used by both proponents 
and opponents of bigotry to blur the distinction 
between criticism and hatred. On the one hand, 
it enables many to attack criticism of Islam as 
illegitimate because it is judged to be ‘Islamophobic’. 
On the other, it permits those who promote hatred 
to dismiss condemnation of that hatred as stemming 
from an illegitimate desire to avoid criticism of Islam. 
In conflating criticism and bigotry, the very concept of 
Islamophobia makes it more difficult to engage in a 
rational discussion about where and how to draw the 
line between the two, and about how to challenge 
the latter.
I am not simply making a semantic or terminological 
point. I am questioning, rather, a particular way 
of looking at the problem that seems often to 
compound, rather than alleviate, the problems 
facing Muslims.
In thinking about how to deal with anti-Muslim 
bigotry and discrimination, we need to distinguish 
four categories: criticism of Islam; hatred of 
Muslims; discriminatory practices; and violent acts. 
For reasons of space, I will, in this chapter, deal 
largely with the first two issues – that is, issues 
primarily of speech and thought – and will have little 
to say about the latter two, though the question of 
how to confront discrimination, in particular, raises 
equally challenging issues.
When it comes to the criticism of ideas, nothing, in 
my view, should be out of bounds. Nothing should be 
unsayable simply because someone finds it offensive, 
or because it is culturally or religiously sensitive. It 
is a view that today finds little resonance. Much of 
the discussion about Islamophobia revolves around 
questions of what speech should be limited and how.
To unpack this discussion, we need again to 
separate out certain distinct categories. We need, 
in particular, to distinguish between the giving of 
offence, the promotion of bigotry or hatred, and the 
incitement of violence. The boundaries between the 
categories are blurred, and have deliberately been 
made more so in recent practice and policymaking. 
The 1986 Public Order Act, for instance, forbids the 
use of ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour, within the hearing and sight of a person 
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress 
thereby’, a phrasing that conflates offence, hatred 
and violence. The use of the concept of Islamophobia 
has helped further erode such distinctions. The 
distinctions are, nevertheless, important, as are the 
different ways in which we should respond to the 
different categories.
I will argue in this chapter that the giving of offence 
should be acceptable in an open, plural, democratic 
society. The fomenting of hatred can be deeply 
problematic, creating fear within certain communities 
and begetting violence. But while bigotry and hate 
speech need urgently to be tackled, they need 
tackling primarily at a political and moral level, 
rather than through the use of legislation to restrict 
speech. The legal line should come at the point not 
of incitement to hatred but of incitement to violence; 
direct incitement should be an offence, just as the 
violence being incited is an offence. 
It has become commonplace to argue that while 
free speech may be a good, it must necessarily be 
less free in a plural society. For diverse societies to 
function and to be fair, so the argument runs, we 
need to show respect not just for individuals but also 
for the cultures and beliefs in which those individuals 
are embedded and which help give them a sense of 
identity and being. This requires that we police public 
discourse about those cultures and beliefs both to 
minimize friction between antagonistic cultures and 
beliefs and to protect the dignity of those individuals 
embedded in them. As the sociologist Tariq Modood 
has put it, that ‘If people are to occupy the same 
political space without conflict, they mutually have 
to limit the extent to which they subject each others’ 
fundamental beliefs to criticism’ (Modood 2005).
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I want to argue the opposite: that it is precisely 
because we do live in a plural society that we need 
the fullest extension possible of free speech. In a 
plural society, it is both inevitable and, often, important 
that people offend the sensibilities of others.
It is inevitable because where different beliefs are 
deeply held, clashes are unavoidable. Almost by 
definition such clashes express what it is to live in 
a diverse society; they should be openly resolved 
rather than suppressed in the name of ‘respect’ or 
‘tolerance’.
And it is often important because any kind of social 
change or social progress means offending some 
deeply held sensibilities. Or to put it another way: 
‘You can’t say that!’ is all too often the response of 
those in power to having their power challenged. To 
accept that certain things cannot be said is to accept 
that certain forms of power cannot be challenged.
The notion of giving offence suggests that certain 
beliefs are so important or valuable to certain people 
that they should be put beyond the possibility of 
being insulted, or caricatured or even questioned. 
The importance of the principle of free speech is 
precisely that it provides a permanent challenge to 
the idea that some questions are beyond contention, 
and hence acts as a permanent challenge to 
authority. This is why free speech is essential not 
simply to the practice of democracy, but to the 
aspirations of those groups who may have been 
failed by the formal democratic processes: to those 
whose voices may have been silenced by racism, 
for instance. The real value of free speech, in other 
words, is not to those who possess power, but to 
those who want to challenge them. And the real 
value of censorship is to those who do not wish their 
authority to be challenged. Once we give up on the 
right to offend in the name of ‘tolerance’ or ‘respect’, 
we constrain our ability to challenge those in power, 
and therefore to challenge injustice.
Commentators and critics often talk about ‘offence 
to a community’. And from The Satanic Verses to 
Charlie Hebdo, speech regarded as offensive to 
Muslims is often described as ‘Islamophobic’.
More often than not, though, what is deemed 
an ‘offence to a community’ refers in reality to 
debates within communities. Some Muslims found 
The Satanic Verses offensive. Others did not. 
Few Muslims objected when the Danish cartoons 
were first published. Only months of campaigning, 
primarily by Saudi Arabian authorities, turned the 
issue into a flashpoint (Malik 2009: 142–147). 
It is because what is often called ‘offence to a 
community’ is in reality debate within communities 
that so many of the flashpoints over offensiveness 
have been over works produced by minority artists 
– not just Salman Rushdie, but also Hanif Kureishi, 
Monica Ali, Sooreh Hera, Taslima Nasrin, M. F. 
Hussain and countless others.
Part of the reason that the debates within 
communities are often ignored, and the spotlight 
shone only on the ‘offence’, derives from the 
way that many today have come to understand 
the meaning of community and of diversity. Anti-
Muslim bigots look upon Muslims as comprising 
an undifferentiated lump. Muslims, in their eyes, 
constitute a single, homogeneous community, all 
speaking with a common voice, all defined primarily 
by their faith, all hostile to ‘western values’ and all 
bearing social views that have remained unchanged 
for over a millennium.
Put like that, few liberals would agree with such a 
perspective. Yet, the common liberal or left-wing view 
of Muslim communities is not that different.
Naser Khader is a secular Danish MP of Muslim 
background. He tells of a conversation with Tøger 
Seidenfaden, editor of Politiken, a left-wing Danish 
newspaper that was critical of the Muhammed 
cartoons. Seidenfaden claimed that ‘the cartoons 
insulted all Muslims’. Khader responded: ‘I am 
not insulted.’ ‘But you’re not a real Muslim’, was 
Seidenfaden’s response (Malik 2009: 164).
‘You’re not a real Muslim.’ Why? Because to be a 
proper Muslim is, from such a perspective, to find the 
cartoons offensive. Anyone who is not offended is by 
definition not a proper Muslim. The argument of the 
liberal anti-racist here meets that of the anti-Muslim 
bigot. For the latter, the real Muslim is the reactionary 
Muslim; for the former, the liberal Muslim is not a real 
Muslim. And in eliding criticism of Islam with hatred of 
Muslims, the concept of Islamophobia helps makes it 
easier for the bigot to portray his bigotry as criticism 
of Islam and for the liberal to view criticism of Islam 
as a form of bigotry. 
This leads us to the questions of bigotry and of 
incitement to hatred. It is one thing to cause offence; 
it is quite another to foment hatred. If the giving of 
offence should be acceptable in an open, plural 
society, hatred, bigotry should not. How, then, should 
we challenge such bigotry and hatred?
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Hate speech laws – the outlawing of certain forms 
of speech defined as hateful – have become 
accepted as essential weapons in combating 
bigotry. But just as the received wisdom that it is 
morally wrong to give offence is misplaced, so is 
the received wisdom that hate speech and bigotry 
should be outlawed. We certainly need to resist 
all attempts to use criticism of Islam to demonize 
Muslims. But criticism, of whatever kind, even if it is 
hateful or bigoted, should be seen as a moral and 
political, not legal, issue.
The argument that we should censor speech to 
prevent bigotry raises a number of questions. The 
first is about who decides what should be censored.
In January 2006, Iqbal Sacranie, then secretary 
general of the Muslim Council of Britain, made 
some derogatory comments about homosexuality 
on Radio 4’s Today programme. Homosexuality, he 
said was ‘harmful’ and ‘not acceptable’. According 
to Sacranie, ‘scientific evidence’ showed that 
homosexuality led to ‘illnesses and diseases’ (BBC 
News 2006).
Sacranie saw himself as merely expressing what 
he considered to be the Islamic view. Many gay 
groups saw his comments as promoting hatred. 
Scotland Yard’s community safety unit launched 
an investigation into whether Sacranie’s comments 
constituted ‘hate speech’, and whether he had fallen 
foul of the 1986 Public Order Act, which forbids the 
use of ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words’.
In response to the police investigation, 22 imams 
and Muslim leaders wrote to The Times (2006) 
demanding the right to be able to ‘freely express 
their views in an atmosphere free of intimidation or 
bullying’. They added that ‘We cannot truly claim 
to be a free and open society while we are trying 
to silence dissenting views’. Many of those same 
leaders had called for Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic 
Verses to be banned. Sacranie himself had said of 
Rushdie, immediately after the Ayatollah Khomeini 
issued his fatwa calling for the author’s murder, 
that ‘Death is too good for him’. And every one of 
the signatories to the Times letter had wanted the 
Danish cartoons, published just four months before 
Sacranie’s comments, to be censored.
The kind of hypocrisy, or moral blindness, expressed 
by those Muslim leaders is widespread. Many 
of those happy to see cartoons lampooning 
Mohammed draw the line at anything mocking the 
Holocaust. Many gay rights activists want Muslims to 
be prosecuted for homophobia but want the right to 
criticize Muslims as they see fit. Racists such as Nick 
Griffin of the British National Party (BNP) or Tommy 
Robinson of the English Defence League (EDL) want 
to be free to spout racist abuse but want Muslim 
clerics locked up for doing the same. And so it goes 
on. The argument for the censorship of bigotry 
quickly degenerates into the claim that ‘my speech 
should be free but yours is too costly’.
The problem of censoring bigotry is not simply 
the difficulty in defining what it is that should be 
censored. It is also that the consequence of such 
censorship is not what many believe it to be. 
Banning certain forms of speech does not reduce or 
eliminate bigotry. It simply festers beyond the public 
gaze. Sheffield University social geographer Gill 
Valentine, for instance, suggests that hate speech 
restrictions do not reduce bigotry but rather ‘change 
its form’ and ‘privatize’ it. ‘The privatized nature of 
contemporary prejudice’, Valentine argues, ‘makes 
it more difficult to expose and challenge, producing 
a frustration that offenders are “getting away with 
it”, and making it harder to identify patterns of 
prejudice in form and intent.’ For those ‘critical of the 
progressive social norms … there is a sense of anger 
and frustration that their views are being silenced in 
public by the law’. The danger, Valentine concludes, 
‘is that if these mutual and antagonistic senses of 
injustice are not openly acknowledged they might be 
exploited by extremist political parties and erupt into 
tension and conflict’ (Valentine 2014).
The rise, in the past few years, of anti-immigrant, 
anti-Muslim political parties throughout Europe 
bears out Valentine’s warning. The emergence of 
such organizations has been regarded by some as 
showing the necessity for even tighter controls on 
bigoted speech. In fact, the attempt to outlaw bigotry 
through censorship has itself provided some of the 
fuel for such bigotry.
The consequence of challenging bigotry through 
censorship also leads ‘anti-racists into a false 
comfort zone, where it feels like the basic arguments 
against prejudice no longer need to be put’, as the 
journalist Paul Mason (2014) has put it. It helps 
absolve us, in other words, of the responsibility of 
tackling such ideas openly and robustly.
It is, in my view, morally incumbent on advocates 
of free speech also to challenge bigotry. Part of 
the reason for free speech is to be able to create 
the conditions for open, robust debate, conditions 
necessary to allow us to challenge obnoxious views. 
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And part of the reason that such obnoxious views 
continue to flourish is that too many remain keener to 
censor than to challenge.
It is worth noting too that, just as with the attempt 
to censor offence, minorities themselves are all too 
often the victims of legal constraints on bigotry. 
The 1965 Race Relations Act introduced Britain’s 
first legal ban on the incitement of racial hatred. 
The first person convicted under its provisions 
was not a member of the National Front or of the 
Racial Preservation Society but the Trinidadian 
Black Power activist Michael X, sentenced to 12 
months’ imprisonment in 1967. Four members of 
the Universal Coloured Peoples’ Association were 
also convicted that year for stirring up hatred against 
white people at Speakers’ Corner.
In the 1960s and 1970s, incitement laws were often 
used to target black activists whose views were 
regarded as unacceptable or dangerous. Today, 
those with unacceptable Muslim or Islamist views 
are more likely to be targets. In Britain, Muslims 
with unpalatable views, from Samina Malik (the 
so-called ‘lyrical terrorist’) to protestors against the 
Danish cartoons, who were jailed for up to six years 
for chants that ‘solicited murder’ and ‘incited racial 
hatred’, have felt the coercive impact of such laws 
(BBC News 2007a, 2007b). In France, after the 
Charlie Hebdo killings, the government organized 
a huge march through Paris in defence of free 
speech. It also used hate speech laws to criminalize 
those who dissented from the official view, from the 
antisemitic comedian Dieudonné to schoolchildren 
who refused to honour the slain cartoonists (Agence 
France-Presse 2015, Amnesty International 2015). 
Many countries now use hate speech laws to outlaw 
support for the anti-Israel BDS (Boycott, Divestment, 
Sanctions) movement.
Critics of such policies usually cry ‘Islamophobia’. But 
what has helped legitimize such actions is the way 
that anti-racists themselves have both demanded 
the criminalization of hate and helped expand the 
meanings of ‘hatred’ and ‘incitement’. When the 
state gets to criminalize dissenting speech, even if it 
is bigoted, minorities themselves too often suffer.
All this suggests that the concept of Islamophobia 
not only elides criticism and bigotry in a problematic 
fashion, but is also an expression of a wider way of 
thinking about racism, and of how to combat it, that 
seems to me unhelpful. To understand this better, let 
me finish by returning to the question of ‘diversity’, of 
how we conceive of it today, and of how we should 
conceive of it.
When we talk about diversity, what we mean is 
that the world is a messy place, full of clashes and 
conflicts. That is all for the good, for such clashes 
and conflicts are the raw material of political and 
cultural engagement. The importance of diversity 
is that it allows us to expand our horizons, bringing 
different values, beliefs and lifestyles face to face, 
and forcing us to think about those differences. Only 
this can create the political dialogue and debate 
necessary, paradoxically, to help forge a more 
universal language of citizenship.
But the very thing that is valuable about diversity 
– the cultural and ideological clashes that it brings 
about – is precisely what many fear. That fear can 
take two forms. On the one side there is the nativist 
sentiment that immigration undermines social 
cohesion and erodes our sense of national identity. 
Islam, in particular, elicits such fear. Many view Islam 
through the lens of the ‘clash of civilizations’, a 
perspective that leads politicians and commentators 
– not just on the right but self-proclaimed liberals 
too – towards deeply illiberal arguments: insisting, for 
instance, that Muslim immigration must be limited, or 
that racial profiling is necessary in the ‘war on terror’, 
or that it is not possible to be racist against Muslims 
because Muslims are not a ‘race’.
And on the other side there is the multicultural 
perspective, that sees Britain, in the words of the 
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 
whose report was published by the Runnymede 
Trust in 2000, three years after the Islamophobia 
report, as ‘a community of citizens and community of 
communities’, in which equality ‘must be defined in a 
culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating 
but not discriminatory manner’ (CMEB 2000). In 
practice, the idea of a ‘community of communities’ 
has helped erode that of a ‘community of citizens’. 
Diversity is too often ‘managed’ by putting individuals 
from minority communities into particular ethnic and 
cultural boxes, defining needs and aspirations by 
virtue of the boxes into which people are put, and 
allowing the boxes to shape public policy. Muslims in 
particular have come to be seen less as citizens who 
happen to be Muslim than as Muslims who happen 
to live in Britain.
At the same time, defining equality in a ‘culturally 
sensitive way’ has led many to view respect for 
others as meaning the need to accept their ways 
of being, and to regard criticisms of, or challenges 
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to, others’ values or practices as ‘insensitive’, even 
racist. As a result, boundaries between groups have 
increasingly become policed in an effort to minimize 
clashes and conflicts.
The one perspective encourages fear, the other 
indifference. What neither begins to address is the 
question of engagement. Engagement requires us 
neither to shun certain people as the Other, with 
values and practices inevitably inimical to ours, nor 
to be indifferent to such values and practices in 
the name of ‘respect’, but rather to recognize that 
respect requires us to challenge the values and 
beliefs of others. It requires us to have a robust, 
open public debate about the values to which we 
aspire, accepting that such a debate will be difficult, 
and often confrontational, but also that such difficult, 
confrontational debate is a necessity in any society 
that seeks to be open and liberal.
It requires us, in other words, to remake the very 
framework within which Islam, and Muslims, are 
viewed from both sides of the debate.
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15 Islamophobia and antisemitism
David Feldman
Islamophobia became a matter of public debate 
in the 1990s and ever since then its congruence 
with antisemitism has been a recurrent theme. As 
early as 1994, three years before the publication 
of Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, the 
Runnymede Trust convened a commission on ‘the 
persistence and dangers of antisemitism’. One 
member, Akbar Ahmed, expressed his hope that the 
Trust would set up a similar commission ‘to study 
prejudice against Muslims and Islam’. His colleagues 
agreed to the extent that they included the aspiration 
in their final report (Runnymede Commission on 
Antisemitism 1994: 15). This tentative connection 
drawn between Islamophobia and antisemitism 
has been supplemented and developed more 
systematically in the last decades by scholars, as 
well as by institutions whose aim is to combat racism 
and discrimination. Together they suggest that 
Islamophobia and antisemitism should be conceived 
within a single frame of analysis and action, though 
they differ over how exactly this should be done. 
In the following pages I explore these attempts 
to bind together opposition to Islamophobia and 
antisemitism. However, I also highlight the social, 
political and conceptual constraints that limit the 
impact of ecumenical anti-racism of this sort, and 
which promote division between Muslims and Jews.
In 1978 Edward Said drew attention to the 
connectedness of antisemitism and aspects of 
what we would now call Islamophobia when he 
observed that ‘Orientalism’ in its ‘Islamic branch’ 
and antisemitism ‘resemble each other very closely’ 
(Said 1978: 28). Orientalism, for Said, was the nexus 
of western knowledge about the Orient which both 
expressed and enabled western power over the 
Middle East. Without denying the significance of 
modern empires and what they have conceived 
as their civilizing mission, more recent writers have 
emphasized the common roots of antisemitism and 
Islamophobia in a conception of Europe, and of 
modern national identity within Europe, which has 
been essentially Christian. In 2002/3 the European 
Union Monitoring Commission Board chairman, 
Robert Purkiss, illustrated the currency of this idea 
that Muslims and Jews alike faced a single source of 
discrimination and hostility:
Our conceptions of European identity are significant 
drivers of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. One 
of the similarities between anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia is their historical relationship to a 
Europe perceived as exclusively Christian. Jews 
have of course suffered the most unspeakable 
crimes by European Christians. But it is true that all 
other religions, including Judaism and Islam have 
been excised from the prevailing understanding 
of Europe’s identity as Christian and white. Both 
Islam and Judaism have long served as Europe’s 
‘other’, as a symbol for a distinct culture, religion and 
ethnicity. (Bunzl 2007: 9)
Increasingly, scholars have argued that the process 
of stigmatization and discrimination experienced by 
Muslims and Jews has not only marked them as 
religious minorities but has also been characterized 
by their ‘racialization’. Religious differences, they 
argue, were conceived as immutable cultural 
differences which converted the messy diversity 
of Muslims and Jews into the collective ‘Muslim’ 
and ‘Jew’. These negative stereotypes did not 
denote differences of belief only but were markers 
that saturated their subjects’ being. Often these 
stereotypes were linked with ideas about lineage, 
blood and phenotypical characteristics, but the 
more vital point is that both Jews and Muslims were 
branded with negative generalizations that were 
about not only their religious lives but their immutable 
attitudes and behaviour more broadly (Meer 2014).
Other writers have focused less on religion, or on 
the common processes of racialization, and more on 
the ways in which the histories of Islamophobia and 
antisemitism form a shared story. For Matti Bunzl 
the relationship between the two is sequential. Since 
the 19th century, he suggests, secular ideas and 
projects have formed the mainspring of prejudice. 
Antisemitism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
was anchored in ideas about race, was fuelled by 
nationalism and turned on the question of whether 
Jews could be included within the new national 
communities. Islamophobia, by contrast, Bunzl 
sees as a phenomenon of the late 20th and early 
21st centuries, fuelled by geopolitical conflicts in 
the Middle East and by population movements 
that have brought millions of Muslims to Europe. 
It does not turn on religion or race, he proposes, 
but on the idea of civilization and the notion that 
Islam engenders a worldview that is fundamentally 
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incompatible with western culture. In this way Bunzl 
connects antisemitism and Islamophobia but does so 
by arguing they have performed similar functions at 
different times in Europe and within different political 
systems (Bunzl 2014).
Most recently, Gil Anidjar, James Renton and 
Ben Gidley have argued that Islamophobia and 
antisemitism have changed over time but they have 
changed together. Jews and Muslims were jointly 
expelled from Iberia in 1492 and the idea of Europe 
never broke free of Christendom. Jews were ‘the 
Other’ within, Muslims the external ‘Other’, one 
that appeared increasingly threatening, following 
the Ottoman seizure of Constantinople in 1453. 
In the 19th century Jews and Muslims were jointly 
conceived as Semites, bound by a linguistic and 
racial heritage as well as by Abrahamic monotheism. 
Arabs were Jews on horseback, as Disraeli wrote. 
It was only in the 20th century, Renton argues, 
following the alliance in 1917 between the British 
Empire and Zionism, that European notions of 
Muslims and Jews entered a new period in which 
Jews ceased to be ‘Oriental’ and Islam was 
reconceived as a political problem (Anidjar 2003, 
Renton and Gidley 2017, Renton 2017).
These efforts to draw Muslims and Jews closer 
together by highlighting the combined development 
of antisemitism and Islamophobia are a significant 
and collective intellectual achievement. They are also 
a political intervention. Relations between Jews and 
Muslims in the UK are often distant and sometimes 
vexed. This is the case notwithstanding the 
everyday interactions between Muslims and Jews in 
employment and consumption and the valiant efforts 
by a few to build understanding. In this context, by 
insisting on the histories and challenges shared by 
Muslims and Jews, the scholars and activists I have 
been discussing push back against the current.
The lack of contact between Jews and Muslims in 
Britain arises in large part from their divergent social 
experiences. Whereas the Jewish population is 
mainly UK-born and coded as ‘white’, just over half 
of the Muslim population in Britain was born outside 
of the country, and it is composed largely, though by 
no means entirely, of people of colour. Moreover, the 
class profiles of the two populations diverge widely: 
50% of Muslims in the UK are living in poverty, and 
Muslims constitute the religious population most 
likely to experience poverty, whereas Jews are 
the least likely, with just 13% living in poverty. Just 
9% of Jews live in social rented accommodation 
compared with 27% of Muslim households, and 
Jewish households are correspondingly more 
likely to own their homes. At the upper end of 
the scale, we find Muslims are the religious group 
least represented in ‘top professions’ in England 
and Wales in proportion to their total number while 
Jews are the most highly represented proportionate 
to their total number. These different experiences 
generate spatial as well as social distance: 46% of 
the Muslim population live in the 10% most deprived 
areas in England; the figure for Jews, by contrast, 
is just 3% (Graham et al. 2007, Muslim Council of 
Britain 2015, Feldman et al. 2017, Heath and Li 
2015, Reynolds and Birdwell 2015).
Differences in social class are supplemented by 
political divergence. Most British Jews are now 
supporters of the Conservative Party, whereas 
Muslims tend to support Labour (Heath et al. 2013, 
Survation 2017). Further, Jews and Muslims tend to 
have contrary and, often, deeply felt allegiances in 
the conflicts produced by the creation of the State 
of Israel in 1948, by the Nakba, the policies of the 
state of Israel and the development of the Palestinian 
national movement. If we turn from these allegiances 
overseas to the ways in which Muslims and Jews 
are represented within domestic political debate we 
see a further striking dissimilarity. Whereas Jews 
have been portrayed by David Cameron and other 
political leaders as a model minority – law-abiding, 
aspiring, with a strong sense of collective identity that 
dovetails with patriotism – Muslims are presented as 
a group that places itself and others in jeopardy – 
inhabiting a culture of poverty, insufficiently integrated 
into British society, and a source of sympathy for 
terror and the nation’s enemies (Jewish Chronicle 
2011, Gov.uk 2015).
These social and political differences are matched 
by the suspicion with which significant elements 
in the Jewish and Muslim populations regard each 
other. Since 2000 there has been a steady rise of 
recorded antisemitic incidents in Britain and this has 
been matched by a growing fear of antisemitism 
among the British Jewish population (Feldman et 
al. 2017, FRA 2013). Although there is no credible 
evidence that Muslims are responsible for the rise 
in the number of reported antisemitic incidents, 
some individuals and institutions assert that ‘radical 
Islam’ is the primary driver of antisemitism in the 
UK (Feldman et al. 2017). This suspicion of the 
Muslim population among some Jews is returned 
in kind by a significant minority of Muslims. The 
most recent and extensive survey of antisemitism 
in Britain found that most Muslims do not respond 
positively to antisemitic statements but, at the same 
time, antisemitism ‘is consistently higher among the 
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Muslim population of Great Britain than among the 
population in general’ (Staetsky 2017: 6, 56).
In the face of much that pulls Jews and Muslims in 
different and sometimes opposite directions, when 
scholars and activists point to the shared foundations 
and functions of Islamophobia and antisemitism they 
highlight the common sources of prejudice that have 
afflicted both groups. Nevertheless, the very terms 
that we use in these discussions – Islamophobia 
and antisemitism – are sometimes used in ways that 
subvert this fragile solidarity. A greater awareness of 
where the terms come from and how they are used 
will bring this into view and make us more aware of 
the pitfalls and complexity we face.
The term ‘antisemitism’ was first popularized in 
Germany in the late 1870s and 1880s. Here self-
proclaimed antisemites argued that equal rights for 
Jews – which had been decisively achieved only 
in 1871 – had been a grave mistake and that the 
state should take urgent action to protect Germans 
and Germanness from Jews and Jewish influence. 
It was only at this point that the word was taken up 
by Jews and their allies, and by commentators, and 
was disseminated rapidly across languages as they 
fought to sustain and vindicate equal rights for the 
Jewish minority. It meant something very specific: the 
attack on the Jews’ legal and political rights. As one 
German-Jewish Zionist put it in 1913, ‘the antisemitic 
movement grew up on German soil; it is almost as 
old as the enfranchisement of the Jews’ (Feldman 
2017). Two points follow from this. First, although we 
have become accustomed to thinking of antisemitism 
as ‘the longest hatred’, synonymous with all forms 
of anti-Jewish prejudice over millennia, the term 
both is quite young and originally had a very narrow 
and precise meaning. Second, we can see how the 
charge of antisemitism was closely connected to a 
programme of claiming rights for Jews: in this case, 
equal civil and political rights in Germany.
In other words, objections to antisemitism were 
never just that. In the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries antisemitism was identified with an assault 
on equal rights. This conception of antisemitism 
did not disappear in the inter-war years. Indeed, 
the victories of National Socialism in Germany and 
Austria illustrated its continuing relevance. After 
1945 the campaign against antisemitism extended 
to Jews in the Soviet Union. For some this was a 
fight to secure Jews their rights under the Soviet 
constitution, for others it was Jews’ human rights 
that were at stake, and for others still the campaign 
for Jews to be allowed to leave the USSR and go to 
Israel was a struggle for their national rights as Jews. 
The campaign against antisemitism at the same time 
invoked a set of rights that was being violated.
What then of Islamophobia? In a suggestion that 
meshes well with the development of the concept 
of antisemitism, AbdoolKarim Vakil proposes, 
‘Islamophobia … is about contestation and the 
power to set the political vocabulary and legal 
ground of recognition and redress, naming and 
claiming Islamophobia as a social category with 
legal purchase’ (Vakil 2011: 277). As presented by 
Runnymede in 1997, Islamophobia was anatomized 
and analysed in the context of liberal and social 
democratic values. Indeed, the harms identified 
as Islamophobic make no sense without these 
other, positive values. ‘The term Islamophobia’, the 
report stated, ‘refers to unfounded hostility towards 
Islam.’ The report went on at length to develop a 
contrast between what it called ‘closed’ and ‘open’ 
views of Islam. ‘Phobic dread of Islam’ is said to 
be the recurring characteristic of closed views 
which have malign practical consequences: first, 
unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and 
communities and, second, exclusion of Muslims 
from mainstream political and social affairs. This 
we might take to be the liberal characterization 
of Islamophobia, derived from a tradition of late-
20th-century responses to racism. The roots of 
the problem are seen to lie in prejudice, in faulty 
cognition, and the answer lies in respect for empirical 
variation (which will undermine any negative 
generalization about Islam or Muslims) and rational 
debate. The goal of policy should be to promote 
equal opportunities and harmonious relations 
between members of different communities. The key 
recommendation, therefore, was to extend anti-
discrimination legislation to cover religious as well as 
ethnic minorities (Runnymede Trust 1997).
In the same ways that the charge of antisemitism has 
carried an assertion of the Jews’ claims for rights, 
so too the charge of Islamophobia claims rights in 
the name of the Muslim population. In the years that 
followed the Runnymede report’s publication we also 
see the charge of Islamophobia being articulated in 
a new register. Tariq Modood has reflected that the 
expression of grievances concerning Islamophobia 
in Britain is closely connected to a rise in Muslim 
consciousness and a ‘struggle for recognition’ 
(Modood 2014). Salman Sayyid similarly proposes 
that ‘an understanding of Islamophobia in absence 
of an understanding of the way in which there has 
been a global reassertion of Muslim identity is difficult 
to sustain’ (Sayyid 2011: 11). There has been a 
shift from the universalism that shaped the attack 
on Islamophobia in 1997. At the very least, this 
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perspective has been supplemented by one that 
privileges specifically Muslim interests.
 We can see something similar in the case of 
antisemitism. Through much of the 20th century 
the meanings attached to antisemitism rested on 
universal ideals as well as Jewish interests – upon 
the ideas of equality vested in Jewish emancipation 
and minority rights. This concept of antisemitism 
has not disappeared but it has been supplemented 
and sometimes overshadowed by a concept of 
antisemitism that is attached to the defence of 
Israel, its right to exist and its policies. The creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948 marked a radical break 
in Jewish history. When Israel is the subject of 
debate the charge of antisemitism may still invoke 
the rights of a historically persecuted minority, 
such as whenever Jews are libelled as a uniquely 
self-interested and darkly conspiratorial force. 
However, the charge of antisemitism often arises in 
contexts in which Jews defend the policies of a state 
which defines itself as Jewish and in which Jews 
compose the majority of the population, in which 
the non-Jewish minorities suffer some systematic 
disadvantage and which since 1967 has exercised 
dominion beyond its internationally recognized 
borders (Peleg and Waxman 2011). When the charge 
of antisemitism arises in the context of debate on the 
politics of Israel/Palestine it is wielded, in part at least, 
as an adjunct to state power and not as an auxiliary 
to the claims of a vulnerable minority.
The changed appearance of the politics of anti-
antisemitism renders common cause with anti-
Islamophobia decreasingly likely. Paradoxically, one 
tendency held in common among Muslims and Jews 
in recent decades only serves to deepen separation: 
namely, the politics of identity. A large majority (93%) 
of British Jews report that Israel forms part of their 
identity as Jews, and 90% support Israel’s right to 
exist as a Jewish state (Miller et al. 2015). This is one 
potent reason why rhetorical attacks on Israel are 
experienced by them as attacks on their identity as 
Jews and are labelled as antisemitic. In the case of 
Islamophobia too, AbdoolKarim Vakil notes, ‘Where 
Islam is integral to Muslim identities, the denigration 
of Islam impacts on Muslim respect and self-worth’ 
(Vakil 2011: 276).
An anti-racist politics built on the language of rights 
may (just) be able to negotiate the space between 
Jews and Muslims both in British society and as 
they respond to conflict in Israel/Palestine. But an 
anti-racist politics built on the politics of Muslim and 
Jewish identity will help entrench those domestic and 
international differences that currently drive Muslims 
and Jews further apart. 
A 20th-anniversary report82
16 The Runnymede Commission on British Muslims 
and Islamophobia: A history 
Robin Richardson
The Runnymede Commission on Islamophobia 
and British Muslims had its formal origins in a 
Runnymede project in the early 1990s concerned 
with antisemitism. One of the recommendations 
arising from that project was that a similar project 
should be established concerned with Islamophobia 
(Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism 1994). 
Less formally, it arose from discussions among 
Runnymede’s staff members and some of its trustees 
about the nature and definition of Runnymede’s 
core subject matter, race relations. These latter 
discussions had been influenced by contact with the 
An-Nisa Society in north-west London, the journal 
Q News, the development of plans to create the 
organization that in due course became known as 
the Muslim Council of Britain, and personal and 
professional contact with the author of a range 
of papers and articles about British Muslims and 
the forms of discrimination they encountered, 
Tariq Modood. I was for my own part director of 
Runnymede throughout the three years, 1993–
1996, during which the plans for a commission on 
Islamophobia gestated and were finalized, and acted 
as drafting editor of the commission’s report in the 
period 1996–1997.
Terminology
It was in May 1996 that the first meeting took place 
of, as it was at that time called, the Runnymede Trust 
Commission on Islamophobia. From the outset there 
was a lively and lengthy discussion about the terms 
of reference for the commission, starting with its 
proposed name.
Some of the commissioners supported ‘Commission 
on Islamophobia’ as the project’s title and were not 
prepared to modify it in any way. They had agreed 
to be members of the commission, they indicated, 
on the understanding that the proposed title would 
not be changed. Others said that, minimally, the title 
needed modifying but preferably should not contain 
the word ‘Islamophobia’ at all. Arguments underlying 
the latter position included: the concept of phobia is 
unacceptable, since it implies deep-seated mental 
illness and should only be used in medical contexts 
and by medical experts; the word ‘Islamophobia’ is 
virtually unknown in the wider world and its use in 
the title of the commission would provoke derision 
or anger, or both, among people unfamiliar with it; 
all the commission’s members were UK citizens or 
long-term residents of the UK and as a group they 
would not have appropriate expertise or credibility to 
talk about Islamophobia even in the rest of Europe, 
let alone in the world at large – and for this reason if 
no other the title must imply a focus on Britain rather 
than on everywhere; and the hostility that Muslims 
in Britain and the world experience from others is to 
an extent caused by themselves and their worldview 
and behaviour, and the commission should signal 
awareness of this in its very title.
Those who did not want the word ‘Islamophobia’ in 
the commission’s title coalesced around the view that 
the title should be ‘Commission on British Muslims’. 
This was unacceptable to others, particularly in 
view of some of the arguments that had been 
advanced in support of it. Eventually the chairperson 
proposed ‘the Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia’. No one objected.
In various ways these arguments and 
disagreements have continued to be replayed in 
national conversations about Islamophobia over the 
last two decades.
Origins
The Runnymede Trust was founded in 1968. 
Up until about 1992 the dominant terms in 
Runnymede’s discourse were ‘race’, ‘race relations’ 
and ‘colour’ – the Trust’s work reflected, that is to 
say, the conceptual consensus established by the 
Race Relations Acts of the 1960s and 1976. The 
dominant discourse portrayed everyone as either 
white or coloured – or, according to the terminology 
developed in the eighties, white or black (later, since 
about 1998, white or BME – Black and minority 
ethnic). The worldview reflected in this language was 
derived in part from the United States and in part 
from Britain’s experience as a colonial power.
Alternative worldviews were, however, advocated 
within the Runnymede staff team and by some of its 
trustees, and in 1992 the Trust set up a commission 
on a form of racism that was clearly not essentially 
to do with colour: antisemitism. As stated above, 
one of the report’s formal recommendations was 
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 83
that there should be a broadly similar commission 
on Islamophobia.
It took almost two years to begin implementing this 
recommendation. There was difficulty in agreeing 
who should be approached to chair the proposed 
commission on Islamophobia and how to choose 
its members. Some of the trustees were concerned 
about such a radical departure from the prevailing 
race relations paradigm enshrined in the 1976 
Act, and had unhappy memories of how CARD 
(the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination) had 
fragmented and collapsed in the 1960s.
Discussions and disagreement
In due course, however, a commission was 
established that had substantial expertise and 
credibility. The chairperson, Gordon Conway, 
was entirely clear that the commission was about 
Islamophobia, not about British Muslims, but equally 
clear that it was about the impact of Islamophobia in 
Britain, not in the world generally. In early 1997 the 
commission published and circulated a consultation 
paper. This was entitled Islamophobia: Its Features 
and Dangers and took the form of an A5 24-
page booklet. It concluded with five principles or 
propositions to guide further action. Also, there were 
nine questions for discussion and consideration. The 
five propositions were as follows: 
• Urgency. Islamophobia is a serious and dangerous 
feature of contemporary affairs and culture. It 
is urgent that substantial measures should be 
adopted to confront and reduce it.
• Many roles. Many different people in Britain 
have significant roles to play, both separately 
and in cooperation and coordination with each 
other. They include politicians and journalists, 
both nationally and locally; opinion-formers and 
policymakers in a wide range of fields, including 
education, the justice system, employment and 
government; church leaders; and prominent 
members of Muslim communities.
• Many tasks. Many kinds of action are required. No 
one measure will be sufficient in itself. Changes in 
the law on discrimination are probably required, for 
example, but so also are less tangible and visible 
measures relating to attitudes and beliefs, and to 
building trust and respect.
• A significant distinction. A distinction needs to 
be drawn, by both Muslims and non-Muslims, 
between phobic opposition to Islam on the one 
hand and reasonable criticism and disagreement 
on the other. Not all criticisms of Islam are 
intrinsically phobic.
• The international dimension. Islamophobia within 
Britain is affected by trends and events elsewhere. 
So also, within Britain, are Muslim self-definitions, 
perceptions and identities. The international 
dimension needs to be borne in mind, but is no 
excuse for not tackling Islamophobia within Britain 
with great urgency.
The written responses to the booklet were 
overwhelmingly positive, particularly from Muslim 
organizations and individuals. They included a 
remarkably substantial submission from the Islamic 
Foundation, and this was invaluable when the 
commission came in due course to formulate its 
final report. There was virtually no response from 
the race relations world. The booklet was sent to all 
race equality councils in Britain and to a wide range 
of race equality officers in public bodies. Very few, 
however, replied. 
Outcomes	and	reflections
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All was published 
in autumn 1997 and was launched at the House 
of Commons by then-Home Secretary Jack Straw. 
It made 60 formal recommendations and many of 
these were in due course implemented, though not 
necessarily – of course – as a direct result of the 
commission’s report.
Key recommendations included the following:
• Government departments, bodies and agencies 
should review equal opportunities policies 
in employment, service delivery and public 
consultation, and ensure these refer explicitly to 
religion as well as to ethnicity, race and colour.
• The Department for Education should collect, 
collate and publish data on the ethnic origins 
and attainment of pupils in all schools … and on 
the religious affiliations of pupils in all schools; 
should review and if necessary modify the criteria 
and procedures for providing state funding to 
religiously based schools, to ensure they do not 
discriminate against Muslim bodies; ensure Muslim 
educationists, as also educationists from other 
faith communities, are involved in discussions 
of education for citizenship; give guidance to 
registered inspectors on points to look for when 
reporting on the arrangements which schools 
make for the pastoral, cultural and religious needs 
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of Muslim pupils; encourage more Muslims to train 
as teachers, including but not only for the teaching 
of religious education.
• The legal system should make discrimination on 
religious grounds unlawful; ensure that proposed 
new legislation on racial violence makes reference 
to religion; and the Public Order Act 1986 to make 
incitement to religious hatred unlawful.
• Healthcare organizations should develop 
guidelines on good practice in healthcare relating 
to religious and cultural needs, including topics 
such as the following: employment and use of 
non-Christian chaplains, religious observance, 
diet and food … consultations and contacts 
with local faith communities, advocacy and 
befriending services.
However, some of the potentially most important 
recommendations were ignored or misunderstood. 
Consider, for example, recommendation number 56, 
very slightly adapted for quotation out of context:
• Race equality organizations and monitoring groups 
should address Islamophobia in their programmes 
of action, for example by advocating and 
lobbying for the policy and procedural changes 
recommended in this report.
It was further clarified that this would entail reviewing 
the definition of racial harassment used in policy 
documentation and ensuring it contained an explicit 
reference to religion, and routinely complaining 
to the Press Complaints Commission and to the 
newspapers concerned when it was considered that 
coverage of Islam or of Muslims had been inaccurate, 
misleading or distorted. Race equality organizations 
did not comment formally on this recommendation, 
let alone make any attempt to implement it. Instead, 
they put their weight behind moves to define 
Islamophobia as nothing more than ‘discrimination 
on grounds of religion or belief’.
Conclusion
The task of an operation such as the Commission 
on British Muslims and Islamophobia is to do 
what is doable and say what is sayable, in the 
circumstances and constraints of its time and 
history, and with the human and material resources 
available to it. This chapter has in effect implied that 
the commission on Islamophobia was as successful 
as could be reasonably expected. The fact remains, 
however, that the dominant race relations paradigm 
was not at the time affected, and still has not been 
materially affected 20 years since the commission’s 
report was published.
With hindsight it is easier than it was 20 years ago 
to see some of the things that went wrong or were 
inadequate, and to engage in some wistful ‘what if’ 
questions:
• What if the commission had engaged, from the 
very start, with senior civil servants at the Home 
Office?
• What if Runnymede had continued to give it high-
profile support?
• What if the commission had found a way of raising 
and discussing difficult and sensitive questions 
about complexities, conflicts and dilemmas within 
and between British Muslim communities, and if 
it had then discussed and given guidance on the 
ensuing responsibilities of public bodies?
Well, ‘what if’ questions have their uses. In particular 
they can help us to look again at potential and 
possibilities in the here and now, and to do what is 
doable, and say what is sayable, here, now, today.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 85
References
Abrams, D., and Houston, D. M. (2006) Equality, 
Diversity and Prejudice in Britain: Results from the 
2005 National Survey, Report for the Cabinet Office 
Equalities Review October 2006. Canterbury: Centre 
for the Study of Group Processes, University of Kent.
Abubaker, M., and Bagley, C. A. (2017) ‘Methodology 
of correspondence testing for employment 
discrimination involving ethnic minority applications: 
Dutch and English case studies of Muslim applicants 
for employment’. Social Sciences, 6(4): 112.
Adam, E. K., Heissel, J. A., Zeiders, K. H., 
Richeson, J. A., Ross, E. C., Ehrlich, K. B., … and 
Eccles, J. S. (2015) ‘Developmental histories of 
perceived racial discrimination and diurnal cortisol 
profiles in adulthood: a 20-year prospective study’. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 62: 279–291.
Agence France-Presse (2015) ‘Dieudonné arrested 
over Facebook post on Paris gunman’. The 
Guardian, 14 January. Available at: www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/jan/14/dieudonne-arrest-facebook-
post-charlie-coulibaly-paris-gunman.
Akbar, A. (2002) ‘Blunkett: British Asians should 
speak English at home’. Independent, 15 September. 
Available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/blunkett-british-asians-should-speak-english-
at-home-177088.html.
Alexander, C. (1996) The Art of Being Black. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Alexander, C. (1998) ‘Re-imagining the Muslim 
community’. Innovation, 11(4): 439–450.
Alexander, C. (2000) The Asian Gang. Oxford: Berg.
Alexander, C. (2002) ‘Beyond black: rethinking the 
colour/culture divide’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
25(4): 552–571.
Alexander, C. (2004) ‘Re-imagining the Asian gang: 
ethnicity, masculinity and youth after “the riots”’. 
Critical Social Policy, 24(4): 526–549.
Alexander, C. (2008) (Re)Thinking ‘Gangs’. Runnymede 
Trust Perspectives. London: Runnymede Trust.
Alexander, C., Chatterji, J., and Jalais, A. (2016) 
The Bengal Diaspora: Rethinking Muslim Migration. 
London: Routledge.
Alexander, C., Redclift, V., and Hussain, A., eds 
(2013) The New Muslims. London: Runnymede Trust.
Alexander, C., Weekes-Barnard, D., and Arday, 
J. (2015) The Runnymede School Report: Race, 
Education and Inequality in Contemporary 
Britain. Runnymede Perspectives. London: The 
Runnymede Trust.
Allen, C. (2010) ‘Islamophobia: From K.I.S.S. to 
R.I.P.’. In S. Sayyid and A. Vakil, eds, Thinking 
Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives. London: 
C. Hurst, 51–64.
Allen, C. (2013) ‘Passing the dinner table test: 
retrospective and prospective approaches to tackling 
Islamophobia in Britain’. SAGE Open 3(2), online. 
Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
pdf/10.1177/2158244013484734.
Allen, C. (2017) ‘Political approaches to tackling 
Islamophobia: an “insider/ outsider” analysis of the 
British Coalition Government’s approach between 
2010–15’. Social Sciences, 6(3): 77.
Allen, C., and Guru, S. (2012) ‘Between political 
fad and political empowerment: a critical evaluation 
of the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group 
(NMWAG) and governmental processes of engaging 
Muslim women’. Sociological Research Online, 
17(3), online. Available at: www.socresonline.org.
uk/17/3/17.html.
Altikriti, A. (2012) ‘Institutionalising Islam in Britain 
post-9/11: mapping subjectivities’. PhD thesis, 
University of Westminster.
Amnesty International (2015) ‘France faces “litmus 
test” for freedom of expression as dozens arrested 
in wake of attacks. 16 January. Available at: www.
amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/01/france-faces-
litmus-test-freedom-expression-dozens-arrested-
wake-attacks/.
Anidjar, G. (2003) The Jew, the Arab: A History of the 
Enemy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ansari, H. (2004) The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain 
Since 1800. London: Hurst & Co.
APPG on Race and Community (2012) 
Ethnic Minority Female Employment: Black, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi Heritage Women. 
First Report of Session 2012–2013. London: 
Runnymede Trust. Available at: www.
runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/
APPGfemaleunemploymentReport-2012.pdf.
Archer, L. (2001) ‘Muslim brothers, black lads, 
traditional Asians: British Muslim young men’s 
A 20th-anniversary report86
construction of race, religion and masculinity’. 
Feminism and Psychology, 11(1): 79–105.
Asad, T. (1990) ‘Multiculturalism and British identity 
in the wake of the Rushdie affair’. Political Quarterly, 
61(2): 143-160.
Awan, I. (2016) Islamophobia in Cyberspace: Hate 
Crimes go Viral. London: Ashgate.
Awan, I., and Zempi, I. (2015) ‘“I will blow your face 
off” – virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate 
crime’. British Journal of Criminology, online. DOI: 
10.1093/bjc/azv122.
Awan, I., Blakemore, B., and Simpson, K. 
(2013) ‘Muslim communities’ attitudes towards 
and recruitment into the British police service’. 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 
41(4): 421–437.
Back, L., Keith, M., Khan, A., Shukra, K., and 
Solomos, J. (2002) ‘New Labour’s white heart: 
politics, multiculturalism and the return of 
assimilation’. The Political Quarterly, 73: 445–454.
Baker, J. P., and McEnery, T. (2015a) ‘The British 
press and radicalisation’. Radicalisation Research, 1 
December. Available at: www.radicalisationresearch.
org/debate/baker-british-press-and-radicalisation/.
Baker, J. P., and McEnery, T. (2015b) ‘The 
representation of Islam in the British press and social 
media: 2010–2014’. Unpublished report. London: 
MEND.
Baker, J. P., Gabrielatos, C., and McEnery, T. 
(2013) Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: 
The Representation of Islam in the British Press. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ballard, R. (1994) ‘Negotiating race and ethnicity: 
exploring the implications of the 1991 Census’. 
Patterns of Prejudice, 30(3): 3–33.
Barnes L. L., de Leon, C. F., Lewis, T. T., Bienias, J. 
L., Wilson, R. S., and Evans, D. A. (2008) ‘Perceived 
discrimination and mortality in a population-based 
study of older adults’. American Journal of Public 
Health, 98(7): 1241–1247.
Batty, D. (2011) ‘Lady Warsi claims Islamophobia is 
now socially acceptable in Britain’. The Guardian, 20 
January 2011.
BBC (2017) ‘Each woman who wears the veil 
has her own story. Here’s mine’. Features, 3 
February. Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/
item/0c6bc603-aff6-4171-9317-a5adfa32a049.
BBC News (2006) ‘Muslim head says gays 
“harmful”’. 3 January. Available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk/4579146.stm.
BBC News (2007a) ‘Four men jailed over cartoon 
demo’. 18 July. Available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk/6904622.stm.
BBC News (2007b) ‘”Lyrical terrorist” found guilty’. 8 
November. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
uk/7084801.stm.
BBC News (2009) ‘Griffin attacks Islam on BBC 
show’. 23 October. Available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8321683.stm.
BBC News (2011) ‘Baroness Warsi says Muslim 
prejudice seen as normal’. 20 January. Available at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12235237.
Beauchamp, Z. (2017) ‘Trump’s counter-jihad: how 
the anti-Muslim fringe conquered the White House’. 
Vox, 13 February. Available at: www.vox.com/
world/2017/2/13/14559822/trump-islam-muslims-
islamophobia-sharia.
Bécares L. (2015) ‘Which ethnic groups have 
the poorest health?’ In S. Jivraj and L. Simpson, 
eds, Ethnic Identity and Inequalities in Britain. The 
Dynamics of Diversity. London: Policy Press, 123–140.
Bécares, L., Nazroo, J., and Kelly, Y. (2015) ‘A 
longitudinal examination of maternal, family, and 
area-level experiences of racism on children’s 
socioemotional development: patterns and possible 
explanations’. Social Science & Medicine, 142: 
128–135.
Bécares, L., Nazroo, J., and Stafford, M. (2009a) 
‘Fear of racism, employment and expected 
organizational racism: their association with health’. 
European Journal of Public Health, 19(5): 504–510.
Bécares, L., Nazroo, J., and Stafford, M. (2009b) 
‘The buffering effect of ethnic density on experienced 
racism and health’. Health and Place, 15: 670–678.
Bécares, L., Shaw, R. J., Nazroo, J. Y., Stafford, 
M., Albor, C., Atkin, K., … and K. E. Pickett (2012) 
‘Ethnic density effects on physical morbidity, 
mortality and health behaviors: A systematic review 
of the literature’. American Journal of Public Health, 
102(12): e33–e66.
Benner, A. D., and Wang, Y. (2017) ‘Racial/ethnic 
discrimination and adolescents’ well-being: the role 
of cross-ethnic friendships and friends’ experiences 
of discrimination’. Child Development, 88(2): 493–
504.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 87
Bernstein, J. (2017) ‘Here’s how Breitbart and Milo 
smuggled Nazi and white nationalist ideas into the 
mainstream’. BuzzFeed News, 5 October. Available 
at: www.buzzfeed.com/josephbernstein/heres-how-
breitbart-and-milo-smuggled-white-nationalism?utm_
term=.iyPznq0kDd&utm_campaign=HW%20
Newsletter%2010062017&utm_medium=email&utm_
source=EOACLK#.je6zOjV3v6.
Berthoud, R., and Blekesaune, M. (2007) Persistent 
Employment Disadvantage. Department of Work 
and Pensions Research Report No. 416. London: 
Department of Work and Pensions.
Bowling, B. (2009) ‘Violent racism: victimisation, 
policing and social context’. In B. Williams and H. 
Goodman-Chong, eds, Victims and Victimisation: A 
Reader. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 45–57.
Briggs, R., Fieschi, C., and Lownsbrough, H. (2006) 
Bringing It Home: Community-Based Approaches to 
Counter-Terrorism. London: Demos.
Bunzl, M. (2007) Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: 
Hatreds Old and New in Europe. Chicago: Prickly 
Paradigm Press.
Busher, J., Choudhury, T., Thomas, P., and Harris, G. 
(2017) What the Prevent Duty Means for Schools and 
Colleges in England: An Analysis of Educationalists’ 
Experiences. Coventry: Centre for Trust, Peace and 
Social Relations, Coventry University.
Cabinet Office (2011) ‘PM’s speech at Munich 
Security Conference’. Available at: www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference.
Cabinet Office (2017) ‘PM words at Race Disparity 
Audit launch: 10 October 2017’. Available at: www.
gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-words-at-race-
disparity-audit-launch-10-october-2017.
Cantle, T. (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of 
the Independent Review Team. London: HMSO.
Casey, Dame L. (2016) The Casey Review: A 
Review into Opportunity and Integration. London: 
Department for Communities and Local Government. 
Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/575973/The_
Casey_Review_Report.pdf.
Chakraborti, N., Garland, J., and Hardy, S. (2014) 
The Hate Crime Project. Leicester: University of 
Leicester.
Cheung, S. I. (2013) ‘Ethno-religious minorities and 
labour market integration: generational advancement 
or decline?’. Ethnic and Religious Studies, 37(1): 
140–160.
Cheung, S. Y., and Heath, A. F. (2007) ‘Nice work if 
you can get it: ethnic penalties in Great Britain’. In A. 
F. Heath and S. Y. Cheung, eds, Unequal Chances: 
Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets. 
Proceedings of the British Academy 137. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 507–550.
Clark, R., Anderson, N., Clark, V., and Williams, D. 
(1999) ‘Racism as a stressor for African Americans. 
A biopsychosocial model’. American Psychologist, 
54(10): 805–816.
CMEB (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic 
Britain) (2000) The Future of Multiethnic Britain. 
London: Profile Books.
Connor, P., and Koenig, M. (2015) ‘Explaining 
the Muslim employment gap in western Europe: 
individual-level effects and ethno-religious penalties’. 
Social Science Research, 49: 191–201.
Coppock, V., and McGovern, M. (2014) ‘“Dangerous 
minds”? Deconstructing counter-terrorism discourse, 
radicalisation and the “psychological vulnerability” 
of Muslim children and young people in Britain’. 
Children & Society, 28(3): 242–256.
Damstra, A., and Tillie, J. (2016) ‘How crosscutting 
weak ties are established: the case of Muslims in 
Europe’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
42(2): 237–260.
Das-Munshi, J., Bécares, L., Stansfeld, S., and 
Prince, M. (2010) ‘Understanding the ethnic density 
effect on mental health: multi-level investigation of 
survey data from England’. British Medical Journal, 
341: c5367.
Dawson, J. (2016) ‘Counter-extremism policy: an 
overview’. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 
7238. London: House of Commons Library.
DCLG (2012) Creating the Conditions for Integration. 
London: Department for Communities and Local 
Government.
de Beauvoir, S. (1953) The Second Sex. London: 
Jonathan Cape.
De Genova, N. (2015) ‘In the land of the setting 
sun: reflections on “Islamization” and “patriotic 
Europeanism”’. Movements, 1(2). Available at http://
movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/15.de-
genova--pegida-islamization-patriotic-europeanism.pdf.
Dearden, L. (2015) ‘David Cameron extremism 
speech: read the transcript in full’. Independent, 20 
A 20th-anniversary report88
July. Available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/david-cameron-extremism-speech-read-the-
transcript-in-full-10401948.html.
DfE (2014) Promoting Fundamental British Values 
as Part of SMSC in Schools: Departmental Advice 
for Maintained Schools. London: Department for 
Education.
Dodd, V., and Marsh, S. (2017) ‘Anti-Muslim hate 
crimes increase fivefold since London Bridge 
attacks’. The Guardian, 7 June. Available at: www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/07/anti-muslim-
hate-crimes-increase-fivefold-since-london-bridge-
attacks.
Dugan, E. (2015) ‘Forced marriage: Asian victims 
being put at risk by closures of services set up to 
protect them’. Independent, 21 July. Available at: 
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/
forced-marriage-asian-victims-being-put-at-
risk-by-closures-of-services-set-up-to-protect-
them-10405731.html.
DWP (2016) Households below Average Income: 
1994/95 to 2014/15. London: Department for Work 
and Pensions. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/
statistics/households-below-average-income-
199495-to-201415.
Erens, B., Primatesta, P., and Prior, G. (2001) Health 
Survey for England 1999: The Health of Minority 
Ethnic Groups. London: The Stationary Office.
Feldman, D. (2017) ‘The meanings of antisemitism’. 
Available at: www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk/events/
events-calendar/the-meanings-of-antisemitism/.
Feldman, D., Gidley, B., Davison, J., Humfris, R., 
and James, I. (2017) Immigration, Antisemitism and 
Toleration in Western Europe Today: United Kingdom 
National Report. London: Pears Institute for the study 
of Antisemitism.
FRA (2013) Discrimination and Hate Crime against 
Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and 
Perceptions of Antisemitism. Vienna: European 
Agency for Fundamental Rights.
Gallup (2011) ‘British Muslims feel, well, British’. 
Available at: http://thequeue.gallup.com/2011/02/
british-muslims-feel-well-british.html.
Gearty, C. (2012) ‘Is attacking multiculturalism a way 
of tackling racism – or feeding it?’ European Human 
Rights Law Review, 2: 121–129.
Gee, G., and Walsemann, K. (2009) ‘Does health 
predict the reporting of racial discrimination or do 
reports of discrimination predict health? Findings 
from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth’. Social 
Science & Medicine, 68(9): 1676–1684.
Gilliat-Ray, S. (2004) ‘The trouble with “inclusion”: a 
case study of the faith zone at the Millennium Dome’, 
The Sociological Review, 52(4): 459–477.
Gilroy, P. (1993) Small Acts. London: Serpent’s Tail.
Goodwin, M. J. (2013) The Roots of Extremism: 
The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad 
Challenge. London: Chatham House. Available 
at: www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/
view/189767.
Gov.uk (2015) ‘Extremism: PM speech’. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-
speech.
Graham, D., Schmool, M., and Waterman, S. (2007) 
Jews in Britain: A Snapshot from the 2001 Census. 
Available at: www.jpr.org.uk/publication?id=362.
Granovetter, M. (1973) ‘The strength of weak ties’. 
American Journal of Sociology, 78(6): 1360–1380.
Greenslade, R. (2016) ‘Kelvin MacKenzie “entitled” to 
attack Channel 5 News over hijab, says watchdog’. 
The Guardian, 19 October. Available at: www.
theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/oct/19/
kelvin-mackenzie-entitled-to-attack-fatima-manji-
over-hijab-says-ipso.
Grierson, J. (2017) ‘Muslim fostering row: how 
the Times and Mail gave a skewed portrayal’. 
The Guardian, 1 September. Available at: www.
theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/01/muslim-
fostering-row-media-times-mail-skewed-portrayal.
The Guardian (2015) ‘Steven Emerson: the Fox news 
expert who thinks Birmingham is “totally Muslim”’. 12 
January. Available at: www.theguardian.com/media/
shortcuts/2015/jan/12/steven-emerson-muslims-
birmingham-error-fox-news.
Gulland, A. (2017) ‘Is there any place for counter-
terrorism in the NHS?’ BMJ, 357: j1998.
Hall, S.-M., McIntosh, K., Neitzert, E., Pottinger, 
L., Sandhu, K., Stephenson, M.-A., Reed, H., and 
Taylor, L. (2017) Intersecting Inequalities: The Impact 
of Austerity on Black and Minority Ethnic Women in 
the UK. A Report by the Women’s Budget Group 
and Runnymede Trust with RECLAIM and Coventry 
Women’s Voices. London: Runnymede Trust. 
Available at: www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/
PressReleases/Correct%20WBG%20report%20
for%20Microsite.pdf and www.intersecting-
inequalities.com.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 89
Halpern, D., and Nazroo, J. (2000) ‘The ethnic 
density effect: results from a national community 
survey of England and Wales’. International Journal 
of Social Psychiatry, 46(1): 34–46.
Hamid, S. (2013) ‘The evolution of British Islamic 
activism’. Public Spirit, 18 November. Available at: 
www.publicspirit.org.uk/the-evolution-of-british-
islamic-activism/.
Harris R. B., Cormack, D. M., and Stanley, J. (2013) 
‘The relationship between socially-assigned ethnicity, 
health and experience of racial discrimination for 
Māori: analysis of the 2006/07 New Zealand Health 
Survey’. BMC Public Health, 13: 844.
Harris R., Cormack, D., Tobias, M., Yeh, L. C., 
Talamaivao, N., Minster J., and Timutimu, R. (2012) 
‘The pervasive effects of racism: experiences of 
racial discrimination in New Zealand over time and 
associations with multiple health domains’. Social 
Science & Medicine, 74(3): 408–415.
Heath, A. and Li, Y. (2015) Review of the Relationship 
between Religion and Poverty: An Analysis for the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. CSI Working paper 
2015-01. Oxford: Centre for Social Investigation. 
Available at: http://csi.nuff.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/religion-and-poverty-working-
paper.pdf.
Heath, A., and Martin, J. (2012) ‘Can religious 
affiliation explain “ethnic” inequalities in the labour 
market?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(6): 1005–
1027.
Heath, A., and McMahon, D. (1997) ‘Education 
and occupational attainment: the impact of ethnic 
origins’. In V. Karn, ed., Education, Employment and 
Housing among Ethnic Minorities in Britain. London: 
HMSO, 91–113. 
Heath, A., and Roberts, J. (2008) British Identity, Its 
Sources and Possible Implications for Civic Attitudes 
and Behaviour. London: Department of Justice/ 
HMSO.
Heath, A., Fisher, S., Rosenblatt, G., Sanders, D., 
and Sobelewska, M. (2013) The Political Integration 
of Ethnic Minorities in Britain. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Helm, T., Taylor, M., and Davis, R. (2011) ‘David 
Cameron sparks fury from critics who say attack 
on multiculturalism has boosted English Defence 
League’. The Guardian, 5 February. Available at: 
www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/05/david-
cameron-speech-criticised-edl.
HM Government (2012a) Challenge It, Report It, Stop 
It: The Government’s Plan to Tackle Hate Crime. 
Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97849/action-
plan.pdf.
HM Government (2012b) Channel: Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework, October 2012. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/118187/vul-assessment.pdf.
HM Government (2014) Challenge It, Report It, Stop 
It: Delivering the Government’s Hate Crime Action 
Plan. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/307624/
HateCrimeActionPlanProgressReport.pdf.
HM Government (2015a) Channel Duty Guidance: 
Protecting Vulnerable People From Being Drawn into 
Terrorism. Statutory Guidance for Channel Panel 
Members and Partners of Local Panels. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_
Guidance_April_2015.pdf.
HM Government (2015b) Prevent Duty Guidance: For 
Higher Education Institutions in England and Wales. 
Available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445916/
Prevent_Duty_Guidance_For_Higher_Education__
England__Wales_.pdf.
HM Government (2015c) Revised Prevent Duty 
Guidance: for England and Wales. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_
Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-
Interactive.pdf.
Home Office (2016) Action against Hate: The UK 
Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime. London: 
Home Office. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/543679/
Action_Against_Hate_-_UK_Government_s_Plan_to_
Tackle_Hate_Crime_2016.pdf.
Hooper, R. (2017) ‘Man charged over horrific double 
acid attack on Muslim model and cousin in east 
London’. Independent, 11 July. Available at: www.
independent.co.uk/News/uk/crime/double-acid-
attack-john-tomlin-charged-resham-khan-jameel-
muhktar-beckton-east-london-a7834721.html.
Hopkins, P. (2007) ‘Young Muslim men’s experiences 
of local landscapes after 11th September 2001’. 
In C. Atkinson, P. Hopkins and M. Kwan, eds, 
Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender 
and Belonging. Aldershot: Ashgate, 189–200.
A 20th-anniversary report90
House of Commons Women and Equalities 
Committee (2016) Employment Opportunities for 
Muslims in the UK: Second Report of Session 
2016–17. London: House of Commons. Available 
at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/
cmselect/cmwomeq/89/89.pdf.
Hughes, L. (2016) ‘David Cameron: more Muslim 
women should “learn English” to help tackle 
extremism’. The Telegraph, 7 January. Available at: 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/12104556/David-Cameron-More-Muslim-women-
should-learn-English-to-help-tackle-extremism.html.
Hussain, A. (2014) ‘Transgressing community: the 
case of Muslims in a twenty-first-century British city’. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37(4): 621–635.
Hussain, S. (2008) Muslims on the Map: A National 
Survey of Social Trends in Britain. London: I. B. Tauris.
Hussain, S., and Sherif, J. (2014) ‘Minority religions 
in the Census: the case of British Muslims’. Religion, 
44(3): 414–433.
Hutnik, N. (1985) ‘Aspects of identity in a multi-ethnic 
society’. New Community, 12(2): 298–309.
IHRC (2000) Anti-Muslim Discrimination and Hostility 
in the United Kingdom. London: Islamic Human 
Rights Commission.
Ishaq, M., and Hussain, A. (2002) ‘British ethnic 
minority communities and the armed forces’. 
Personnel Review, 31(6): 722–739.
Jackson, P. (2011) The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far 
Right’ Social Movement. Northampton: The 
University of Northampton. Available at: http://nectar.
northampton.ac.uk/6015/7/Jackson20116015.pdf.
Jalili, I. (2004) ‘Arab population in the UK’. 
Available at: www.naba.org.uk/the-library/reports/
arabPopUK_04.htm.
Jewish Chronicle (2011) ‘David Cameron’s speech 
to the CST’. 3 March. Available at: www.thejc.com/
news/uk-news/david-cameron-s-speech-to-the-
cst-1.21596.
Jivraj, S. (2013) ‘Muslims in England and Wales: 
evidence from the 2011 Census’. In C. Alexander, 
V. Redclift and A, Hussain, eds, The New Muslims. 
London: Runnymede Trust, 16–19.
Jones, C. (2000) ‘Levels of racism: a theoretic 
framework and a gardener’s tale’. American Journal 
of Public Health, 90: 1212–1215.
Karlsen, S. and Nazroo, J. Y. (2002) ‘The relationship 
between racial discrimination, social class and health 
among ethnic minority groups’. American Journal of 
Public Health, 92(4): 624–631.
Karlsen, S. and Nazroo, J. Y. (2004) ‘Fear of racism 
and health’. Journal of Epidemiology & Community 
Health, 58: 1017–1018.
Karlsen, S., and Nazroo, J. Y. (2010) ‘Religious and 
ethnic differences in health: evidence from the Health 
Surveys for England 1999 and 2004’. Ethnicity and 
Health, 15(6): 549–568.
Karlsen, S., and Nazroo, J. Y. (2014) ‘Ethnic 
and religious variations in the reporting of racist 
victimization in Britain: 2000 and 2008/2009’. 
Patterns of Prejudice, 48(4): 370–397.
Karlsen, S., Nazroo, J. Y., McKenzie, K., Bhui, 
K., and Weich, S. (2005) ‘Racism, psychosis and 
common mental disorder among ethnic minority 
groups in England’. Psychological Medicine, 35(12): 
1795–1803.
Kelly, Y., Bécares, L., and Nazroo, J. (2013) 
‘Associations between maternal experiences of 
racism and early child health and development: 
findings from the UK Millennium Cohort Study’. 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 
67(1): 35–34.
Khan, K. (2009) Preventing Violent Extremism 
(PVE) and PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim 
Community. London: An-Nisa Society.
Khan, Z. (2000) ‘Muslim presence in Europe: 
the British dimension – identity, integration and 
community activism’. Current Sociology, 48(4): 
29–43.
Khattab, N., and Johnston, R. (2013) ‘Ethnic and 
religious penalties in a changing British labour market 
from 2002 to 2010: the case of unemployment’. 
Environment and Planning, 45: 1358–1371.
Khattab, N., and Modood, T. (2015) ‘Both ethnic and 
religious: explaining employment penalties across 
14 ethno-religious groups in the UK’. Journal of the 
Scientific Study of Religion, 54(3): 501–522.
Kim, H. (2015) Making Diaspora in a Global City: 
South Asian Youth Cultures in London. London: 
Routledge.
Kitchen, S., Michaelson, J., and Wood, N. (2006) 
2005 Citizenship Survey: Race and Faith Topic 
Report. London: Department for Communities and 
Local Government.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 91
Krieger N. (2009) ‘Does racism harm health? Did 
child abuse exist before 1962? On explicit questions, 
critical science, and current controversies: an 
ecosocial perspective’. American Journal of Public 
Health, 93: 194–199.
Krieger N., and Sidney, S. (1996) ‘Racial 
discrimination and blood pressure: the CARDIA study 
of young blacks and white adults’. American Journal 
of Public Health, 86: 1370–1378.
Kumar, D. (2012) Islamophobia and the Politics of 
Empire. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
Kundnani, A. (2009) Spooked! How Not to 
Prevent Violent Extremism. London: Institute of 
Race Relations. Available at: http://s3-eu-west-2.
amazonaws.com/wpmedia.outlandish.com/
irr/2017/04/26154810/spooked.pdf.
Kundnani, A. (2014) The Muslims Are Coming! 
Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on 
Terror. London: Verso.
Kundnani, A. (2015) A Decade Lost: Rethinking 
Radicalization and Extremism. London: Claystone.
Kwate, N. O., and Goodman, M.(2015) ‘Cross-
sectional and longitudinal effects of racism on mental 
health among residents of Black neighborhoods in 
New York City’. American Journal of Public Health, 
105(4): 711–718.
Laitin, D., Adida, C., and Valfort, M.-A. (2010) 
‘Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France’. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America, 107(52): 22384–
22390.
Lawrence, E. (1982) ‘Just plain commonsense: the 
“roots” of racism’. In CCCS Collective, ed., The 
Empire Strikes Back. London: Routledge.
Lewis, P. (1994) Islamic Britain. London: IB Tauris.
Lewis, T. T., Everson-Rose, S. A., Powell, L. H., 
Matthews, K. A., Brown, C., Karavolos, K., … and 
Wesley, D. (2006) ‘Chronic exposure to everyday 
discrimination and coronary artery calcification in 
African-American women: the SWAN Heart Study’. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 68(3): 362–368.
Lewis, T. T., Troxel, W. M., Kravitz, H. M., 
Bromberger, J. T., Matthews, K. A., and Hall, M. H. 
(2013) ‘Chronic exposure to everyday discrimination 
and sleep in a multiethnic sample of middle-aged 
women’. Health Psychology, 32(7): 810–819.
Li, Y., and O’Leary, R. (2007) ‘Progress in reducing 
Catholic disadvantage in Northern Ireland’. In A. F. 
Heath and S. Y. Cheung, eds, Unequal Chances: 
Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets. 
Proceedings of the British Academy 137. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 551–590.
Lindley, J. (2002) ‘Race or religion? The impact of 
religion on the employment and earnings of Britain’s 
ethnic communities’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 28(3): 427–442.
Littler, M., and Feldman, M. (2015) Tell MAMA 
Reporting 2014/2015: Annual Monitoring, Cumulative 
Extremism, and Policy Implications. Middlesbrough: 
Teesside University Press.
Maidment, J. (2017) ‘UKIP manifesto for General 
Election 2017: key points, policies and summary’. 
The Telegraph, 7 June. Available at: www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/0/ukip-manifesto-general-election-2017-
key-points-policies-summary.
Malik, K. (2009) From Fatwa to Jihad. London: 
Atlantic.
The Marmot Review (2010) Fair Society, Healthy 
Lives: Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in 
England Post-2010. London: The Marmot Review.
Martin, D. (2015) ‘Universities ordered to ban campus 
hate preachers’. Daily Mail, 16 September. Available 
at: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3237586/
Universities-ordered-ban-campus-hate-preachers-
Cameron-demands-clamp-protect-questionable-
young-minds.html.
Mason, P. (2014) ‘Would it be better for society to let 
bigots openly say what they think?’ The Guardian, 
16 November. Available at: www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/nov/16/better-society-let-
bigots-say-what-they-think-racism-homophobia.
Massoumi, N. (2017) ‘Does Prevent undermine 
equality on campus?’ Paper presented at the 
University of Bath in London, 23 March.
McCrudden, C., Ford, R., and Heath, A. F. (2004) 
‘Legal regulation of affirmative action in Northern 
Ireland: an empirical assessment’. Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 24: 363–415.
Meer, N. (2006) ‘“Get off your knees”: print media 
public intellectuals and Muslims in Britain’. Journalism 
Studies, 7(1): 35–59.
Meer, N., 2009. ‘Identity articulations, mobilisation 
and autonomy in the movement for Muslim schools 
in Britain’. Race, Ethnicity and Education, 12(3): 
379–398.
A 20th-anniversary report92
Meer, N. (2013) ‘The role of race, culture and 
difference in antisemitism and Islamophobia’. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 36(3): 385–398.
Meer, N. (2014) ‘Racialization and religion: race, 
culture and difference in the study of antisemitism 
and Islamophobia’. In N. Meer, ed., Racialization 
and Religion: Race, Culture and Difference in the 
Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1–14.
Meer, N. (2015a) Citizenship, Identity and the 
Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim 
Consciousness. Palgrave: Basingstoke. 
Meer, N. (2015b) ‘Islamophobia and contemporary 
Europe’. Discover Society, 22. Available at: http://
discoversociety.org/2015/07/01/focus-islamophobia-
and-contemporary-europe/.
Meer, N., and Modood, T. (2009) ‘The multicultural 
state we’re in: Muslims, “multiculture” and the “civic 
re-balancing” of British multiculturalism’. Political 
Studies, 57(3): 473–497.
Meer, N., Dwyer, C., and Modood, T. (2010) 
‘Embodying nationhood? Conceptions of British 
national identity, citizenship, and gender in the “veil 
affair”’. The Sociological Review, 58(1): 84–111. 
Meetoo, V., and Mirza, H. S. (2007) ‘“There is nothing 
‘honourable’ about honour killings”: gender, violence 
and the limits of multiculturalism’. Women’s Studies 
International Forum, 30(3): 187–200
Mercia Group (2006) Review of the Evidence Base 
on Faith Communities. London: Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister.
Merry, M. (2004) ‘Islam versus (liberal) pluralism? 
A response to Ahmad Yousif’. Journal of Muslim 
Minority Affairs, 24(1): 123–139.
Miah, S. (2017) Muslims, Schooling and Security: 
Trojan Horse, Prevent and Racial Politics. London: 
Palgrave.
Miller, S., Harris, M., and Shindler, C. (2015) The 
Attitudes of British Jews towards Israel. London: City 
University.
Mirza, H (2015) ‘Dangerous Muslim girls? Race, 
gender and Islamophobia in British schools’. In C. 
Alexander, D. Weekes-Bernard and J. Arday, eds, 
The Runnymede School Report: Race, Education 
and Inequality in Contemporary Britain. London: 
Runnymede Trust, 40–43.
Modood, T. (2005) Multicultural Politics: Racism, 
Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press; Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press.
Modood, T. (2013) Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea. 
Second edition, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Modood, T. (2014) ‘Afterword: Islamophobia and the 
struggle for recognition’. In N. Meer, ed., Racialization 
and Religion: Race, Culture and Difference in the 
Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 135–137.
Modood, T., Berthoud, R., Lakey, J., Nazroo, J., 
Smith, P., Virdee, S., and Beishon, S. (1997) Ethnic 
Minorities in Britain: Disadvantage and Diversity. 
London: Policy Studies Institute.
Mondon, A., and Winter, A., (2017) ‘Articulations 
of Islamophobia: from the extreme to the 
mainstream?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, online. DOI: 
10.1080/01419870.2017.1312008.
Murray, Douglas (2006). ‘What are we to do about 
Islam?’ Speech given at the Pim Fortuyn Memorial 
Conference 2006, March 5, The Hague.
Muslim Council of Britain (2015) British Muslims in 
Numbers. London: The Muslim Council of Britain.
Mustafa, A. (2017, forthcoming) Muslims in the 
Military: Broadening Diversity in the British Armed 
Forces. Available at: www.asmamustafa.com/
muslims-military-report/.
Nazroo, J. Y. (2001) Ethnicity, Class and Health. 
London: Policy Studies Institute.
Nazroo, J. Y. (2003) ‘The structuring of ethnic 
inequalities in health: economic position, racial 
discrimination and racism’. American Journal of 
Public Health, 93(2): 277–284.
Open Society Justice Initiative (2016) Eroding 
Trust: The UK’s PREVENT Counter-Extremism 
Strategy in Health and Education. New York: 
Open Society Foundations. Available at www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/
eroding-trust-20161017_0.pdf.
O’Toole, T., Nilsson DeHanas, D., Modood, T., 
Meer, N., and Jones, S. (2013) Taking Part: Muslim 
Participation in Contemporary Governance. Bristol: 
University of Bristol.
Ouseley Report (2001) Community Pride Not 
Prejudice: Making Diversity Work in Bradford. 
Bradford: Bradford Vision.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 93
Paradies Y. (2006) ‘A systematic review of empirical 
research on self-reported racism and health’. 
International Journal of Epidemiology, 35(4): 888–901.
Paradies Y., Ben, J., Denson, N., Elias, A., Priest, 
N., Pierterse, A., … and G. Gee (2015) ‘Racism as 
a determinant of health: a systematic review and 
metaanalysis’. PLoS One, 10(9): e0138511.
Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Peleg, I., and Waxman, D. (2011) Israel’s 
Palestinians: The Conflict Within. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Perry, B. (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding 
Hate Crimes. New York: Routledge.
Perry, B., and Alvi, S. (2012) ‘“We are all vulnerable”: 
the in terrorem effects of hate crimes’. International 
Review of Victimology, 18(1): 57–71.
Pew Research Center (2008) ‘Unfavorable views 
of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe’. 
17 September. Available at: www.pewglobal.
org/2008/09/17/unfavorable-views-of-jews-and-
muslims-on-the-increase-in-europe/.
Phillips, M (2007) Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating 
a Terror State Within. London: Gibson Square.
Phillips, T. (2016) Race and Faith: The Deafening 
Silence. With commentaries from David Goodhart 
and Jon Gower Davies. London: Civitas.
Pickett, K. E. and Wilkinson, R. G. (2008) ‘People like 
us: ethnic group density effects on health’. Ethnicity 
and Health, 13: 321–334.
Poynting, S., and Mason, V. (2007) ‘The resistible 
rise of Islamophobia: anti-Muslim racism in the UK 
and Australia before 11 September 2001’. Journal of 
Sociology, 43(1): 61–86.
Priest, N., Paradies, Y., Stevens, M., and Bailie, 
R. (2012) ‘Exploring relationships between racism, 
housing and child illness in remote Aboriginal 
communities’. Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, 66(5): 440–447.
Prime Minister’s Office (2006) ‘Speech on 
multiculturalism and integration’. Speech 
given by Tony Blair, 8 December. Available 
at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20080909022722/http://www.number10.gov.uk/
Page10563.
Ramamurthy, A. (2013) Black Star: Britain’s Asian 
Youth Movements. London: Pluto Press.
Rashid, N. (2016) Veiled Threats: Representing the 
Muslim Woman in Public Policy Discourses. London: 
Policy Press. 
Renton, J. (2017) ‘The end of the Semites’. In 
J. Renton and B. Gidley, eds, Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia: A Shared Story. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 99–140.
Renton, J., and Gidley, B. (2017) ‘Introduction: the 
shared story of Europe’s idea of the Muslim and the 
Jew – a diachronic framework’. In J. Renton and 
B. Gidley, eds, Antisemitism and Islamophobia: A 
Shared Story. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 99–140.
Reynolds, L., and Birdwell, J. (2015) Rising to the 
Top. London: Demos. Available at: www.demos.
co.uk/project/rising-to-the-top/.
Rights Watch UK (2016) Preventing Education? Human 
Rights and Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools. 
London: Rights Watch UK. Available at: http://
rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/preventing-
education-final-to-print-3.compressed-1.pdf.
Ritchie, D. (2001) Oldham Independent Review: One 
Oldham One Future. Oldham: Oldham Independent 
Review Panel.
Rosenthal, L., Earnshaw, V. A., Lewis, T. T., Reid, A. 
E., Lewis, J. B., Stasko, E. C., … and Ickovics, J. R. 
(2015) ‘Changes in experiences with discrimination 
across pregnancy and postpartum: age differences 
and consequences for mental health’. American 
Journal of Public Health, 105(4): 686–693.
Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism 
(1994, reprinted 1997) A Very Light Sleeper: The 
Persistence and Dangers of Antisemitism. London: 
Runnymede Trust.
Runnymede Trust (1997) Islamophobia: A Challenge 
for Us All. London: Runnymede Trust. Available 
at: www.runnymedetrust.org/companies/17/74/
Islamophobia-A-Challenge-for-Us-All.html.
Runnymede Trust (2005) Islamophobia: Issues, 
Challenges and Action. London: Runnymede Trust.
Saeed, A. (2007) ‘Media, racism and Islamophobia: 
the representation of Islam and Muslims in the 
media’. Sociology Compass, 1(2): 443–462.
Saeed, A., Blain, N. and Forbes, D. (1999) ‘New 
ethnic and national questions in Scotland: post-British 
identities among Glasgow Pakistani teenagers’. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 22(5): 821–844.
Saggar, S., Somerville, W., Ford, R., and Sobolewska, 
M. (2012) The Impacts of Migration on Social 
A 20th-anniversary report94
Cohesion and Integration: Final Report to the Migration 
Advisory Committee. London: Home Office.
Said, E. (1978) Orientalism. London: Penguin.
Sayyid, S. (2011) ‘Out of the devil’s dictionary’. 
In S. Sayyid and A. Vakil, eds, Thinking Through 
Islamophobia. London: Hurst, 9–43. 
Schilling, H., and Simone, A. M. (2015) ‘Practices 
within precarity: youth, informality, and life making 
in the contemporary city’. Paper presented at the 
RC21 International Conference on ‘The ideal city: 
between myth and reality. Representations, policies, 
contradictions and challenges for tomorrow’s urban 
life’, Urbino, Italy, 27–29 August. Available at: www.
rc21.org/en/conferences/urbino2015/. 
Sharman, J., and Jones, I. (2017) ‘Hate crimes rise 
by up to 100 per cent across England and Wales, 
figures reveal’. Independent, 15 February. Available 
at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/
brexit-vote-hate-crime-rise-100-per-cent-england-
wales-police-figures-new-racism-eu-a7580516.html.
Shaw, R. J., Atkin, K., Bécares, L., Albor, C., 
Stafford, M., Kiernan, K., … and Pickett, K. E. (2012) 
‘A systematic review of the impact of ethnic density 
on adult mental health’. British Journal of Psychiatry, 
10: 11–19.
Sherif, J. (2011) ‘A census chronicle – reflections 
on the campaign for a religion question in the 2001 
Census for England and Wales’. Journal of Beliefs 
and Values, 32(1), 1–18.
Siddiqui, S. (2017) ‘Anti-Muslim rallies across US 
denounced by civil rights groups’. The Guardian, 
10 June. Available at www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jun/10/anti-muslim-rallies-across-us-
denounced-by-civil-rights-groups.
Silvestre, S. (2010) ‘Muslim self-organisation in 
Europe: risks and odds of state intervention’. In 
A. Kreienbrink and M. Bodenstein, eds, Muslim 
Organisations and the State: European Perspectives. 
Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 
38–53.
Simpson, L. (2013) What Makes Ethnic Population 
Groups Grow? Manchester: Centre on Dynamics of 
Ethnicity.
Simpson, L., Kingsley, P., Abdelouahid, T., 
Fieldhouse, E., Vasilis, G., Tranmer, M., … and 
Dorling, D. (2006) Ethnic Minority Populations and 
the Labour Market: An Analysis of the 1991 and 
2001 Census. Department for Work and Pensions 
Research Report 333. London: Department for Work 
and Pensions.
Sloan, A. (2017) ‘Islamophobia can make UKIP 
relevant again’. Al Jazeera, 25 April 2017. Available 
at: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/
islamophobia-ukip-relevant-170425114420675.html.
Smith, K., Lader, D., Hoare, J., and Lau, I. (2012) 
Hate Crime, Cyber Security and the Experience of 
Crime among Children: Findings from the 2010/11 
British Crime Survey. London: Home Office.
Smith, M., and Shifrin, T. (2017) ‘A second warning 
for antifascists: thousands on the streets of London 
as far right reorganises’. Searchlight Magazine, 
27 June. Available at: www.searchlightmagazine.
com/2017/06/a-second-warning-for-antifascists-
thousands-on-the-streets-of-london-as-far-right-
reorganises/.
Social Integration Commission (2014) How Integrated 
Is Modern Britain? London: Social Integration 
Commission.
Social Mobility Commission (2016) Ethnicity, 
Gender and Social Mobility. London: Social Mobility 
Commission. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/579988/Ethnicity_gender_and_social_mobility.pdf.
Social Mobility Commission (2017) The Social 
Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims. 
London: Social Mobility Commission. Available 
at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-
mobility-challenges-faced-by-young-muslims.
Solomos, J., and Back, L. (1996) Racism and 
Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Song, A. M. (2014) ‘Challenging a culture of racial 
equivalence’. British Journal of Sociology, 65(1): 
107–129.
Spalek, B., and McDonald, L. (2009) ‘Terror crime 
prevention: constructing Muslim practices and beliefs 
as “anti-social” and “extreme” through CONTEST 2’. 
Social Policy and Society, 9(1): 123–132.
Sproston, K., and Mindell, J. (2006). Health 
Survey for England 2004. Vol. 2: Methodology and 
Documentation. Leeds: The Information Centre.
Staetsky, L. D. (2017) Antisemitism in Contemporary 
Great Britain: A Survey of Attitudes towards Jews 
and Israel. London: Institute for Jewish Policy 
Research.
Stafford, M., Bécares, L., and Nazroo, J. (2009) 
‘Objective and perceived ethnic density and health: 
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 95
findings from a UK general population survey’. 
American Journal of Epidemiology, 170(4): 484–493.
Storm, I., Sobolewska, M., and Ford, R. (2017) ‘Is 
ethnic prejudice declining in Britain? Change in social 
distance attitudes among ethnic majority and minority 
Britons’. British Journal of Sociology, 68(3): 410–434.
Survation (2017) “Jewish Chronicle poll, 30 May 
2017”. Available at: http://survation.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/Final-JC-VI-Poll-5c1d5h.pdf.
The Times (2006) ‘Islam and homosexuals’. Letters, 
14 January.
Travis, A. (2017) ‘Hate crime surged in England 
and Wales after terrorist attacks’. The Guardian, 17 
October. Available at: www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/oct/17/hate-soars-in-england-and-wales.
Triandyfillidou, A., Modood, T., and Meer, N., eds 
(2011) European Multiculturalism(s): Cultural, 
Religious and Ethnic Challenges. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press.
Tufail, W., and Poynting, S. (2013) ‘A common 
“outlawness”: criminalisation of Muslim minorities in 
the UK and Australia’. International Journal for Crime, 
Justice and Social Democracy, 2(3): 43–54.
Underhill, W. (2009) ‘Dispelling the myth of Eurabia’. 
Newsweek, 10 July. Available at: www.newsweek.
com/dispelling-myth-eurabia-81943.
United Nations (2016) International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: 
Concluding Observations on the Twenty-First to 
Twenty-Third Periodic Reports of United Kingdom. 
Geneva: UN.
Vakil, A. (2011) ‘Who’s afraid of Islamophobia?’ 
In S. Sayyid and A. Vakil, eds, Thinking Through 
Islamophobia. London: Hurst, 271–278.
Valentine, G. (2014) The Privatisation of Prejudice: 
Equality Legislation and Political Correctness in 
the UK. Living with Difference in Europe Brief No. 
3. Sheffield: University of Sheffield. Available at: 
http://livedifference.group.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/The-Privatisation-of-Prejudice-
equality-legislation-and-political-correctness-in-the-
UK-difference-final-1.pdf.
Virdee, S. (1997) ‘Racial harassment’. In R. Modood, 
L. Berthoud, J. Lakey, J. Nazroo, P. Smith, S. Virdee 
and S. Beishon, eds, Ethnic Minorites in Britain: 
Diversity and Disadvantage. London: Policy Studies 
Institute, 259–289.
Wainwright, M. (2001) ‘Some Bradford Muslims 
act like colonists’. The Guardian, 12 September. 
Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/society/2001/sep/ 
12/localgovernment.raceequality.
Wallace, S., Nazroo, J. Y., and Bécares, L. (2016) 
‘Cumulative exposure to racial discrimination across 
time and domains: exploring racism’s long term 
impact on the mental health of ethnic minority people 
in the UK’. American Journal of Public Health, 106(7): 
1294–1300.
Walters, M., and Brown, R., with Wiedlitzka, S. (2016) 
Preventing Hate Crime: Emerging Practices and 
Recommendations for the Improved Management 
of Criminal Justice Interventions. Brighton: Crime 
Research Centre and the International Network for 
Hate Studies.
Ward, H. (2017) ‘Schools “overzealous” in reporting 
radicalization fears’. TES, 3 August. Available at: 
www.tes.com/news/school-news/breaking-news/
schools-overzealous-reporting-radicalization-fears.
Watt, N. (2014) ‘Cameron furious over extremism row 
between Gove and May’. The Guardian, 5 June.
Weaver, M. (2015) ‘Cameron’s anti-terror strategy is 
“barking up the wrong tree”’. The Guardian, 20 July.
Weichselbaumer, D. (2016) Discrimination against 
Migrants Wearing Headscarves. Bonn: The Institute 
for the Study of Labour (IZA).
Weller, P (2004) ‘Identity, politics and the future of 
religion in the UK’. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 
19(1): 2–22.
Weller, P. (2006) ‘Addressing religious discrimination 
and Islamophobia: Muslims and liberal democracies. 
The case of the United Kingdom’. Journal of Islamic 
Studies, 17(3): 295–325.
Williams D. (1999) ‘Race, socioeconomic status, 
and health: the added effects of racism and 
discrimination’. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, 896: 173–188.
Williams, M. and J. Tregidga (2014) ‘Hate crime 
victimisation in Wales: psychological and physical 
impacts across seven hate crime victim-types’. 
British Journal of Criminology, 54(5): 946–967.
Wind-Cowie, M., and Gregory, T. (2011) A Place for 
Pride. London: Demos.
Wittgenstein, L. (1968) Philosophical Investigations. 
G. E. M. Anscombe, trans., Oxford: Blackwell.
A 20th-anniversary report96
Wohland, P., Rees, P., Nazroo, J., and Jagger, C. 
(2015) ‘Inequalities in healthy life expectancy between 
ethnic groups in England and Wales 2001’. Ethnicity 
and Health, 20(4): 341–353
Woodhead, L. (2010) Religion of Belief: Identifying 
Issues and Priorities. Manchester: Equality and 
Human Rights Commission.
Ye’or, B (2007) Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis. 
Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
Yousif, A. (2000) ‘Islam, minorities and religious 
freedom: a challenge to modern theory of pluralism’. 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 20(1): 29–41.
Zempi, I. (2014) Uncovering Islamophobia: The 
Victimisation of Veiled Muslim Women. Leicester: 
University of Leicester.
Zempi, I., and Chakraborti, N. (2014) Islamophobia, 
Victimisation and the Veil. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Zempi, I., and Chakraborti, N. (2015) ‘“They make us 
feel like we’re a virus”: the impact of Islamophobic 
victimisation upon veiled Muslim women’. 
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy, 4(3): 44–56.
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 97
Notes on contributors
Claire Alexander is professor of sociology in 
the School of Social Sciences at the University 
of Manchester. She has researched, written and 
published on issues of race, ethnicity, youth and 
migration in Britain for over 25 years. She is author 
of The Art of Being Black (OUP, 1996), The Asian 
Gang (Berg, 2000) and (with Joya Chatterji and Annu 
Jalais) The Bengal Diaspora: Rethinking Muslim 
Migration (Routledge, 2016). A former trustee of the 
Runnymede Trust, Claire has worked closely with 
Runnymede over the past decade on several projects 
aimed at diversifying the school history curriculum 
(see www.banglastories.org, www.makinghistories.
org.uk, www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk) and on race 
equality in schools and higher education. 
Chris Allen is a lecturer in social policy and 
sociology at the University of Birmingham. For 
just under two decades he has been researching 
the phenomenon of Islamophobia and the 
problematization of Muslim communities. In addition 
to his critically acclaimed book, Islamophobia 
(Ashgate, 2010), he is widely published both in Britain 
and elsewhere. He regularly writes for non-specialist 
audiences, is a frequent commentator in the media 
and has been appointed to various consultative 
roles. He has been awarded fellowships with the 
US Department of State’s International Visiting 
Leadership Program, the Royal Society of Arts 
and the Higher Education Academy; he is also an 
alumnus of the John Adams Society. He tweets as  
@DrChrisAllen.
Imran Awan is an associate professor in criminology 
and deputy director of the Centre for Applied 
Criminology at Birmingham City University. Imran’s 
research examines the impact of Islamophobia, 
anti-Muslim hate crime and security on Muslim 
communities. His recent publications include 
examining online and offline Islamophobia. Dr Imran 
Awan was appointed as an independent member of 
the cross-government Anti-Muslim Hatred Working 
Group, based in the Department for Communities 
and Local Government, and acts as an advisor to the 
British government on issues related to anti-Muslim 
hatred. Imran’s contributions to education were 
recognized when he was nominated and shortlisted 
for the ‘Services to Education’ award at the British 
Muslim Awards (2016) and the ‘Upstanding Research 
and Innovation Award’ at the National Hate Crime 
Awards (2017). He is an advisory board member for 
the International Network of Hate Studies. His new 
book (co-authored with Irene Zempi, 2016), entitled 
Islamophobia: Lived Experiences of Online and 
Offline Victimisation, is published by Policy Press.
Laia Bécares is a lecturer in social statistics 
at the University of Manchester. Her research 
interests are in studying the determinants of ethnic 
inequalities in health, with a focus on life course 
and neighbourhood effects. She is particularly 
interested in understanding the pathways by which 
the racialization of people and places lead to social 
and health inequalities. This work has mostly focused 
on examining the association between racism and 
health, and looking at neighbourhood effects to 
examine how people, and the areas where they live, 
are racialized differently across ethnic minority groups 
(within and across countries). 
Shenaz Bunglawala is lead consultant on media 
and public discourse at the Aziz Foundation, London, 
and a director of the Byline Festival Foundation 
for inclusive journalism. She was formerly head 
of research at MEND, where she led research 
into Islamophobia in the British media, racial and 
religious equality, and the impact of counter-
terrorism legislation on British Muslims. She sat on 
the Research Excellence Framework 2014 expert 
sub-panel for theology and religious studies and has 
advised on various Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) and Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) research projects. She is a fellow 
of the Royal Society of Arts, a trustee of the Muslim 
Media Forum and a member of the Citizens UK 
Muslim Leadership Panel.
Barbara Cohen has worked for more than 30 years 
to strengthen legal rights against discrimination 
and to increase and broaden access to substantive 
equality. Between 1995 and 2002 she was head of 
legal policy at the Commission for Racial Equality and 
played a major role in the enactment of amendments 
to the Race Relations Act following the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry. Since 2002 she has worked as 
a discrimination law consultant, collaborating with 
lawyers, public authorities and NGOs in the UK, 
Europe and other jurisdictions to draft and give effect 
to anti-discrimination legislation. Barbara has served 
for many years as a trustee of the Runnymede Trust; 
she was a member of the Runnymede-led UK NGO 
delegation to the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination in 2011 and 2016. She has also 
contributed to the work of the Discrimination Law 
Association to improve the content and effectiveness 
of UK equality law. 
A 20th-anniversary report98
Farah Elahi is a research and policy analyst at 
Runnymede. Previous research has focused on 
ethnic inequality in London, employment and 
education. Recent reports include a number of 
local Race Equality Scorecards and policy briefings, 
Nations Divided: How to Teach the History of 
Partition and Ethnic Inequalities in London: Capital 
for All. Prior to joining Runnymede, Farah worked 
in research and project management for the Family 
and Childcare Trust and MEND. Farah completed 
a Masters in the Philosophy of Education at UCL 
Institute of Education, and a BA in Economics and 
Development Studies at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies.
David Feldman is director of the Pears Institute for 
the Study of Antisemitism and professor of history 
at Birkbeck, University of London. He has written 
on the history of migrants and minorities in Britain. 
His policy work includes reports written for the 
Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism and 
a role as vice chair of the Chakrabarti Inquiry into 
antisemitism and other forms of racism in the Labour 
Party. He is currently writing a history of the concept 
of antisemitism.
Anthony Heath, CBE, FBA, is director of the 
Centre for Social Investigation at Nuffield College, 
Oxford, and professor of sociology at Manchester 
University. He is a specialist in survey research and 
his research interests cover social stratification 
and mobility, ethnicity, electoral behaviour, social 
and political attitudes, national identity, and social 
cohesion. His most recent books include Unequal 
Attainments: Ethnic Educational Inequalities in 
Ten Western Countries (OUP, 2014), The Political 
Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (OUP, 2013) 
and Hard Times: The Divisive Toll of the Economic 
Slump (with Tom Clark, Yale University Press, 2014). 
He is currently a member of a team conducting field 
experiments on ethnic and religious discrimination 
in five European countries (part of the Horizon 2020 
GEMM – Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and 
Markets – project). He was also a member of the 
expert advisory panel of the Cabinet Office’s Race 
Disparity Audit.
Ajmal Hussain is research fellow in the School of 
Social Sciences at the University of Manchester. 
His research interests are in the areas of cultural 
identity among Muslim youth in postcolonial urban 
locales and the intersections with globalized religion, 
‘tradition’, consumerism, politics, resistance, and 
histories of ‘race’ and racism. He is currently leading 
the UK research on Islamist radicalization as part 
of the Dialogue About Radicalization and Equality 
(DARE) project funded under the EU Horizon 2020 
Research and Innovation programme. Ajmal has 
held visiting fellowships at LSE Cities and the Aston 
Centre for Critical Inquiry into Society and Culture.
Serena Hussain is a human geographer and 
produced the first ever comprehensive study on 
British Muslims using statistics, which was published 
as Muslims on the Map: A National Survey of Social 
Trends in Britain (I. B. Tauris, 2008). She completed 
her PhD at the University of Bristol, and went on to 
obtain an ESRC research fellowship in geography at 
the University of Leeds. She then held a postdoctoral 
fellowship at the University of Oxford, where she 
remained a visiting senior research associate in the 
School of Geography until 2013. She has acted 
as principal scientist on international migration 
and multiculturalism at Charles Darwin University 
in Australia and worked as an expert consultant 
for a number of British government departments, 
with organizations such as Ipsos MORI and the 
BBC World Service. She is currently an associate 
professor and the course director for the Masters in 
Global Diversity Governance at Coventry University.
Omar Khan is Runnymede’s director. He is also 
a governor at the University of East London and a 
2012 Clore Social Leadership Fellow. Omar’s other 
advisory positions include being chair of social 
enterprise Olmec, of the Ethnicity Strand Advisory 
Group to Understanding Society, and of the advisory 
group of the Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity at 
the University of Manchester; commissioner on the 
Financial Inclusion Commission; a member of the 
2014 REF (Research Excellence Framework); and 
the UK representative (2009–2013) on the European 
Commission’s ‘network of socio-economic experts’. 
Omar has published many articles and reports for 
Runnymede since 2000 and has spoken on topics 
including socioeconomic disadvantage, integration, 
multiculturalism and positive action, including in 
giving evidence to Parliament, at the United Nations 
in Geneva, at the European Parliament, on Capitol 
Hill in Washington DC, and in universities across the 
UK and Europe.
Kenan Malik is a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. 
An updated edition of his book From Fatwa to 
Jihad was published by Atlantic this year; it tells the 
story of ‘How the world changed from The Satanic 
Verses to Charlie Hebdo’. Previous books include 
The Quest for a Moral Compass (Atlantic, 2014), 
Multiculturalism and its Discontents (Seagull, 2012), 
Strange Fruit (Oneworld, 2008), Man, Beast and 
Zombie (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000) and The 
Meaning of Race (NYU Press, 1996). From Fatwa 
Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all 99
to Jihad was shortlisted for the 2010 George Orwell 
Prize and Strange Fruit was nominated for the 2009 
Royal Society Science Book Prize. He is a columnist 
for the International New York Times. His website is 
Pandaemonium: www.kenanmalik.wordress.com.
Nasar Meer is professor of race, identity and 
citizenship in the School of Social and Political 
Sciences at the University of Edinburgh. He is 
currently principal investigator of the Governance 
of Local Integration and the Migration of Europe’s 
Refugees (GLIMER, 2017–2020, Horizon 2020) and 
Race Equality in Scotland (2014–2020, Royal Society 
of Edinburgh). In 2016 he was awarded the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh (RSE) Thomas Reid Medal for 
Excellence in the Social Sciences, and in 2017 he 
was elected as a fellow of the Academy of Social 
Sciences (AcSS). See www.nasarmeer.com and  
@NasarMeer.
Tariq Modood is professor of sociology, politics 
and public policy, the founding director of the 
Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at 
the University of Bristol and the co-founder of the 
international journal Ethnicities. He was awarded 
an MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic 
relations in 2001, was made a fellow of the Academy 
of Social Sciences (UK) in 2004 and elected a fellow 
of the British Academy in 2017. He served on the 
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 
the National Equality Panel, and the Commission on 
Religion and Belief in British Public Life. His latest 
books include Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (second 
edition, Polity Press, 2013); and, as co-editor, 
Multiculturalism Rethought, Multiculturalism and 
Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines and The 
Problem of Religious Diversity: European Problems, 
Asian Challenges (Edinburgh University Press, 2015, 
2016 and 2017 respectively). His website is  
www.tariqmodood.com.
Asma Mustafa is the Salahuddin Abdul Jawad 
Research Fellow in the Study of Muslims in Britain at 
the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies and a senior 
research fellow at Linacre College, University of 
Oxford. Her research interests focus on Muslims 
in the west, including political participation, civic 
engagement, identities, social and economic 
integration, and transnationalism. Asma has 
published a monograph titled Identity and Political 
Participation Among Young British Muslims (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) and she will soon be releasing 
a report based on a two-year project funded by 
the British Academy on ‘Muslims in the Military: 
Broadening Diversity in the British Armed Forces’.
James Nazroo is professor of sociology and 
director of the ESRC Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity 
(CoDE) at the University of Manchester. His research 
focuses on inequalities in later life and in relation to 
race and ethnicity. His work documents the extent of 
these inequalities, how they relate to health and the 
underlying processes that drive these relationships. 
This work has covered a variety of elements of social 
disadvantage, including socioeconomic position, racial 
discrimination and harassment, and ecological effects, 
and has extended to cover the inter-relationships of 
different dimensions of inequality, how these relate to 
racialized identities and processes of racism, and how 
these patterns have changed over time.
Ed Pertwee is a PhD candidate in the Department 
of Sociology and Centre for the Study of Human 
Rights at the London School of Economics, where 
he also teaches. His main research interests are in 
the areas of political sociology, human rights, and the 
sociology of race and ethnicity. His doctoral research 
focuses on anti-sharia, anti-halal and anti-burka 
movements across Europe and North America and 
the connections between them.
Naaz Rashid is a lecturer in media and cultural 
studies at the University of Sussex. She completed 
her PhD at the London School of Economics and 
a book based on that research, Veiled Threats: 
Representing the Muslim Woman in Public Policy 
Discourses, was published by Policy Press in May 
2016. Her research looked at the way Muslim women 
were engaged with as part of the UK government’s 
Prevent programme between 2008 and 2010. 
She continues to write about representations of 
Muslim women as well as the ‘war on terror’ against 
the background of broader policy debates on 
multiculturalism, Britishness and integration. 
Robin Richardson was director of the Runnymede 
Trust from 1990 to 1996, and for several years before 
that was chief inspector for education in a London 
borough. He was the drafting editor of Islamophobia: 
A Challenge for Us All, published by Runnymede 
in 1997, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and 
Action (Trentham Books, 2004) and Young, Muslim 
and Citizen: Identity, Empowerment and Change 
(Runnymede, 2009). More recently he was co-editor 
of Pointing the Finger: Islam and Muslims in the UK 
Media (One World Publications, 2011) and Living with 
Difference: Community, Diversity and the Common 
Good (Woolf Institute, 2015).
Waqas Tufail is a senior lecturer in criminology at 
Leeds Beckett University. His research primarily 
concerns the policing, racialization and criminalization 
A 20th-anniversary report100
of marginalized and minority communities and he has 
published several peer-reviewed journal articles and 
book chapters on these topics. He is the co-author 
of a forthcoming edited collection entitled Media, 
Crime, Racism (Palgrave Macmillan). Waqas is also 
co-founder and joint convenor of the Northern Police 
Monitoring Project, a community collective that works 
with and provides a platform for local racial and 
social justice campaigns.
Irene Zempi is a lecturer in criminology, Department 
of Sociology, Nottingham Trent University. Prior to 
holding this position, Irene worked as a teaching 
fellow in the Department of Criminology at the 
University of Leicester for five years. Irene has 
published widely on issues of Islamophobia and anti-
Muslim hate crime. She is the co-author of the books 
Islamophobia: Lived Experiences of Online and 
Offline Victimisation (Policy Press, 2016, with Imran 
Awan) and Islamophobia, Victimisation and the Veil 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, with Neil Chakraborti). 
Irene is also a board member of Tell MAMA 
(Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks), Nottinghamshire 
Hate Crime Steering Group and Leicestershire Police 
Hate Crime Scrutiny Panel. As a practitioner, Irene 
has extensive experience working with victims of hate 
crime, domestic violence, volume crime and anti-
social behaviour at Victim Support in Leicester.
20th-Anniversary Report
This report marks the 20th-year anniversary 
of Runnymede’s 1997 report Islamophobia: 
A Challenge for Us All. Part I represents 
Runnymede’s position, including 10 
recommendations to address Islamophobia, 
Part II outlines the evidence on Islamophobia 
in various social domains, and Part III includes 
differing perspectives on how to understand 
Islamophobia.
About the Editors
Farah Elahi is research and policy analyst 
at the Runnymede Trust. Previous research 
has focused on ethnic inequality in London, 
employment and education. Recent reports 
include local Race Equality Scorecards, 
Nations Divided and Ethnic Inequalities in 
London: Capital for All.
Omar Khan is Runnymede’s director. His 
advisory positions include being chair of 
the Ethnicity Strand Advisory Group to 
Understanding Society, chair of Olmec, a 
governor at the University of East London, and 
a commissioner on the Financial Inclusion 
Commission.
Runnymede 
St Clement’s Building,  
London School of Economics,  
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
T 020 7377 9222 
E info@runnymedetrust.org
Registered in England 3409935 
Registered Charity 1063609
www.runnymedetrust.org
